Destroying Hezbollah’s heartland will change Lebanon forever

A new wave of social and demographic re-engineering is unfurling that includes Syrians, Palestinians, and displaced Lebanese Shiites

Aliaa Aboukhaddour

Destroying Hezbollah’s heartland will change Lebanon forever

In Lebanon, where demographics are inseparable from politics, the displacement of more than a million people will always leave a lasting impact. Indeed, recent history shows this to be true. Waves of displacement and deportations since Israel first began attacking its northern neighbour in the 1970s have contributed to Lebanon’s destabilisation and disintegration, the repercussions hindering post-civil war reconstruction efforts.

Since September of this year, when Israel initiated its latest war by activating bombs inside the pagers of thousands of Hezbollah members, hundreds of thousands of Lebanese in areas with a strong Hezbollah presence have left their homes to seek refuge, both within and beyond Lebanon’s borders.

They join another 100,000 others who fled their villages in southern Lebanon after Israeli retaliation for Hezbollah’s so-called “Support War” for Gaza began in October 2023, triggered by Hamas attacking southern Israel and Israel launching a subsequent invasion. This plunged the region into a new phase of intense upheaval.

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has tracked the swelling number of displaced people in Lebanon, which totalled 1.2 million as of mid-October. These numbers add to the one million Syrian refugees living in Lebanon since 2011 and the generations of Palestinian refugees, compounding the severity of the crisis.

Risking sectarian violence

Lebanon’s small size, its overpopulation, and its limited natural resources mean that demographic shifts often fuel sectarian tensions, raising the risk of sectarian clashes. For a country whose economy collapsed so completely five years ago, a new refugee influx is a pending disaster of daunting proportions.

Aliaa Aboukhaddour

Relocating 1.2 million Lebanese to areas with different sectarian majorities presents challenges. In non-Shiite areas, there is animosity towards Hezbollah, whose supporters are among the displaced. The group’s influence remains divisive in communities that see it as a threat to their autonomy and security.

The most hardline voices in groups affected by Hezbollah's growing influence even threatened to refuse to host displaced southerners. For them, Hezbollah's military presence in the south triggered conflict with Israel, especially as recent years have seen Iran's allies and proxies increasingly coordinate.

Despite the initial threats, in their time of need, displaced Lebanese have been able to find shelter across different regions, with communities outside Israeli target areas largely offering refuge. Although isolated incidents and skirmishes have been reported, so far, there has not been the major unrest many feared.

Longstanding grievances

Tracing Lebanon's history of displacement, the emergence of the Dahiyeh—the southern suburbs of Beirut and a Shiite stronghold—is crucial. Its transformation from the hub of Lebanese leftist movements in the 1970s to a base camp for groups like Amal and Hezbollah would not have been possible without the civil war.

Read more: A walk through Dahiyeh shows why residents call it ‘the second Nakba’

The conflict uprooted residents from eastern and northern Beirut—once known as "the belt of misery"—driving them to relocate to the Dahiyeh. Many came in search of jobs and housing, fleeing the Bekaa Valley and the southern villages under attack from Israel. The state's long-standing neglect of these areas fostered grievances that predate the armed Palestinian presence in southern Lebanon in the late 1960s.

In Lebanon, where the economy collapsed so completely five years ago, a new refugee influx is a pending disaster

Another significant precedent is the displacement of Christians during the 'Mountain War' in 1983, which reshaped the political landscape of eastern Lebanon and bolstered the ranks of the Lebanese Forces (LF). Many Christians partly blamed the LF for their displacement from the mountain and their demoralising military defeat to Druze fighters from the Progressive Socialist Party.

These are but two examples of incidents during the civil war that amounted to a form of sectarian cleansing, driving residents from weaker sects to seek refuge in areas where their community held the majority. Such forced relocations have left a lasting impact on Lebanon's political landscape, reshaping political representation with socio-economic shifts.

Changing demographics

Today, a new wave of social and demographic re-engineering is unfurling that includes Syrians, Palestinians, and displaced Lebanese, predominantly Shiites. This could exacerbate sectarian tensions and deepen political divisions.

The Shiite community, which comprises Hezbollah's support base, has been dispersed across Lebanon, extending north to Akkar and even into Syria and Iraq. Locals worry their arrival may bring Israeli airstrikes to their area, as seen in villages like Baadran, Maasira, and Ito in Druze and Maronite regions. 

In contrast to 2006, substantial international aid to Lebanon has not been forthcoming. This reflects a shift in Arab sympathies and perceptions of Hezbollah. Once celebrated as a national resistance movement, Hezbollah is now widely seen as an Iranian tool, embroiled in regional conflicts to support Iranian allies. 

The forced displacement of residents from villages south of the Litani River, coupled with Israel's apparent intention to prevent their return, is set to create new refugee communities. This is especially concerning given the extensive destruction of the southern suburbs and the absence of funds for reconstruction. 

Nor is there any financial support for displaced families who need to rent while their homes are rebuilt. Such payments were made by Hezbollah in 2006, while home reconstruction was largely funded by Arab countries. In 2024, the situation is decidedly different. 

No bailout forthcoming

Humanitarian aid is trickling in from allied and friendly nations, and being distributed to the displaced, some of whom say it falls short of meeting their basic needs, but it is alarming that there has been no talk of reconstruction, despite the destruction far exceeding that of 18 years ago.

In part, this is due to the collapse of the Lebanese banking sector in 2019 and the failure of politicians to enact any meaningful reform to rectify the situation. It is also a reaction to Hezbollah's efforts to effectively kill an investigation into the Beirut port explosion of August 2020 that killed hundreds and caused billions of dollars worth of damages. In short, donors baulk at throwing good money after bad.

Lebanon's political landscape was already paralysed, as evidenced by the years-long inability to appoint a president, but Israel's relentless and high-intensity assault is likely to make it worse. Hezbollah, such a prominent player, has been hit hard and prevented from regrouping or focusing on anything beyond its survival.

Israel's campaign has specifically targeted cities regarded as Shiite hubs, such as Nabatieh, Tyre, and Bint Jbeil. Their destruction threatens to leave Shiite citizens in a state of enduring displacement and detachment from their homeland, while the cities will bear the scars of this relentless bombing, forever altering what once was.

Israel's systematic bombardment of Shiite-majority towns risks igniting an already-incendiary situation in Lebanon

Opportunity and gratitude

Former allies of Hezbollah are now distancing themselves from it. Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) leader Gebran Bassil is perhaps the most prominent. Since a 2006 deal facilitated General Aoun's presidency, Hezbollah has bestowed favours on Aounists like Bassil, so this is quite the schism.

In exchange for political support and a Christian endorsement, the FPM was given a significant role in Lebanon's political sphere, including opportunities for public resource exploitation. Bassil's shift, appearing both opportunistic and ungrateful, shows how the Lebanese political toolkit includes treachery, abandonment, and backstabbing.

It remains to be seen how Shiite supporters of Hezbollah and Amal will respond. Backed into a corner, Hezbollah's reaction to events has been one of heightened defiance, not only towards Israel but also towards other Lebanese factions. 

The extensive destruction of Shiite towns and villages, coupled with the loss of livelihoods, has stirred resentment and accusations that some are trying to force Lebanon's Shiites back into the impoverished conditions they endured under the First Republic following Lebanon's independence. 

Tensions have been exacerbated by the perception that some factions have sought to capitalise on the vulnerability of Shiites after Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah was killed on 27 September.

It is clear that Israel's campaign against Shiite heartland goes beyond the mere targeting of Hezbollah's rockets. It is about fundamentally reshaping Lebanon's political landscape by weakening an already fragile political structure and extending its instability far into the future, regardless of who claims victory in the current war.

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