Rather than extend a hand, Netanyahu rains of Syria’s parade

The departure of Assad and of Iranian influence in Syria gave Israel a new diplomatic opportunity: to reach out publicly to the people of Syria, to congratulate them on their liberation, and to set the stage for bilateral relations in the future, relations that could perhaps one day lead to a formal peace. 

But like the opportunity that Assad had in 2011, this was spurned in favour of violence, when Israel launched an air campaign against Syrian military assets and moved to occupy Syrian territory in violation of the 1974 Agreement on Disengagement. Why? 

Officially, Israel justified it as pre-emptive in nature, citing the Islamist character and terrorist background of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which dominates the emerging new administration in Damascus as a potential threat. Israel is not alone in questioning what HTS, a one-time affiliate of Al Qaeda, has in mind for Syria's future.  

Still, was it sensible for Israel to assume the worst about HTS and act accordingly? Are Israeli interests served by going to war pre-emptively against post-Assad Syria?

Saving Israel, or Netanyahu?

On 7 October 2023 Israel was woefully unprepared when Hamas launched its military assault and committed unspeakable crimes in communities in southern Israel. In time, Israel may officially determine the cause of that unpreparedness and hold accountable those who left thousands of Israelis at the mercy of murderers.  

To many Israelis, the principal culprit was Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. After all, he was charge. For years he had let Qatari money make its way to Hamas in the belief that Gaza's rulers would forsake terror for treasure. In the aftermath of 7 October 2023, Netanyahu appeared to many to be a (politically) dead man walking. 

Fast forward to today. Despite what happened then, and notwithstanding his legal woes, the PM is again dominating Israeli politics, having already blamed Israel's military for the unpreparedness that cost so many lives of 2023. Clearly, he wishes to remain PM for as far as the eye can see.  

The view here is that Israel's decision to make war on post-Assad Syria was driven, more than anything else, by Netanyahu's drive to survive and thrive politically. In part, that means him making sure that the unpreparedness in Israel's south in October 2023 is not repeated to Israel's north in December 2024, by doing to Syria what it now believes it should have done to the Gaza Strip before Hamas struck. 

The absence of any indicators of HTS aggression against Israel is neither here nor there. A statement of Israeli armed might was deemed essential, a decision facilitated by the powerlessness of the target.

Reactions and priorities

To their credit, Syrians—even the leaders of HTS—are doing their best to ignore Israel's assaults, as they celebrate the ouster of a kleptocratic mass murderer, while trying to find out what happened to tens of thousands of their relatives and friends who were seized, imprisoned, tortured, and in many cases killed by Assad's thugs.  

Shorn of an Assad presidency for the first time in decades, Syrians are trying to organise themselves to provide basic services and set parameters for the country's future governance and eventual reconstruction. They are in no position to resist Israeli military force, much less to conduct Hamas-style attacks into the Golan Heights. This will be well-known to Israeli intelligence.

Are there still armed men in Syria interested in killing Israelis? It would be foolish to assume that there weren't. But with the ouster of Iran and Hezbollah, has the threat increased, enough to justify a pre-emptive war? Indeed, has HTS indicated any interest is seizing the anti-Israel mantle, picking up where Iran and Hezbollah left off? 

If Israel's military defences in the Golan Heights were adequate to dissuade aggression by the Assad regime, Iran, and Hezbollah (with Russian air power lurking in the background), what suddenly made those defences inadequate after 8 December 2024?

Syrians would have welcomed the destruction of the Assad regime's Air Force, Navy, headquarters facilities, and military infrastructure had Israel, Turkey, or the US done so when Assad was using them to slaughter civilians with barrel bombs and sarin gas. It could have saved tens of thousands of Syrian lives. But now? Why now?  

Playing into Iranian hands

Syrians are trying to ignore this spasm of post-Assad violence against their country, mainly because they can do nothing about it. They hope it will end soon, but Syrians have long memories—will they forget it?

No doubt Mr. Netanyahu's political survival is of supreme importance to him, and no doubt few Israelis will lose any sleep over Syrian military assets being destroyed, or Syrian territory seized. Still, can't Israeli leaders see that treating 20 million Syrians with an ounce of respect in their moment of liberation might help Israel in the long run?  

Likewise, is there no-one in Donald Trump's incoming administration interested enough in sealing victory in Syria over Iran and Hezbollah to counsel Israel to stop its gratuitous alienation of the Syrian people? Leaders in Tehran will be praying that Israel keeps it up. All this plays into their hands.

To avoid doing so, Israel's pre-emptive war on Syria should stop now. The rain Israel showered on Syria's victory parade cannot be undone, but with skilful diplomacy the damage done to Israel's interests can be mitigated over time. Indeed, Israel could still help shape the Syria that emerges post-Assad. Yes, HTS will remain a question mark, but Israel need not create an enemy where none may exist.