Houthis in Syria: Genuine threat or political posturing?

Nevertheless, subsequent reports from Syrian and Israeli sources suggested that four senior Houthi commanders entered Syria from Iraq even before al-Houthi's public threat. These commanders were allegedly escorted by the Iranian-backed Iraqi Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) and held meetings with officials from the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Hezbollah at a military base in Al-Bukamal, near the Iraqi border.

Additional reports indicated that around 50 Houthi fighters had entered Syria and were deployed to the southern regions, adding fuel to the fire of speculation about the group's true intentions. The PMF has recently strengthened its military collaboration with the Houthis and announced joint attacks against Israel over the past few months, lending credibility to these reports.

While these reports are difficult to independently verify, the idea that Houthi fighters have entered Syria is not entirely far-fetched. The group has previously trained in Syria, and its close ties to Iran and the PMF suggest it could easily access areas controlled by Iranian-backed forces inside the country.

Although the presence of Houthi fighters in Syria does not necessarily mean they will imminently attack Israel, it is logistically feasible for the group to launch an assault should they obtain approval from Iran. The group's advanced weaponry is sourced from or based on Iranian technology, meaning there would be no need to transport arms from Yemen to Syria—Iran or its Iraqi allies could easily supply the necessary equipment.

Another question is about the type of attack the Houthis might launch from Syria. Given Israel's recent military build-up along its border with Syria, a ground assault seems unlikely. Instead, an aerial attack, likely using drones or missiles, is more plausible.

Reports indicate that many of the Houthi fighters allegedly entering Syria are drone specialists, suggesting that drone strikes are the most likely method of attack. However, the ultimate choice of weapon will depend on whether the broader objective behind any potential assault is to make a symbolic statement or cause significant damage.

Political posturing

The deployment of a small number of Houthi fighters to Syria likely serves more of a political purpose than a tactical one. It is highly unlikely that these fighters possess any unique skills that are not already available among the thousands of Iranian-backed forces stationed in Syria. Given this, the real motive behind their presence is likely symbolic. For Iran, positioning Houthi fighters in Syria bolsters its "unity of front" narrative, illustrating solidarity among its regional allies and showcasing its ability to deploy them in attacks against Israel, even beyond their traditional areas of operation.

In turn, the Houthis can benefit from positioning themselves near Israel's borders, as it allows them to demonstrate their extended reach. A minor missile attack from southern Syria could be sufficient to achieve this goal. While such an attack may have little military significance, it would still enable the Houthis to claim that they have brought the fight directly to Israel's doorstep, thereby enhancing their influence and regional stature.

PMF considerations

Whether true or merely a rumour, publicising the presence of Houthi fighters in Syria could also serve the interests of the PMF, which does not appear to be in a position to escalate in solidarity with Hamas. Since October, these groups have demonstrated their support by attacking US forces in both Iraq and Syria. However, as Iraq approaches an agreement to facilitate the withdrawal of US troops by 2026, the militias may soon face constraints in their operations against American targets.

In this context, rumours of Houthi fighters in Syria provide the PMF with a convenient rationale for scaling back their direct actions. They could claim that such a decision is intended to empower the Houthis to lead the resistance from within Syria against Israel and US forces. To avoid appearing overly passive, the PMF stationed in Syria might assist the Houthis in launching symbolic strikes, signalling that the impending withdrawal of US forces from Iraq has not diminished their commitment to supporting Hamas.

Al-Assad's calculations

While seemingly the least involved actor in this situation, the Syrian regime also has its own calculations to consider. Since the outbreak of the Gaza conflict, al-Assad has maintained a careful stance of non-involvement, even as Israeli air strikes continue to hit targets in Syria. Several factors drive his reluctance to engage: Syria's weakened military capacity, a struggling economy, concerns over Israeli retaliation, strained ties with Hamas, and a desire to strengthen diplomatic relations with Arab states.

If Houthi fighters are indeed present in Syria and preparing for an attack against Israel, al-Assad's response will likely depend on his assessment of the associated risks. Without solid evidence of an imminent large-scale attack, al-Assad could conclude that the repercussions of such an attack would be minimal, particularly since Israeli strikes on Syrian territory have become routine.

As a result, the Syrian regime may choose to turn a blind eye, as it has occasionally done with Iranian-backed groups launching limited strikes against Israel from its territory. Moreover, al-Assad's willingness to allow a symbolic strike could be motivated by economic considerations. Syria is currently grappling with severe fuel shortages, and al-Assad might see cooperation with Tehran in this matter as a way to secure more oil supplies.

While the potential presence of Houthis in Syria may be largely symbolic rather than a game-changer, its implications could nonetheless be significant. Israel might leverage this presence as a justification to escalate military operations across the region. Such actions would likely exacerbate tensions, leaving both the region and its residents on high alert, anxiously preparing for the worst.