Trump's victory encourages Netanyahu to 'go all in' in his quest for total victory. But his quest to defeat Israel's long list of foes could backfire if he pushes too far.
MANDEL NGAN / AFP
US President Donald Trump and Israel's Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu take part in an announcement of Trump's Middle East peace plan in the East Room of the White House in Washington, DC, on January 28, 2020.
In early September, Netanyahu was at one of his lowest points since the beginning of the war. Hostages had been executed by Hamas, bringing new furore to the streets of Tel Aviv. Internal and external pressure was intensifying, the Gaza war seemed to be going nowhere, the strategy of pressuring Hamas appeared to be broken, the Biden Administration was growing increasingly vocal about its frustration with Netanyahu, and residents of northern Israel were nowhere close to returning to their homes.
Fast-forward to November, and the situation has dramatically improved for the embattled Israeli leader. If it weren’t for a series of pesky investigations into the way the Israeli PM office has used leaked intelligence for its benefit, Netanyahu would be riding high: Hezbollah and Iran have been dealt serious blows, Yahya Sinwar and Hassan Nasrallah are dead, the annoying buzz of criticism coming from Defence Minister Yoav Gallant has been quashed. But the cherry on top (and perhaps the cake itself): President Donald Trump has been elected.
Buoyed by the domino effect of continued “victories,” the bubble surrounding Netanyahu is tempted by victory: to press harder until Hamas collapses, to push deeper until Hezbollah agrees to its own surrender, and to strike Iran again and push the regime over the edge.
Up until this point, Netanyahu’s promise of “total victory” sounded more like an empty slogan. But to Netanyahu’s entourage, Trump’s election is the final sign that the stars have aligned and that those sceptical of Israel’s ability to “change the Middle East” will be proven wrong.
The Israeli premier was one of the first to congratulate President Trump for a “huge victory”, and one could almost argue that—in Netanyahu’s view—“total victory” wouldn’t truly be complete without a Trump victory, which gives the clear to go all in. Sceptics, on the other hand, are concerned that Netanyahu may be drinking his own kool-aid about a victory that (regardless of who is in the White House) may never come—but that could still bring its fair share of defeats and suffering.
A public spat between Trump and Netanyahu is unlikely because it would make little sense to their respective bases
A Trump "surprise"?
On the Gaza front, President Trump's pledge to "end wars" rather than start them has led some to believe he may be able to coax Netanyahu into a ceasefire. Reports have claimed that the president-elect may even have called on Israel to "wrap things up" before his inauguration on 20 January. Netanyahu himself sent his close advisor, Strategic Affairs Minister Ron Dermer, to the US to get clarity as to what Trump wants.
Some think Netanyahu will have to listen to Trump if pressed to end the war. Given the former president's unpredictability, the Israeli PM might not want to take his chances by defying him. The two leaders did indeed have a fallout. When Netanyahu rushed to congratulate President Biden on his election win against Trump, the former US president did not mince his words, reportedly saying 'f*** him". Netanyahu will remember this and knows that one can easily fall out of favour with Trump.
Over the past months, Netanyahu has sought to mend the relationship, which he finally did in July during a visit to Washington. Netanyahu's rocky relationship with Biden and defiance of the US administration may also play well in the new administration. But Netanyahu's tricks, including pandering to Trump and the Republicans when tensions were high with Biden, won't work anymore: 2025 will not be an election year, and the Democrats are unlikely to play the same games the Republicans did. If Trump was to apply pressure on Israel, the Democrats will likely be on board.
A match made in heaven
Having said that, the perception that Trump has more leverage over Netanyahu—and will use it—is likely an illusion. A public spat between Trump and Netanyahu is unlikely because it would make little sense to their respective domestic supporters. Why would two leaders who seemingly agree on so much butt heads? Why would Netanyahu spar with a leader who has so clearly aligned not just with Israel but specifically with the Israeli right—a leader Netanyahu has so clearly favoured over Biden?
This public alignment will also likely trickle down to their respective foreign policy teams. President Trump swiftly named his new Ambassador to Israel: Governor Mike Huckabee. Huckabee, an evangelical leader, is one of the most vocal pro-Israel voices who supports Israeli sovereignty over the West Bank. Israel's far-right Minister of National Security, Itamar Ben Gvir, welcomed Huckabee's appointment.
Mike Huckabee looks on as Republican presidential nominee and former US President Donald Trump reacts during a campaign event at the Drexelbrook Catering and Event Center, in Drexel Hill, Pennsylvania, US, October 29, 2024.
In turn, Netanyahu has announced a new pick for US Ambassador Yechiel Leiter, another staunch advocate of settlements and the war in Gaza. The two ambassadors are almost interchangeable, and one could just as easily take the position of the other. No one would notice, for they align on all points.
Though I suspect Trump is no fan of Netanyahu (and vice-versa), neither side can afford a public fallout or even the whiff of criticism against the other. Trump confessed his frustration over Netanyahu's behaviour during his first mandate but could only bring himself to express this sentiment when he was out of the White House. During his mandate, the two leaders appeared thicker than thieves. Now that Trump is back in the White House, their personal dislikes and prior disputes matter less than the perception among their respective base that they are "a match made in heaven".
The illusion of a ceasefire in Gaza
Trump is an enigma, which leads even his ideological adversaries to pray that he will be a "pleasant surprise," including when he pledges to "end wars." In many ways, however, this is just the first stage of grief: denial.
To be sure, Trump's policy on Gaza does need some decoding. The president has made conflicting statements regarding Gaza, at times calling to "finish off" Hamas and at others calling for an end to the conflict. In one key interview with a right-wing Israeli newspaper, Trump appeared to even condemn Israel's bombing of urban areas in Gaza. Except he was not so much condemning the bombing itself so much as the fact that the world could see it. He was castigating Israel for releasing images of air strikes in Gaza but was less bothered by the strikes themselves.
And herein lies the key to reading Trump's policy: The upcoming US president is not bothered by the continuation of the conflict itself but rather by the fact that it caught the world's attention. When Trump says he wants things to "end", he does not necessarily refer to a ceasefire but rather an end to the public attention surrounding the issue. What Trump is saying is: "Make this problem go away". Contrary to the Biden Administration, Trump is not interested in the "day after" in Gaza. He is not interested in how the war ends or whether it paves the way for a political resolution. He wants this pesky issue off his desk. He wants to be able to ignore it.
Unless Trump shifts gears and starts actually caring about how the conflict ends, the message relayed to Netanyahu will be that he can sweep the conflict under the carpet as long as he keeps it contained. This aligns with Netanyahu's security-focused view of how the war would end: Low-level military operations would continue, with Israel maintaining a key presence along several corridors and even emptying northern Gaza until the area is "cleared".
Palestinians displaced from shelters in Beit Hanoun cross the main Salaheddine road into Jabalia in the northern Gaza Strip following Israeli army evacuation orders on November 12, 2024.
And Lebanon?
There may be a higher chance for a ceasefire in Lebanon. After a month and a half of ground operations and thousands of air strikes, Israel sits at an inflexion point. Either it expands its operation to pressure Hezbollah into a deal the group would not take otherwise—but at the risk of getting dragged into another endless conflict—or it withdraws, avoiding the risk of an "endless" war in Lebanon but potentially leaving the door open for Hezbollah to come back to the border area.
In southern Lebanon, the Israeli army has managed to operate in a limited 2-3-km-deep border area. Israel believes that in that first line of villages, Hezbollah had built an infrastructure designed to carry out an "October 7-style" attack—a massive cross-border attack aimed at maximising Israeli casualties and capturing as many Israeli hostages as possible.
Nasrallah himself had mentioned the plan, dubbed "Conquest in the Galilee", in a speech. In that sense, the objective the Israeli government has set for the ground operation has been completed—or is close to being completed—with the border area now being cleared of Hezbollah fortifications and attack positions.
Now is the time for diplomacy, but this is where things may get difficult. Israel is insisting on reinforcing the monitoring mechanism in Lebanon to ensure that Hezbollah does not rearm and does not rebuild its military infrastructure in southern Lebanon. More specifically, Israel wants to be able to intervene in Lebanon in case a reported violation is not dealt with appropriately. This "right to intervene" is something Israel will not forgo, but it is also something neither Hezbollah nor Lebanon will accept.
It's possible for Netanyahu to agree to a ceasefire in Lebanon to avoid military defeat. This panders to Trump's rhetoric on "ending wars".
The Israeli army understands that dragging out the war in Lebanon would be risky: If Israel expands its operations in Lebanon, it could easily get stuck while also giving a boost to Hezbollah's "resistance narrative" and the claim that Israel is there to occupy Lebanon, rather than fight Hezbollah. Therefore, it's possible for Netanyahu to agree to a ceasefire that avoids turning the third Lebanon war into another defeat and also pander to Trump's rhetoric on "ending wars".
But here, the "temptation of victory" will again be high. Short of a deal that shapes conditions in Lebanon and allows for the long-term weakening of Hezbollah, the Israeli government may push further and ramp up the pressure on Hezbollah and its patron, Iran.
After Israel's attack on Iran on 26 October, Iran's air defences were severely weakened, leaving the country exposed to follow-up strikes. Short of getting what it wants, the Israeli government could count on the tacit support of the US administration, its inability to publicly or privately restrain Israel, as well as a supportive US foreign policy team that could even secure logistical support to carry out more strikes against Iran. Here, the tit-for-tat direct blows between Iran and Israel could very well turn into an all-out war.
