In a new Middle East, Tehran now speaks a new language

Iran’s negotiating position has changed significantly since the Obama-era nuclear talks. Pushed to relinquish its capabilities by Donald Trump, Tehran finds it has far less leverage than in 2015.

In a new Middle East, Tehran now speaks a new language

The ongoing US–Iran nuclear negotiations have become a diplomatic laboratory, where genuine proposals and tactical feints intermingle, testing not only negotiating partners but also external observers.

A case in point is Washington’s recent demand that Iran cease all uranium enrichment and instead rely on imported enriched uranium, an arrangement typical of nations operating civilian nuclear reactors.

Some interpreted this as a nod to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who does not want American talking to the Iranians, and who was reportedly angered by a US agreement with Yemen’s Houthis to halt attacks on shipping in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden—an understanding reached without his prior consultation.

To offset Netanyahu’s frustration, American officials want to look tough on Iranian enrichment, but in reality there may be more flexibility. Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei appeared to go along with this carefully choreographed display, expressing public pessimism about the likelihood of reaching a resolution.

The right to enrich

For years, Iran has insisted on its right to maintain the “full nuclear fuel cycle,” which begins with the extraction of raw uranium and extends through enrichment for peaceful uses, including energy generation, medical research, and agriculture. But this leaves Tehran with the option of enriching uranium to a level needed for nuclear weapons.

To offset Netanyahu's frustration, American officials want to look tough on Iranian enrichment, but in reality there may be more flexibility

Iran has used this ambiguity to strategic effect. It has repeatedly announced its achievement of 60% enrichment, far beyond the 5% needed for civilian reactors like the one in Bushehr. These announcements serve as deliberate reminders that Iran could step over the nuclear threshold if it wanted to.

Once little more than abandoned concrete shells left behind in Bushehr by the German company Siemens after the fall of the Shah, Iran's nuclear programme has evolved and expanded over the years into a vast infrastructure of nuclear facilities. It has become a matter of national pride, a rare point of consensus in a divided political landscape.

Points of difference

Constructed at immense cost, it has survived Israeli and US sabotage campaigns, including the targeted assassination of key scientists and some of the most punishing sanctions in modern history. To many Iranians, it represents not only a scientific achievement but also a symbol of sovereignty, resilience, and sacrifice.

Today, Iranian officials remain adamant that the nuclear program will not be dismantled. Yet for the first time, it appears that its technical specifics and components are being laid bare on the negotiating table.

This marks a stark departure from the era of former US President Barack Obama, when Iran held a far stronger hand in nuclear negotiations, leveraging its regional influence to shape what ultimately became the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, a deal later scrapped by Trump in 2018.

Less cards to play

Amidst a dramatically reconfigured regional order, Iran's negotiating position is today much weaker, since it is no longer able to call on allies and proxies in Gaza, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen, either because they are no longer there, or because they have been significantly weakened.

For the first time, it appears that Iran's nuclear programme's technical specifics and components are being laid bare on the negotiating table

Gone are Hezbollah's missile threats, the Assad regime's logistical support, and the veil of deniability once provided by Iraqi militias or Houthi provocations. Gone are the days when Iran could orchestrate Houthi strikes on Gulf states or have Hezbollah threaten incursions into Galilee. Hezbollah is not the force it was, while the Houthis have agreed their truce with Trump, having been bombed for six weeks straight.

This new reality helps explain Tehran's recent, almost fantastical overtures, from discussing $4tn in US investments to proposing US-supervised "peaceful" nuclear reactors. Even its carefully phrased declarations about nuclear capability—claiming that it can build a bomb at will but chooses not to—reflect a striking rhetorical shift.

This would have been unthinkable only a few years ago. That it is being heard today speaks volumes about Iran's recognition of the region's new geopolitical landscape and its own sharply reduced room for manoeuvre.

font change