Syria needed tough pragmatism, not democratic idealism

In 2016, this vision was just a vague hope, because the military capabilities of the opposition's myriad had failed to defeat the regime. Moreover, there was deadly infighting among the rebels. This time, it may be different.

From the beginning of the Syrian Revolution in 2011, the West was guilty of wishful thinking and naivety, with democratic and moralistic ideals prioritised over the results-oriented pragmatism and realpolitik that the situation required to meaningfully contribute to resolving the conflict.  

Being proved wrong

From the outset, many Western politicians thought a solution was only possible with al-Assad gone, which they believed was forthcoming. Diplomats in Damascus even predicted a timescale, the summer of 2012 being widely mooted. They were proved wrong. 

The regime's resilience was vastly underestimated, partly due to ignorance of its inner workings and partly due to misplaced optimism. Other diplomats had felt then that the Assad regime might endure for a long time. I was one. We were accused of being pro-Assad or even anti-democracy. It was a difficult atmosphere. Objective reporting on Syria was becoming increasingly fraught. Academics, journalists, and politicians were often hastily labelled as pro- or anti-regime as a fierce propaganda war raged in the media.  
 
A basic principle of diplomacy is that only limited objectives can be achieved when there is a lack of both will and resources. Yet, when it came to Syria, few people accepted that. They insisted on sticking to ethical positions but were unprepared to invest the resources needed to help achieve those objectives. In this way, the foreign countries involved only contributed to a prolonged war. The result was over half a million dead, more than ten million refugees, and a once-prosperous country in tatters.  

To talk or not to talk

Many believed that in refusing to talk to the regime, they were helping the Syrian opposition, but the consequences of their ethical stance carried an unethical dimension: by rejecting a more pragmatic approach, they inadvertently caused bloodshed and destruction. In 2011, I argued that a solution to the conflict should be pursued through dialogue between the regime and the opposition. By 2012, the death toll was 10,000. I felt it would rise considerably, but I was in the minority, so dialogue with al-Assad was categorically rejected.

If you refuse to engage with the other much stronger party in a conflict, or set unachievable conditions, you limit your chances of reaching a political solution. To me, this seemed logical and obvious, but few shared my view. Most rejected it. 

Had a military victory over the regime been a viable option, this might have been an alternative to dialogue, but since the war was clearly proving unwinnable at the time, there were few, if any, realistic options left. Isolating the regime was the preferred strategy of most, but somewhat predictably it failed to yield any positive results, nor did the many statements issued by the UN or individual states.

In the early stages of the Syrian Revolution, armed opposition groups occupied large parts of Syrian cities like Aleppo, but locals did not always appreciate their efforts to 'liberate' them from the regime. Had they only known how it would play out.

Pursuing state interests

The Syria war remains a stain on the international community, with states waging proxy wars and pursuing their own interests with no care for the disastrous consequences it may have on ordinary Syrians. 

Russia and Iran wanted to save their Syrian ally. Gulf states wanted to curb Iran's regional influence. The US wanted to stop Russia and Iran from undermining its strategic position in the Middle East. Israel wanted Iran out of Syria. And Turkey wanted to weaken Syria's Kurds, particularly those linked to the PKK. 

So it went, on and on. Most states that opposed the Syrian regime initially pursued regime change without thinking this might usher in radical Islamists. So, once their efforts to topple the regime failed, they began re-engaging with Damascus.

The Syrian bloodbath was predictable many years in advance. In the second edition of my book The Struggle for Power in Syria—published 30 years before the start of the Syrian Revolution—I predicted that any attempt to overthrow the extremely well-organised Syrian Ba'ath regime would result in many dying, and so it proved. 

Role of the Alawites

For decades, leaders of the Syrian army and security services have mostly belonged to al-Assad's Alawite minority, which constituted roughly 10% of Syria's population. They trusted one another, especially during crises. When threatened by external forces, their solidarity strengthened—determined to remain in power at all costs.

It is important to note that this was not an 'Alawite regime', as is often described, but rather an Alawite-dominated dictatorship, with key positions disproportionately occupied by Alawites. As in most dictatorships, the entire population was oppressed (except for an elite group within the regime and their close relatives), meaning that Alawites in Syria often suffered just as much as non-Alawites. 

If anything, the Alawite community bore a disproportionate burden, having to provide vast amounts of 'cannon fodder' for the regime's war effort. This made it inevitable that the Alawite community would come to resent the regime as well. 

For Alawites, tribal or familial ties often outweighed religious ones, whereas for Syria's Sunni majority, religion played a more significant role. Many Sunnis viewed Alawites as 'heretical non-Muslims,' which created a conflict of asymmetrical perceptions. Sunnis saw al-Assad's regime as Alawite religious sectarian oppression, whereas the regime—which was secular—placed little importance on religion. 

Raising false hopes

During a meeting in Geneva in 2016, which I attended with the Syrian opposition's negotiating delegation, the chief negotiator of the High Council for Negotiations at the time, Mohammad Alloush—also the leader of Jaysh al-Islam—asked what steps the permanent members of the UN Security Council (UNSC) would now take to implement UNSC Resolution 2254, which was key to further talks.  

He specifically asked the three Syria envoys of the permanent members present (the US, the UK, and France). One replied: "We are committed!" Perhaps he felt obliged to say so, since it reflected the policy of his government, but it was an empty promise. Enforcing 2254 would require military intervention, which none of these countries were prepared to undertake. Afterwards, I shared my view confidentially with the head of the Syrian delegation, Yahya al-Qadmani. 

Not backing it up 

This is just one example of how false expectations were raised among Syria's opposition. Likewise, the statements by Western politicians calling for the establishment of safe zones, no-fly zones, or humanitarian corridors, all of which were urgently needed to prevent the regime from bombing civilians and to provide safe havens for Syrian refugees.

Yet these politicians should have known that safe zones, no-fly zones, and humanitarian corridors can only be enforced militarily, which they were unwilling to do. Again, it gave false hope. Honesty and realism are better forms of friendship.

Observers often suffered from a 'Syrian blind spot'. They knew that al-Assad's regime was dictatorial, brutal, and repressive, yet they thought it would make concessions entirely incompatible with its nature. The same applied to opposition groups. They thought they could remove al-Assad through negotiations and that talks would end with his regime surrendering and being brought to trial.  

Both sides wanted complete victory, which was impossible to achieve voluntarily with their opponents. Al-Assad was never going to sign his own death warrant, nor was the opposition ever likely to compromise on its demand for his removal. The only 'solution' appeared to be victory for one side over the other. In December 2024, that is exactly what happened. 

Traumatic memories 

Victory does not necessarily mean peace. The armed opposition groups who worked together to topple al-Assad were once enemies of one another. Their grievances may not have been forgotten. Owing to the profound damage inflicted on the delicate fabric of Syrian society, real peace may take generations to achieve.

Millions of Syrians are deeply traumatised by the horrific events that they witnessed and endured since 2011. Predicting the long-term effects of this collective trauma will be difficult. Putting the genie back in the bottle after years of chaos and violence is no easy task. 

Peace will mean dismantling Syria's numerous militias, addressing the country's endemic corruption, extortion, and intimidation, and rebuilding the state's physical infrastructure. The latter will require money, manpower, and skills, all of which Syria currently lacks. 

HTS, originally an offshoot of al-Qaeda and Jabhat al-Nusra, appears to have metamorphosised from radical jihadist Islamist group to a more pragmatic, moderate organisation, if its statements are to be believed. After occupying Aleppo and Hama, they extended a hand to minorities including Alawites, Isma'ilis, Druze, and Christians. Whether the rank-and-file members of HTS and the Turkey-backed SNA share the same tolerance is another matter. 

Finally, hope

The new situation undoubtedly gives hope for Syrians exhausted by years of war, poverty, and repression, who have yearned for change, peace and prosperity. However, if Syrian history is anything to go by, it is more likely that one authoritarian regime will be replaced by another. 

Syria has far more experience with dictators than it does with democracy, yet such capacity certainly exists. Achieving this vision requires military backing and a collective desire across groups to support it. 

To date, Syria's many different groups have been too divided to act effectively as a unified force, but events of the past fortnight could offer hope. Yet, in the world of realpolitik, it usually comes down to who holds the most power and who is best organised. 

Syrians have endured the devastating consequences of war. The entire nation is a victim of this prolonged conflict. An improvement in their situation is urgently needed and long overdue. Those who ousted al-Assad now have a golden chance to create an improved 'new Syria'. That will be easier said than done.