US-Iran talks steam ahead

Both sides are committed to getting a deal, but will outsiders be able to derail them?

This picture shows a magazine front page at a kiosk in Tehran on April 19, 2025, featuring the Iran-US talks on the Iranian nuclear programme.
ATTA KENARE/ AFP
This picture shows a magazine front page at a kiosk in Tehran on April 19, 2025, featuring the Iran-US talks on the Iranian nuclear programme.

US-Iran talks steam ahead

The ongoing talks between Iran and the United States are steaming ahead with the latest round held on 26 April in Muscat. The first two rounds couldn't have gone better, with both sides expressing optimism and hope for progress.

In the space of a few weeks, the negotiating climate between Iran and the US has been transformed. Both sides are clearly interested in a deal, even more than they were during the Obama administration, when talks held between 2013-15 led to the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) deal.

For the US, a deal will ensure Iran won’t get nuclear weapons and will "behave" better regionally. For Iran, the lifting of even some of the sanctions on the country’s economy could be life-saving.

But if these dynamics were also at work in 2013-15, things are now much more urgent. Iran’s nuclear programme has advanced so much that Tehran is now considered a nuclear threshold state. If the talks fail, the alternative won’t be just more economic pressure on Iran, but military attacks by Israel and the United States.

This explains the strong motivations in both Washington and Tehran for a deal. But there are many stakeholders, both in these capitals and beyond, who might worry about the final shape of a deal or outright prefer military attacks. They’ve been raising their voice against the talks, but compared to the 2013-15 period, the main stakeholders are much favourable to a deal.

Let’s start with the politics of both countries. In Iran, the hardliners who have traditionally sought to halt any progress in Iran-US talks now find themselves politically hampered. President Masud Pezeshkian belongs to the reformist camp, while the speaker of the parliament, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, is a conservative who is close to the president on foreign policy issues. He is no friend of the hardliners.

Reuters
Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and President Masoud Pezeshkian during a meeting in Tehran on March 8, 2025.

Balancing interests

For his part, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei still holds most of the power, but he has learnt that he must balance out between different interests in the regime and society and has allowed the talks to go ahead. In an incredible speech on 24 April, on the anniversary of the passing of a Shiite Imam, Khamenei gave a long account of Shiite history, explaining why Shiite imams often had to resort to peace with adversaries and patience.

Even major hardliners, like Saeed Jalili, a former chief nuclear negotiator who lost the presidential elections last year, have been rather muted in their criticism of the Iranian negotiators. After a few months' absence, Jalili recently resumed his weekly speeches, but most of his comments on talks with the US remained limited to critiquing the 2015 deal, rather than the current talks. Jalili’s supporters had claimed that a major official of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) would attend the talks, but he was a no-show.

Iran’s state TV is perhaps the most important institution controlled by hardliners, including a brother of Jalili who serves as its deputy head. The state TV has come under massive domestic criticism in recent days. First, it aired comedy programmes criticising Saudi officials, which was seen as harmful to the recent improvement in Tehran-Riyadh ties, seen as critical to any eventual success in Iranian-US talks. Then, in a family programme, it featured a guest who said inappropriate words about Abu Bakr, the first Muslim caliph and a holy name amongst the Sunnis.

This was a clear provocation against millions of Iranian Sunnis and people of regional Arab countries who are mostly Sunni-majority. The head of the state TV, Peyman Jebeli, apologised, and several officials in the broadcaster have been fired, and some are being prosecuted. The hardliners are learning the limit of their power the hard way.

Any opposition to the talks is also hindered by the fact that they clearly serve the Iranian economy. The mere existence of positive news coming out of the negotiations has rallied the Iranian rial, raising its value vis-à-vis the US dollar by more than 20%. Lifting of the sanctions won’t cause an overnight miracle for Iran’s beleaguered economy, but it could lead to significant advances.

It would be crucial in the medium and long term, a leadership member of Iran’s Chamber of Commerce recently said in an interview. At the very least, he said, it would reduce transaction costs and lead to a modest but significant increase in Iranian commodity exports, such as carpets, and the importation of necessary Western goods, like technology.

The more the talks progress, the more thorny the details will become

Telling appointment

On the US side, there are differences inside the Trump camp, but the president strongly supports negotiations. The proponents of the talks might have scored a win with the appointment of Michael Anton as head of the US technical team, which will conduct talks with Iranian counterparts ahead of the political talks.

Anton is not a career diplomat but a conservative thinker and essayist who heads the in-house think tank of the State Department. He belongs to a wing of the Trump camp that is sceptical of US warfare in the Middle East. He is also close to Trump and was likely chosen for his loyalty to the president.

On the regional level, Israel remains sceptical of the US-Iran talks. But while Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu led a loud campaign against the Obama administration during the 2013-2015 talks, he can hardly criticise Trump, whom he has long regarded as a close ally.

More importantly, Saudi Arabia and other members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) now support the talks, unlike the case in the lead up to 2015. In fact, a recent trip by Saudi defence minister, Prince Khalid bin Salman, at the head of a large security delegation to Tehran showed that a new era is upon Tehran-Riyadh relations.

Khamenei himself has a long history of insulting the Saudi royal family. But his aggressive brand of ideological Islamism has proven bankrupt and with little support in Iran, either at the societal or even establishment levels. Iran's military and security elites have seemingly found out that they must find a way of working with Saudis and other regional powers, instead of constant provocations against them. All this bodes well for the future of the talks with the US as well. A calmer region, which can focus on economic development, will be in the interest of all parties.

In between his talks with Witkoff, Araghchi has been busy talking to other stakeholders too. He has been to Russia and China, meeting with his counterparts. Speaking from Beijing on 23 April, he said Iran and China had "a very good understanding" about the talks with the US. Pezeshkian is supposed to visit China twice this year, in a bilateral visit with his Chinese counterpart, Xi Jinping, and also for the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit in September.

Tatyana MAKEYEVA / AFP
Russia's Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov (R) shakes hands with Iran's Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi (L) during a joint press conference following their talks in Moscow on April 18, 2025.

On 24 April, Iranian foreign minister Abbas Araghchi also made a gesture to the UK, France and Germany. He called for a new page in Iranian-European relations and offered to visit London, Paris and Berlin. Anton has also been meeting with the Europeans, and they are likely to collaborate with the US on this issue, despite major disagreements on other matters, such as Ukraine.

Thorny issues ahead

The Iran-US talks are thus steaming ahead. What will put them to a serious test are the substantive issues likely to come up in technical and political discussions. The more the talks progress, the more thorny the details will become.

One potential sticking point is this: Will Iran be allowed to enrich uranium on its own soil, if put under the 3.67%  limit that was also part of the 2015 deal? The US officials have expressed conflicting positions on this issue. US's top diplomat, Marco Rubio, recently suggested that even if Iran wanted to have a civilian nuclear programme, it had no reason to enrich on its own soil and it could simply buy enriched uranium from elsewhere.

This goes against Iran's insistence on keeping its enrichment apparatus on its own soil. Tehran has usually considered this a red line.  On 19 April, Ali Shamkhani, a leading military official now in charge of the nuclear file, outlined nine principles that Iran would follow in the talks.

One was "rejection of the Libya/UAE model," which refers to two different cases: Libya's former leader, Muammar Gaddafi, gave up his entire nuclear programme in exchange for an agreement with the West, while the UAE's nuclear programme is based on importing enriched uranium from Europe. Will the US be able to twist Iran's arms for them to accept such a deal, or perhaps one that maintains some enrichment but also includes elements of the Emirati model, like importation of uranium?

These questions will be asked in Muscat, Rome, and wherever else the talks might head next.

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