Filling the void: Syria’s Assad seeks to reprise a role in Lebanon

With Israel having killed so many Hezbollah leaders, including the influential Hassan Nasrallah, Iran's joystick controlling Beirut has been severed. Eyeing a power vacuum is Syria's Bashar al-Assad.

Filling the void: Syria’s Assad seeks to reprise a role in Lebanon

Not long ago, a senior-level meeting was convened in Damascus. Supported by key Arab states, it explored the reassertion of Syrian influence in Lebanon.

For almost three decades, from 1976 to 2005, troops from Beirut’s much larger eastern neighbour were stationed in Lebanon, only leaving after the assassination of popular Lebanese Prime Minister Rafic Hariri. How, attendees pondered, could Syria re-enter the fray?

The ‘elephant in the room’ was Hezbollah’s Secretary-General, Hassan Nasrallah. A staunch ally of Syria, he had spent three decades making Hezbollah the most influential force in Lebanon, effectively assuming Syria’s former role. Indeed, when the Syrian army withdrew from Lebanon in April 2005, Nasrallah even organised a ‘Loyalty to Syria’ march. It symbolised a transfer of the Lebanese crown.

What remained unspoken during discussions was that Nasrallah now represented an obstacle to Syria’s reassertion into Lebanon. The possibility of Israel removing Nasrallah from the equation entirely also went unmentioned at the meeting, yet it will have been on more than one mind.

That outcome has now come to pass. Analysts now wonder whether his absence will weaken the two decades of influence that Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has had in Lebanon. If so, could it let Syrian President Bashar al-Assad reprise the role first initiated by his father Hafez?

Sniffing an opportunity

Israel’s operational objectives in Lebanon include dismantling Hezbollah’s leadership, severing its communications networks, eliminating the missile stockpiles, launch sites, and production facilities, and disrupting supply lines from both the sea and Syria. Arguably, it is achieving its aims.

At the time of writing, Israel is also weighing up a ground incursion, as part of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s plan to let 60,000 displaced Israelis return to northern Israel by creating a threat-free zone north of the border.

When the Syrian army withdrew from Lebanon in April 2005, Nasrallah organised a 'Loyalty to Syria' march, a symbolic transfer of the Lebanese crown

This mirrors Israel's original aims in Gaza: to establish a safe-zone in the northern part of the Gaza Strip to facilitate the return of displaced Israelis near the border. However, the conflict quickly escalated, leading to extensive land and air operations and widespread destruction.

There are similar mirrors in history—notably the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, which began with the aim of establishing a security buffer zone but expanded to a full-scale invasion that reached Beirut and Baalbek near the Syrian border. The siege ultimately led to the expulsion from Lebanon of Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) fighters under Yasser Arafat, who packed his bags and decamped to Tunisia.

Quietly manoeuvring

Israel may be planning something similar in the coming weeks and months, encouraged by financial, military, and intelligence support from the United States, which is otherwise preoccupied with its upcoming November elections.

The period between now and January is when outgoing US presidents are known as "lame ducks" on account of their lack of time or clout to do anything of substance. This may give Israel and Netanyahu greater leeway to intensify operations, knowing that Washington is pre-occupied.

Netanyahu is not alone in manoeuvring. Syrian President Bashar al-Assad also seems to be positioning himself to capitalise on developments in Lebanon—a country Syria's leaders see as their strategic backyard. For the past year and throughout the Gaza war, al-Assad has maintained a notably silent and neutral stance, giving no military support to Hamas or the Iran-backed Axis of Resistance. Even his statements have been restrained.

A favour not repaid

When the Israelis killed senior Iranian military leaders in their consulate in Damascus in April, al-Assad did nothing, just as he has whenever Israeli air strikes targeted Iranian or Hezbollah assets in Syria. This is despite Syria being an ally of Iran and despite Hezbollah having helped save al-Assad's regime just over a decade ago.

When Israel and Hezbollah last went to war in 2006, Syria's role was markedly different—it actively supported Hezbollah, both covertly and overtly. Today, Hezbollah is lucky if Damascus expresses sympathy.

A case in point was al-Assad's message to the "Lebanese National Resistance" and the "family of the martyr Hassan Nasrallah," delivered three days after Nasrallah's death. He said Nasrallah "will remain in the memory of the Syrian people, in recognition of his leadership of the Lebanese National Resistance alongside Syria in its war against the tools of Zionism, despite the heavy burden of that confrontation".

When Israel and Hezbollah went to war in 2006, Syria actively supported Hezbollah. Today, Hezbollah is lucky if Damascus expresses sympathy.

Hezbollah recently reminded al-Assad of the pivotal support it showed him just over a decade ago when anti-Assad forces had the upper hand and were heading for Damascus until Hezbollah and Russia intervened.

A video tribute mourning the assassination of Hezbollah commander Ibrahim Aqil emphasised his involvement in key battles in the Damascus countryside, Idlib, and Homs. It showed Aqil helping al-Assad in his hour of need. Many saw it as a subtle rebuke to al-Assad's disinterest in returning the favour.

How to fill the void

Hezbollah's thorough penetration by Israeli intelligence, followed by precision targeting from Israel's air force, has led to the death or injury of many Hezbollah leaders and fighters and the destruction of much of its advanced weaponry.

The group is on the ropes. If it survives, it will likely be preoccupied with a major rebuild over the coming years. That preoccupation will lose its influence in Damascus. Naturally, any weakening of Hezbollah in Lebanon directly diminishes Iran's influence there, creating a power vacuum that other parties will inevitably seek to fill. Al-Assad will have seen this opportunity.

Preserving Hezbollah's structure is now a top priority for Iran's Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei. Yet, he will know that al-Assad cannot waltz into Lebanon as his father did in 1976 when the Syrian military was strong, and the Syrian state was stable and cohesive.

Eyes on a bigger prize

Today's Syria is vastly different. It is fragmented into three distinct regions, each operating almost independently. Syrian society remains deeply riven, and its economy is on life support. Unable to control its own territory, vast swathes of Syria have become the playground of foreign powers who set up bases to wage war against armed groups, whether it be Turkey fighting Kurdish groups or America fighting jihadists.

Whereas Syria's former role in Lebanon was once part of some broader regional and international agreements, today's Syria is internationally isolated, sanctioned by the West, and fighting to reclaim its former standing.

In the past, al-Assad's support for Hezbollah was a strategy to break Syria's isolation. Today, several Arab states urge him to move away from Hezbollah and Iran if he wants to reintegrate into the Arab fold.

And that may not be the only prize.

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