2025 could be a defining year for the West Bank

An emboldened settler movement drunk on the prospect of Trump recognising Israel's control there and an increasingly weakened Palestinian Authority make for a dangerous combination

A woman walks past the wreckage of a car on a street in the occupied West Bank city of Jenin.
Jaafar ASHTIYEH / AFP
A woman walks past the wreckage of a car on a street in the occupied West Bank city of Jenin.

2025 could be a defining year for the West Bank

The year 2025 promises to be dangerous for the West Bank, where the aftermath of Israel's war on Gaza forced a weakened Palestinian Authority out of its slumber, and the Israeli settler movement, drunk on the prospect of annexing the occupied West Bank, make for a particularly explosive combination.

This piles upon existing trends that predate October 7, 2023. Since around 2022, the West Bank has been on a path to what some have called “Gazification” due to a spike in violence between Israel and armed factions that have taken hold of parts of the northern West Bank. Israel has increasingly used tactics seen in Gaza, including relying on air power and carrying out ground raids using special forces and bulldozers to “clear” Palestinian cities of what it calls terrorist infrastructure.

The destructive whack-a-mole game has been playing out in Jenin even before the Gaza war, with its refugee camp being the target of several Israeli security operations—and even a PA one—forcing displacement and creating a vicious cycle that may be difficult to stop.

At the same time, settler violence has been on the rise, with the most radical part of the settler movement seeing October 7 as an opportunity to lash out, knowing that the world’s focus on Gaza, resentment towards Palestinians in Israel was rising, and the presence of settler figures within the government, would water down any semblance of a response.

The settler movement has grown so emboldened as even to attack Israeli soldiers and figures the (few) times Israeli troops stepped in to intervene. Most recently, just as a ceasefire was reached in Gaza, Israel launched another major security operation dubbed “Iron Wall”. The operation was initially focused on the Jenin camp but has since expanded to other nearby towns.

REUTERS/Mohammed Torokman
In an unprecedented attack, Israeli forces carry out several simultaneous explosions in the Jenin refugee camp in the occupied West Bank, destroying at least 20 houses on February 2, 2025.

Read more: With Gaza on backburner, Israel turns its military might on Jenin

This is, in part, a response to the strengthening of armed Palestinian groups who have been able to operate freely in several areas of the Northern West Bank. Refugee camps in Jenin, Nablus, Jericho, and Tulkarm have increasingly fallen outside of the control of the Palestinian Authority. This isn’t new; signs of a slow decline were already there nearly a decade ago. But those trends have now matured, and a myriad of groups—some under the flag of prominent factions like Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad but others operating independently—are now able to carry out more sophisticated attacks.

Perhaps more worryingly, the Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades—a group that has ties to Fatah (the party in control of the Palestinian Authority) and even former members of the Palestinian security forces—have increasingly been involved in attacks, showing a complete loss of control by the Palestinian Authority over groups it should be able to control, further compounding the existing risks.

Not one to miss a strategic opportunity, Iran has jumped to action with the hope of opening a new front against Israel. It has provided these groups with weapons and funds to wage a low-grade insurgency. Through smuggling routes used by drug traffickers, Iran has attempted to deliver weaponry, including anti-personnel mines, more powerful explosives and a slew of assault and handguns to the West Bank.

With much of the attention focused on Gaza, this enduring multi-pronged crisis provides fertile ground for dramatic changes, including by actors whose dream is to break the status quo.

Piecemeal annexation

One of the first Israeli officials to congratulate President Donald Trump was Israel’s far-right Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich. This is not coincidental: The far-right religious settler movement Smotrich represents has been waiting for Trump with almost as much fervour as they wait for the Messiah. In 2020, Smotrich was already one of the leading figures pushing Netanyahu to implement a grand plan to annexe the West Bank, but the Abraham Accords thwarted his efforts at the time.

As the saying goes, not everyone gets a second chance. Smotrich is very well aware of this. The far-right leader views Trump’s return as a golden opportunity to make sure annexation does go through this time. In a post on social media just days after Trump’s election, Smotrich pledged that 2025 would be the “year of Israeli sovereignty over Judea and Samaria”, referring to the West Bank by its Biblical name.

At a meeting of Smotrich’s Religious Zionism party, the Israeli Finance Minister later made it even clearer: "Trump's victory also brings with it an important opportunity for the State of Israel. We were a step away from applying sovereignty to the settlements in Judea and Samaria, and now the time has come to do it”.

In other words, Smotrich missed his chance in 2020, at a time when he was seated outside of the government, and he does not intend to miss it now that he sits so prominently inside the corridors of power in Israel.

Smotrich knows that, despite Trump’s entry at the White House and Netanyahu’s purported support for annexation, securing actual backing both in Israel and in the US won’t be easy. He knows that if he overplays his hand and pushes for annexation of the whole West Bank, this would likely prompt a push-back.

As a more savvy political operator, he understands that Trump and Netanyahu may well try to go for a replay of 2020, using the threat of annexation to advance normalisation. And even if he had the full backing of the White House and that of Netanyahu himself, he also knows that annexing the whole of the West Bank would raise a host of issues—most notably by forcing Israel to take care of the needs of millions of Palestinians, as well as by raising the question of giving Palestinian voting rights. This could easily turn Smotrich’s “dream” of a 'Greater Israel' into his nightmare: a binational state.

Instead, Smotrich will likely push for a more piecemeal strategy, demanding that Israel annexe only settlement blocs where Jewish residents already are a majority. On the ground, this wouldn’t be a dramatic change, as Israeli law already applies to Israeli settlers.

We were a step away from applying sovereignty to the settlements in Judea and Samaria, and now the time has come to do it

Israeli Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich

But make no mistake: this would still be a dramatic shift. By doing so, Israel would formally kill the two-state solution. Israel's critics will certainly claim that the reality is already that the two-state solution is dead. The truth is, it is not dead enough to people like Smotrich. More concretely, this would allow Smotrich to start planning for the next phase of Israel's gradual advance, including legalising more than 100 "wildcat" outposts situated deeper inside the occupied West Bank.

This legislation would, in turn, lay the groundwork for a dramatic expansion of those smaller settlements into bigger blocs, paving the way for another layer of annexation in the coming years and effectively killing the prospect of creating a Palestinian state. This strategy would also add fuel to fire in the West Bank by removing the mere possibility of a future negotiated resolution to the conflict, leaving only one path open: total war.

PA collapse?

Another persistent risk hanging over the area is that of a collapse of the Palestinian Authority (PA). Even before October 7, a deep legitimacy crisis has plagued the PA. As a product of the Oslo Agreement, the PA's raison d'etre is to be a preliminary step towards a Palestinian state. But as the prospect of peace has grown even more remote, the Palestinian Authority has become a shell of what it was meant to be.

This is not to mention the rampant corruption as well as a lack of representative leadership and elections. The powerlessness of the PA, its inability to deliver both when it comes to a better livelihood for Palestinians and a pathway to independence, means its actual "authority" is shaky at best. This is not to mention that the PA faces a looming succession crisis to replace its ailing president, Mahmoud Abbas. Abbas has been reluctant to name a successor, knowing that by doing so, he may well find himself sidelined.

The Palestinian president knows he is unpopular and would lose in free and fair elections. In 2021, in an effort to regain some legitimacy, Abbas set legislative and presidential elections, only to see members of his own party form rival lists. The coup de grace came when Marwan Barghouti—a popular Palestinian figure who is in prison in Israel over his role in a wave of attacks—hinted he might run in the presidential elections (his wife had also been drafted in a list headed by an opponent of Abbas).

AFP
Men walk past a section of Israel's separation barrier painted with a portrait of Palestinian Marwan Barghouti, held in an Israel jail, on November 6, 2023, in Bethlehem in the occupied West Bank.

Because the leadership in Ramallah knows its own fragility too well, it has moved into growing paralysis, aimed not to kill the prospect of peace by engaging in violence (as Hamas and other groups do), yet failing to propose any clear pathway to a state. Abbas knows that the PA is in such a fragile state that one wrong move may easily bring about its collapse.

Yet this year, the Palestinian Authority is forced to consider big steps. For one, Ramallah has an opportunity to potentially return to Gaza after being ousted in a violent takeover by Hamas in 2007. This would be a major victory for Abbas, who sees this de facto "reunification" as a way to reassert the primacy of his party, Fatah, in the Palestinian landscape and pressure Israel to resume the peace process.

Yet doing so isn't without risks. This would entail reforming the Palestinian Authority and taking charge of the needs of Palestinians in Gaza. The PA is already stretched thin and has lost control of key areas in the West Bank, casting doubt as to its ability to take on such a giant challenge.

In part because of these doubts, the Palestinian Authority has sought to reassert control over key areas of the West Bank, starting with the Jenin refugee camp. Ramallah launched a new operation last year dubbed "Protect the Homeland". In the framework of that operation, Palestinian security forces have gone after "criminal elements"—rival armed groups who operate freely in the camp.

This sparked a wave of criticism from these groups, including Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, who accused Abbas's PA of doing Israel's bidding. The operation ended, but this criticism was reinforced by the fact that, right after the PA suspended its operation, Israel began its own raid as part of the "Iron Wall" operation.

Jaafar ASHTIYEH / AFP
A member of the PA security forces looks on inside an armoured vehicle as they deploy in the Jenin camp for Palestinian refugees in the occupied West Bank on January 18, 2025, following an agreement reached with local militants.

The PA now finds itself stuck between a long-hostile Palestinian public who views it as a glorified municipality at best, an Israeli leadership pushing the idea of annexation, and a Trump administration willing to tighten the screw on the PA. But for all its (many) faults, its collapse could have very negative repercussions on both Palestinians and Israelis as it could empower radicals on both sides who want the PA gone.

Hamas, in particular, is very much intent on expanding its footprint in the West Bank. The group may be willing to let the Palestinian Authority return to Gaza and deal with the aftermath of the October 7 attacks and war, but this doesn't mean that the group has abandoned its ambition to kill off its main Palestinian rival in Ramallah.

In fact, by relinquishing civilian control over Gaza and returning to its identity as an insurgent group (rather than a civilian government), Hamas hopes to boost its popularity. By doing so, Hamas will be able to continue carrying out attacks against Israel without having to deal with the consequences and with Palestinians blaming the PA for its failure to deliver.

The West Bank is of particular interest in that sense: the release of Palestinian prisoners by Israel, as part of the ceasefire agreements of 2025 and pause of 2023, have continued to boost Hamas's profile—as many released are from the West Bank.

More broadly, the year ahead presents a number of complex risks compounded by the fact that the few actors watching the West Bank closely generally tend to be the same who could benefit from further chaos. 

font change