Conflict in the Middle East: The cost of inaction

The shifting global order and Western reluctance to intervene have allowed conflicts to persist unchecked in the Middle East

Conflict in the Middle East: The cost of inaction

Israel’s mission to eradicate Hamas in Gaza following the group’s killing of over 1,200 Israelis on 7 October 2023 has expanded into a much wider military campaign. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is seizing this moment to restore his country’s deterrence, downgrade the capabilities of Hamas, Hezbollah and other armed non-state actors, and reassert Israel’s military and technological dominance in the region.

But what has enabled this moment? How can Netanyahu prosecute a war that has killed, to date, over 42,000 Palestinians and at least 2,000 Lebanese civilians without the entire international community imposing or demanding a ceasefire?

The cause of Israel’s actions this time around can be attributed to Hamas’s military incursion and Hezbollah’s repeated missile attacks against its territory—no country should have to endure that. But to comprehend how a single conflict actor can seemingly act with impunity, one needs to look at the changes in the international political environment following the US-led war on Iraq.

Security in a multipolar world

While the conflicts we are witnessing now have a long and painful history, their nature stems from the aftermath of Iraq, which tempered the appetite of Western governments to intervene in conflicts. The chaos left in the wake of the NATO-led operation in Libya in 2012—which was supposed to exorcise the ghost of Iraq—only compounded leaders’ reluctance to engage in future conflicts.

This shift became abundantly clear when Russia annexed Crimea in 2014 and deployed its forces into Syria in 2015. The Western response—to impose sanctions and arm opposition groups—was limited. Even after Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022—which was on another scale, on par with Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990—Western states employed similar measures. By doing so, they signalled to middle powers that they were free to act at will and could do so without fear of major sanction.

The unipolar order has given way to a messy multipolarity, and Western states have narrowed their definitions of "national interest"

Gone are the days when superpowers could compel allies to exercise constraint. The US no longer desires to mobilise coalitions and liberate countries or apply overbearing pressure on all conflict parties to reach a ceasefire. The unipolar order has given way to a messy multipolarity, and Western states have narrowed their definitions of "national interest."

It is not just about avoiding military intervention but, more importantly, a reluctance to exercise muscular diplomacy—to persuade partners to stop killing civilians and make a genuine push for ceasefires. The US and European powers might call for ceasefires but are unwilling to put weight behind them. The Biden administration criticises Israel's actions against Palestinian and Lebanese civilians and chastises Netanyahu but does little else. In fact, it continues to arm Israel.

In this multipolar world, major powers seem willing to live with active conflicts as long as they pose no threat to their national interests. In the Middle East, conflicts continue in Libya, Syria, Yemen, Gaza and now Lebanon—with no end in sight.

The 2015 nuclear deal (JCPOA) marked the US's political "swing" away from the region. The US withdrawal from the deal during Donald Trump's presidency did little to alter Washington's course. President Biden has tried to steer in the same direction. Meanwhile, Europe also swung away, becoming more inward-looking as it dealt with Brexit and COVID-19. Neither Russia nor China has the capacity or will to swing into the West's place.

This has left a political and security vacuum for regional states and armed non-state actors to fill—which they have, attacking their enemies with impunity and without recourse from the major powers. Examples include Iran targeting Saudi Arabia's energy assets in Abqaiq and Khurais in 2019; the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps launching missiles against a suspected Israeli target in Erbil in 2022; Yemen's Houthis targeting shipping in the Red Sea after October 2023; and Israel killing of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran in July this year.

The US and European powers have shown a reluctance to exercise muscular diplomacyto persuade partners to stop killing civilians

The new face of conflict

It is in this environment that Israel now operates. Netanyahu has chosen this moment—in the aftermath of 7 October, after a decade preparing to dismantle Hezbollah, and during the dying days of a lame-duck US presidency—to press home Israel's military advantage and project its dominance back into the region. He has come to realise that he can act without restraint, at least until the next US president takes office, and is therefore determined to vanquish Israel's enemies with little thought for civilian lives.

Aside from the US deploying aircraft carriers to signal its readiness to aid Israel in the event of an all-out war, the states and armed non-state actors of the region will be left to fight it out. Meanwhile, the US continues to supply Israel with advanced arms and matériel, giving Tel Aviv an unassailable advantage overall.

As the Israeli army pushes further into Lebanon, continues its bombardment of Gaza and contemplates a reprisal against Iran—the world's major powers will call for an end to violence, wring their hands, and live with the conflicts.

In the short term, it seems only the next US president will have the authority to rein in Israel and bring an end to these battles, but that is not a given. Over the longer term, Israel will have to face living in a regional environment in which it has squandered goodwill and the hope for normalisation and stoked generational resentment.

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