The Assads were phony champions of the Palestinian cause

In its public statements, the Syrian government has long supported the Palestinian cause. In reality, the Assads sought to stymie the PLO, whose famous leader, Yasser Arafat, never trusted Damascus.

LOUAI BESHARA / AFP

A Syrian woman holds a picture of President Bashar al-Assad as other protestors fly Palestinian and Syrian flags during a demonstration to mark Land Day in Damascus on March 30, 2012.

The Assads were phony champions of the Palestinian cause

Majed Kayali

last update on 14 Dec 2024

There was nothing selfless about the Syrian Assad regime’s “ideological” stances. To gain legitimacy, it proclaimed its values to be unity, freedom, and socialism. In reality, and like many populist authoritarian regimes, it practised propaganda, mass mobilisation, and the suppression of citizens’ rights and freedoms, monopolising politics and exploiting or squandering Syria’s national resources.

This manipulative, two-faced, say-one-thing-but-do-another approach extended to the Assad regime’s handling of the Palestinian cause. Publicly, it said this was a top priority, that it supported the ‘axis of resistance’, that it rejected the normalisation of relations with Israel, and that it supported Palestinian factions. Again, as with so many things in Syria, the reality was very different.

The relationship that recently deposed dictator President Bashar al-Assad (and, before him, his president father Hafez) had with the Palestinians, their cause, and their national movement was complex, but it involved both humiliation and exorbitant costs.

Not feeling the love

There were persistent tensions between Damascus and key Palestinian factions, particularly the secular Fatah, which, for decades, was led by the late Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) leader Yasser Arafat, whose relationship with Hafez al-Assad was fractious at best.

AFP — PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat with Syrian President Hafez al-Assad on September 1, 1989 in Tripoli, Libya.

The Assad regime had a habit of interfering in Palestinian politics. This extended not just to political strategies but to the internal structures of Palestinian factions and was designed to enable the Syrian regime to assert control over Fatah, in part by embedding loyal Syrian army officers within its ranks, particularly in the early days.

These officers were granted operational authority in exchange for allowing Fatah to establish offices in Syria. The arrangement was contentious, however, and in 1966, in the Yarmouk Camp for Palestinian refugees in Damascus, it came to a head with the death of Yusef Urabi, a Palestinian officer in the Syrian Army and an early member of Fatah’s armed wing.

Urabi was a protégé of then-Syrian defence minister Hafez al-Assad, who selected him to head Fatah's operations and ordered Arafat to respect Urabi's authority. When Arafat fell out with fellow Palestinian leader Ahmed Jibril (founder and head of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – General Command, or PFLP-GC), a meeting was called between them, with Urabi to chair it.

A confrontation ensued, and Urabi was killed in circumstances that have always been disputed. Al-Assad was furious and arrested both Arafat and his fellow Fatah founder Khalil al-Wazir, both of whom had been called to the meeting. They were kept in solitary confinement, and al-Assad personally interrogated al-Wazir.

Publicly, the Assad regime said the Palestinian cause was a top priority, but the reality was very different

Arafat was found guilty and sentenced to death but was pardoned by Syria's then-president, Salah Jadid, after significant intervention from Arab leaders. The episode is detailed by Intisar al-Wazir (Um Jihad) in her book Rifqat Omr, published in 2022.

Harassment and detention

When al-Assad realised that he could not control Fatah, he turned to the PLO, creating factions such as As-Sa'iqa (led by Zuhair Mohsen and later Issam Al-Qadi) and the PFLP-GC (led by Jibril and later Talal Naji). He also put restrictions on other factions, bolstered by the establishment of specialised intelligence units: the Fedayeen Authority and the notorious Palestine Branch, infamous for its brutal practices.

Prominent Palestinian leaders, including Arafat, George Habash, al-Wazir, Azzam al-Ahmad, Tawfiq al-Tirawi, and Samir al-Rifai, were among those detained or harassed by the regime. Even setting up a primary school or art exhibition required approval from the Fedayeen Directorate.

Al-Assad's goal was to use the Palestinian cause as leverage in negotiations with other states and to blackmail other Arab regimes. This led Arafat to prioritise independent Palestinian decision-making and to resist Syrian control. After the PLO was expelled from Beirut in 1982, Arafat, therefore, chose to relocate his fighters to Tunisia, Yemen, and Algeria—not Damascus, as was being offered.

AFP — Palestinian fighters raise the victory sign and carry pictures of Yasser Arafat, on a military truck as they leave Beirut for Tunisia, August 22, 1982.

As Syria's defence minister in 1967, Hafez al-Assad bore responsibility for the 1967 June War defeat to Israel, but instead of being held accountable and losing his job, he seized power in a 1970 military coup, transforming Syria's republican system into a hereditary one.

Targeting the camps

Further clashes between Palestinian factions and Assad-aligned fighters erupted when the Syrian Army entered Lebanon in 1976. Al-Assad partnered with the Phalangists—a right-wing Christian party and militia that collaborated with Israel and opposed the Palestinian presence in southern Lebanon. This culminated in the massacre of thousands of Palestinians at Tal al-Zaatar refugee camp that same year.

More was to follow. In the 1980s, al-Assad-backed militias attacked Palestinian camps in Beirut, such as Sabra, Shatila, and Burj al-Barajneh, under the pretext of curtailing Fatah's influence. These resulted in further mass displacement, thousands more deaths, and horrific suffering.

And when Hafez died in 2000, his son, Bashar, took over, continuing his father's policy of subterfuge. In 2007, the Assad regime facilitated the emergence of Fatah al-Islam, which established a stronghold in Nahr al-Bared camp in Tripoli, Lebanon. The camp was ultimately destroyed, displacing its residents. The group's leader, Shaker Al-Absi—previously released from Syrian custody—vanished.

Al-Assad used the Palestinian cause to blackmail other Arab regimes and as leverage in negotiations with other states

No friend worth keeping

The regime's disdain for Palestinian rights also extended to regional allies. Iraqi sectarian militias loyal to Iran (Syria's ally) kicked Palestinian refugees out of Iraq, leaving them on the Jordanian and Syrian borders. Despite these crimes, such militias have been cynically incorporated into the 'axis of resistance'.

Under Bashar, the regime systematically targeted Palestinian refugee camps in Syria, with Yarmouk, the largest of these camps, enduring mass displacement, aerial bombardment, and a suffocating siege beginning in late 2012. Tragically, some Palestinian factions were complicit, allowing the camp to become a target for Syrian artillery and Russian air strikes.

The tragedy was compounded by a lack of understanding among some Palestinians—particularly in the West Bank, Gaza, and within Israel—about the true nature of the Assad regime. Manipulated by slogans of resistance, they didn't understand its exploitation of the Palestinian cause or the fight for freedom and justice of ordinary Syrians.

By prioritising self-interest over principles, some Palestinian factions let Syria and Iran co-opt the Palestinian cause for their own agendas at the expense of suffering Palestinian communities. Today, Syrians have freed themselves from the Assad regime, dismantling one of the world's most oppressive systems. Most Palestinians will not mourn its loss.

+ / -