Iran and the Houthis: complex ties and a history of deception

Like many across the region, Yemenis initially welcomed the 1979 revolution and the emergence of the Islamic Republic of Iran, but they soon grew wary when Iran began exporting its interpretation of Islam to Sunni-majority Arab countries. 

When war erupted between Iran and Saddam Hussein's Iraq, Yemen sent a special military unit to Iraq in defence of the "eastern gate of the Arab nation". Although largely symbolic, the gesture was not lost on Iran's rulers. 

The nadir came when Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh joined Saddam Hussein to perform Friday prayers in the Qasr-e Shirin district of northwestern Iran shortly after Iraqi forces entered the area in late September 1980. In response, Tehran summoned the Yemeni ambassador, angry that Saleh had visited what it saw as "occupied territory."

To repair the deep rupture in relations, Saleh travelled to the Iranian capital on 17 April 2000, where he met Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and President Mohammad Khatami. Upon his return, he declared that "our ties with our Iranian brothers have returned to normal," as he phrased it. This assessment would later prove far from accurate.

Behind the smiles

During an unrecorded ten-minute conversation in Sana'a on 15 May 2003, Khatami spoke in eloquent Arabic (reminiscent of classical Arab literary style), stressing what he described as the "deep-rooted" Persian presence in the histories of Yemen, Oman, the UAE, Bahrain, and the wider region—a legacy he insisted could not be denied, citing names, historical facts, and events that were difficult to dismiss. 

Despite the cordial language and handshakes, however, Iran's subsequent conduct showed that its intentions towards Yemen were not conciliatory, as it began quietly penetrating the country under the guise of charitable initiatives. Gradually, and without telling Saleh (who was killed in 2017), Tehran began gently courting the Houthi movement in Saada, northern Yemen, strategically guiding and shaping the group into a Yemeni version of Lebanon's Hezbollah.

At first, residents of Saada—particularly followers of the Zaydi sect (a branch of Shiite Islam)—were invited to Iran and then to Hezbollah's base in southern Beirut. Soon, efforts were being made to convert the Houthis from a religious group into an armed faction. Light and medium weapons were smuggled in, and cash injections let the group buy other arms from local dealers.

In 2004, the Houthis first clashed with the Saleh regime, which arrested hundreds. Fighting in June and July ended with the death of the group's founder, Hussein Badreddin al-Houthi (who was buried in Sana'a Prison), and the arrest of several young leaders, which only heightened tensions in the region.

Subsequent rounds of conflict followed, and the Houthis emerged stronger after each, led by the founder's younger brother, Abdul-Malik al-Houthi. Another brother, Yahya Badreddin al-Houthi, sought political asylum in Germany, from where he became a key conduit between Iran and the group and leveraged his presence in Europe to voice Houthi grievances in the international media.

Sitting tight in Sana'a

A year after the 2012 uprising that ousted Saleh, official delegations and local mediators travelled to Saada to try to persuade the Houthis to join the National Dialogue Conference, held under the auspices of the United Nations. 

This conference recognised the "Saada grievance", and on 5 June 2013, the remains of the group's founder were returned to his family. Thousands attended his funeral, and a grand mausoleum resembling the shrines of Shiite imams in Iran was erected. Yet the Houthis were in no mood to concede and swiftly seized control of the capital, leading to war in March 2015.  

Every time United Nations envoys travelled to Tehran to persuade the Iranians to encourage the Houthis to enter into dialogue and pursue a political solution, they were met with a familiar refrain: "If you believe we hold sway over their decision, then your efforts are misdirected."

Hopes of a negotiated peace in Yemen were renewed in 2013 when Saudi Arabia and Iran agreed to a thaw in their hostilities after Chinese mediation. Riyadh also hosted a Houthi delegation in September 2023, when the group met Saudi Defence Minister Prince Khalid bin Salman. "Saudi Arabia is committed to reaching a comprehensive and lasting political solution in Yemen," he told the Houthi delegates.

Saudi Arabia sent its ambassador to Yemen, Mohammed Al Jaber, to hold talks with Houthi leaders in Sana'a, but despite a visit spanning several days, the Houthis' position remained unchanged. Analysts concluded that Tehran was the reason why the Houthis decided against moving from a temporary ceasefire to a meaningful political settlement.

Last man standing

Few believe that Iran will scale back its interference in Yemen—particularly after the past year, during which its influence in Syria and Lebanon has waned hugely. The Houthis are one of the only Iranian-allied forces still capable of influencing the regional agenda, and its attacks on Israel and Western shipping in support of Gaza have won it fans across the Arab world. 

On 15 March, US president Donald Trump ordered American military attacks on Houthi positions, with strikes conducted over several days. He ultimately wants Tehran to disband its nuclear programme and is targeting the Houthis to force Iran's hand (and to encourage an end to attacks on American shipping through the Red Sea).

For Iran, the Houthis are well-placed and willing to stand up to Washington, so it is happy for them to do so. This risks Yemen becoming a pawn in the broader geopolitical struggle between the US and Iran. Tehran sees Sana'a as a potential "fourth capital" aligned with its interests, with Yemen's strategic location the missing link in its plan to tighten its grip over critical waterways.

But as is typical with conflicts across the region, it is the Yemeni people pay the price of geopolitical power struggles.