Libya’s national crisis—steadily deteriorating since the end of the 2020 civil war—recently slipped once again to new depths of division, danger, and depravity as war briefly returned to its capital. But while everyone remained shocked by the brief explosion of violence, the bigger war waged on.
If the UN doesn’t step in to take control of Libya’s political transition from these warring parties, then we should be assured that Libya’s politics will turn violent again soon, and we should be worried about what that means for regional stability—from the Mediterranean to the Sahel. But in an environment where every UN move is met with escalation from Libya’s conflicting parties, they will need broader international support to have any stabilising effect.
As the old cliché reminds us, war is simply politics by other means, and few cases illustrate this truism as clearly as Libya. For years now, a showdown for absolute power between Libya's two de facto rulers has been in play. The Dbeibeh family, who run the civilian Government of National Unity from the capital Tripoli, and the Haftar family, who run the rival government from Libya’s eastern capital Benghazi.
Sure, there are other bit-part players and other influences on Libya’s tragedy over the past five years. But this central driver and its associated dangers have often been misinterpreted as a helpful vehicle for neo-colonialism by outside actors who see considerable profit through exploiting the lawlessness and division. Or, patronisingly underappreciated as a status quo that is “Libya good enough”, which can eventually be resolved by some good old-fashioned mediation over dividing Libya’s wealth.
Stark reminder
But the suddenness of the recent violence and its remarkable potential for rapid and exponential escalation should serve as a reminder of why those misreadings are so dangerous, especially as diplomats slip back into familiar roles and violent skirmishes are replaced by political games.
In short, the violence began as Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh, who has been losing influence and—perhaps more crucially—control over Libya’s finances for over a year now, feared that his enemies would move to replace him as prime minister and so sought to consolidate power in Tripoli. This meant displacing militias he had once relied upon to secure his government, and who had extorted him in the process to massively increase their own wealth and power. Now, he feared they could act as a fifth column to replace him with a rival who would essentially be appointed by Haftar.
So, relying upon the Turkish-trained and equipped 444th battalion of the Ministry of Defence, and units from his home city of Misrata, he put on his Michael Corleone hat. (reference to The Godfather movie) Abdulghani al-Kikli (known as Ghneiwa)—Tripoli’s most prominent militia leader—was invited to a meeting only to be summarily executed. In the aftermath, the 444 quickly moved to secure Ghneiwa’s former bases.
