Tehran would be wise not to bank on Moscow coming to its defence
Evgenia Novozhenina / AFP
Russian President Vladimir Putin and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian sign a strategic partnership treaty during a ceremony following their talks at the Kremlin in Moscow on January 17, 2025.
Iran and Russia have significantly deepened their strategic ties in recent years, moving beyond a relationship based on convenience to one of direct military and economic cooperation.
One of the most notable manifestations of this budding alliance has been Iran's provision of military hardware to Russia for use in its ongoing war in Ukraine. Iranian-made Shahed drones have played a critical role in Russian attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure, helping Moscow sustain its military campaign despite international sanctions and Western military aid to Kyiv. Tehran’s willingness to supply weapons to Russia has not only strengthened their defence partnership but also elevated Iran's global standing as a military supplier, showcasing its drone technology on the battlefield.
Beyond military assistance, Russia and Iran have also expanded their economic ties in response to Western-imposed sanctions. The two nations have been exploring ways to bypass the dollar-dominated global financial system, utilising alternative payment methods and barter trade to sustain their economies. Moscow has also increased its investments in Iran's energy sector, helping it develop its oil and gas infrastructure.
All this underscores an emerging interdependence between the two countries as they seek to counterbalance Western economic and military pressures. Yet, despite these growing ties, the question remains: is Russia able or willing to come to Iran's defence if it is attacked?
While Russia may continue its strategic cooperation with Iran, this doesn't guarantee Iran's security
Cemented partnership
On 17 January 2025, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian signed a 20-year comprehensive strategic partnership treaty in Moscow. This agreement marked a significant milestone in Russia-Iran relations, solidifying their cooperation across various sectors, including defence, energy, and trade.
The treaty includes provisions for deeper military coordination, intelligence sharing, and joint defence initiatives. Russian and Iranian officials have emphasised that this pact strengthens their commitment to mutual security, with Iran seeking greater guarantees from Moscow against potential threats from the United States and Israel.
Beyond military aspects, the treaty lays the groundwork for long-term economic collaboration. Russia has pledged to invest in Iran's oil and gas sector, while Tehran has agreed to expand its role in supplying military equipment to Russia.
Additionally, the two countries have committed to joint nuclear energy projects, with Russia assisting in the construction of Iranian nuclear power plants. However, despite the grand rhetoric surrounding the treaty, the reality remains that much of Russia's support for Iran is based on strategic interests rather than a deep-seated commitment to Iranian security. The pact enhances diplomatic ties, but whether Russia would intervene militarily if Iran were attacked remains in doubt.
Russian President Vladimir Putin and his Iranian counterpart Masoud Pezeshkian after signing the association treaty in the Kremlin on January 17, 2025.
Iran's outreach to Russia has been driven by a pressing need to demonstrate that it has the backing of a global power, especially amid escalating tensions in the Middle East. Additionally, Trump's re-election in November 2024 sent shockwaves through Iran's political leadership, which remembers his previous administration's policy of "maximum pressure", including harsh economic sanctions and the assassination of top Iranian general Qasem Soleimani.
Given this history, Iranian officials anticipate renewed US economic and military pressure, which could possibly include allowing Israel to launch preemptive strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities. It comes at a time when Iran's geopolitical position has been further weakened by the fall of its strongest regional ally, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. For years, the Assad regime served as a key conduit for Iranian influence in the Levant, allowing Tehran to supply arms and logistical support to Hezbollah and other allied militias.
The fall of his regime in late 2024 dealt Iran a strategic blow. With fewer regional allies to rely on, Iran looks to project strength to deter potential adversaries. Here, its alliance with Russia becomes all the more critical. But will Moscow be able to protect Iran, or is their strategic partnership more symbolic than substantive?
Several factors raise doubts about Moscow's ability—or willingness—to come to Iran's defence if it faces a direct military threat from Israel or the United States. A quick search of past examples comes up dry: Russia hasn't taken concrete military actions to shield Iran from external aggression before.
A handout image grab made available by the Iranian state TV, the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB), shows what the TV said was a live picture of the city of Isfahan early on April 19, 2024, after Israeli air strikes.
When Israel struck Iranian military sites in Iran last year, Russia remained largely passive. It did not intervene directly, opting instead to maintain a delicate balancing act between its relations with both Israel and Iran. Given this history, it remains doubtful Moscow would step in militarily if Israel were to attack Iran again.
Also, Russia has much bigger fish to fry with its ongoing war in Ukraine, which has severely strained its military resources, and it would much rather not get bogged down in another military conflict. It couldn't even prevent the Assad regime—a longtime ally—from being toppled in December 2024.
One of the most telling examples of Russia's limitations as an ally can be seen in the downfall of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. Despite Russian military intervention in Syria since 2015, Moscow was ultimately unable to prevent Assad's regime from collapsing under pressure from rebel forces and external actors.
Although it provided air support, military advisors, and diplomatic backing, these efforts fell flat in the face of sustained opposition. Al-Assad's ouster serves as a stark reminder that Russia's military power has limits, especially when facing determined adversaries.
If Moscow was unable to secure the survival of its Syrian ally despite years of direct involvement, there is little reason to believe that it would fare any better in protecting Iran from a potential Israeli or US military operation.
While Russia may continue its strategic cooperation with Iran and offer it diplomatic backing at the UN, this doesn't guarantee Iran's security. Israeli and US military planners are well aware of these limitations, which is why Russia doesn't really factor into their calculations over a potential strike against Iran's nuclear facilities.
In summary, although Russia and Iran have showcased their alliance through military cooperation and diplomatic agreements, the reality is that Moscow's support remains largely symbolic. Its primary interests lie in maintaining its own global position rather than engaging in direct military confrontations over Iran.
Moscow understands the risks of confronting the United States and Israel directly. And while Russia benefits from its partnership with Iran by securing military supplies, economic agreements, and geopolitical leverage, these interests do not necessarily translate into a willingness to shield it militarily, so Iran should be careful not to bank on it.
