“Shopping Lists”: from Greenland to Yemen

US statements on Russia and China’s use of northern sea routes rehash old questions about the right to territorial expansion

“Shopping Lists”: from Greenland to Yemen

Officials in President Donald Trump’s administration step before television cameras and speak as though reading from a shopping list: Cuba is bad. Mexico’s president is good, but drug cartels run the country. Colombia’s president should watch himself (the actual phrasing was less polite). Greenland must come under American sovereignty, and Denmark has no legitimate claim to it. The European Union is an “adversary”, “created to harm the United States”. We will crush Iran. We will destroy Hamas. Lebanon is a failed state—followed by much more in the same register.

Alongside this catalogue sits another: leaders who have earned Trump’s admiration, among them Russia’s Vladimir Putin and North Korea’s Kim Jong Un—who appears on the roster of favoured figures, disappears from it, then reappears, with no coherent explanation—along with others who receive no appreciation at all.

If one can interpret the praise Trump and his officials extend to certain presidents through the prism of the personal value he assigns to rulers of large and small states alike, the “shopping list” itself is harder to parse. None of the countries named is suffering a power vacuum, whatever the nature of its political or economic system, or its record in protecting—or violating—citizens’ rights. Such questions appear to weigh little in Washington. What matters is the pursuit of geopolitical objectives and immediate American interests.

That is, at least, what one might infer from leaving Nicolás Maduro’s regime intact—apart from arresting him and his wife and transporting them to New York. No information has emerged about dismantling the drug-export networks invoked as the pretext for the 3 January attack on Caracas, nor about reviving the political process that stalled in 2017 after Maduro sabotaged elections and voided their outcome. “The United States will run Venezuela,” Trump said—an assertion so opaque that even American commentators sympathetic to the president struggle to explain what it means.

Many actors harbour ambitions to redraw internationally recognised borders

Meanwhile, Hungary's Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has suggested that the Greenland issue is "simple" because it lies between two NATO countries: Denmark and the United States. This overlooks the Trump administration's own view of the alliance as little more than a financial burden on Washington. It also ignores a more basic reality: the United States regards the vast Arctic island through the lens of national security and economic opportunity. Shared NATO membership should, in principle, pre-empt such disputes; the alliance exists to defend all its members, including the United States.

On another front, American statements on Russia and China's use of northern sea routes—especially as the Arctic ice sheet melts and opens passages closer to US shores—revive an old question: who has the right to territorial expansion at the expense of other states in the name of "national security" or "vital space"? This is one of the most consequential dilemmas in international politics. It has fuelled wars and conflicts across centuries, and has repeatedly served as a pretext for ethnic cleansing, occupation, and exploitation.

Expansion ambitions

It is no secret that violating long-standing norms and international laws prohibiting the annexation of territory by force, a principle the United Nations has sought to entrench as a cornerstone of international relations since the Second World War, exerts a powerful allure around the globe. Many actors harbour ambitions to redraw internationally recognised borders and to embark on a perpetual process of territorial revision.

It is increasingly plausible that our region will develop a "shopping list" of its own

Other major poles

This necessitates consideration of the positions of the other two major poles in the much-vaunted "multipolar world": China and Russia. Both condemned the arrest of Venezuela's president by American forces. Yet each carries its own fraught record of expansion, annexation, and the use—or threat—of force in international politics.

There is the Russian–Ukrainian war, through which Moscow seeks to seize roughly 20% of Ukraine's territory, while Trump refused to send additional weapons to Kyiv absent an arrangement granting Washington major advantages in exploiting Ukraine's mineral wealth. There is, too, Beijing's insistence on "reclaiming" Taiwan by whatever means it deems available. For these reasons, neither Russia nor China appears inclined to escalate over Venezuela.

With indications mounting of a large-scale Israeli military action against Iran, sustained pressure on Lebanon over Hezbollah's disarmament, and support for non-state actors in Yemen and Sudan, it is increasingly plausible that our region will develop a "shopping list" of its own. Those who compile it will share with the American administration a similar reading of international law, of sovereignty and territorial integrity, and of peace as a supreme value—at least in theory.

*This is a direct translation of the Arabic version*

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