Defence commentators say this was likely built by the UAE, which was part of the Saudi-led coalition against the Houthis until 2020, but that it could be used by the Israeli air force. A port and helipad have also been built. Although the likely purpose is to support military operations in Yemen, it is unclear whether Israel will use these facilities once they are fully operational.
Other unverified reports suggest that Israel may have a covert presence on Eritrea's Dahlak Archipelago in the Red Sea, including a signals intelligence outpost and a naval surveillance facility to monitor maritime traffic through the Bab-el-Mandeb, which would help Israel track Iranian and Houthi movements in the region.
Israel has other options, albeit with challenges. Sudan is also in the Horn of Africa, and an interim government agreed to normalise relations with Israel in 2020, but the country has since descended into civil war, with Iran reportedly supplying weapons to one of the two belligerents (army leader Abdel Fattah al-Burhan). The army is fighting the Rapid Support Forces, a paramilitary group seen as close to the UAE.
Like Russia, Iran may be supplying weapons to the army because it wants to build a military base on Sudan's coast, giving it an important warm-water port on the Red Sea. That is also on landlocked Ethiopia's wish list, with Addis Ababa recently offering official diplomatic recognition in return for a port at Berbera on Somaliland's coast.
Global trade gateway
The Bab-el-Mandeb Strait is a narrow 12km stretch of water located between Yemen and the Arabian Peninsula on one side, and Eritrea and Djibouti in the Horn of Africa on the other. As such, it is among the world's most critical maritime chokepoints, with a substantial portion of global trade transiting. It is also the gateway to the Suez Canal.
Read more: Why Ethiopia's Red Sea ambitions unnerve Egypt
The potential establishment of an Israeli military base near the Strait (such as in Somaliland) carries far-reaching geopolitical implications. On the one hand, it could significantly enhance maritime security in the Red Sea, which is frequently beset by piracy and insurgent activity. On the other hand, giving Israel a base at the entrance to the Red Sea would alter the regional balance of power, extend the Abraham Accords alliance, and project Israeli military influence into the Indian Ocean.
Iran and its regional proxies, especially the Houthis, would almost certainly see such a move as a direct threat, potentially triggering an escalation, but Egypt—which relies on Suez Canal transit fees—also maintains an interest. Some Egyptian analysts see an Israeli base in Somaliland as a threat to Red Sea security and Egypt's southern border.
Across Africa, there are concerns that Israeli recognition of Somaliland could encourage other separatist movements. According to sources, construction is advancing under the oversight of local partners to accommodate specific Israeli operational needs, with an Israeli-manufactured early-warning radar system reportedly deployed, although this has not been verified. Analysts say this could alert Israel to any attacks emanating from Yemen.
Israel has deployed naval units to the Red Sea to strike Houthi targets in Yemen, most recently on 10 June, when two piers in the port city of Hodeidah were attacked. Israel claims that Hodeidah is used by Houthi rebels to transport weapons, threatening a naval blockade unless the Houthis cease their attacks on Israel. The Israeli missiles were launched from hundreds of kilometres away by Israeli Navy Sa'ar 6-class corvettes. These ships have a range of 7,400km.
The Houthis have been attacking Israel and Western shipping since Israel began its war against Gaza in October 2023. They launched drones and missiles towards Israeli territory, including the Red Sea coastal city of Eilat. On 27 October 2023, a Houthi drone reached Eilat and detonated, catching Israel's military leadership off guard.
