Indeed, Israel could be escalating today to avoid war; that is, to push Hezbollah to accept the only diplomatic solution on the table—the one presented by Amos Hochstein (the US envoy for international energy affairs) to delink Lebanon from Gaza and implement UN Security Council Resolution 1701, which ended the 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah. This means that Hezbollah will have to accept a separate ceasefire agreement, withdraw its military presence to north of the Litani River, roughly 18 miles away from the border, and allow displaced Israelis to return safely to the north.
Until last week, Israel and Hezbollah had been walking a very thin line between a full-scale war and a calculated pattern of attacks and responses.
Hezbollah lost military infrastructure, commanders, and weapons, but most importantly, it lost security and trust among its ranks. After every assassination or strike, and specifically with the mass explosions of pagers and radios, Hezbollah now fears more in-depth infiltration in its ranks by the Israeli intelligence agencies. And its militants lost trust in their own, fearing that anyone could be an Israeli spy.
Read more: Pager attack transforms 'axis of resistance' into 'axis of paranoia'
The group also lost trust in technology and has no reliable communications system that it could rely on for any military response or war. The only way left is verbal communications, which its leaders resorted to when the in-person meeting between Akil and the Radwan Forces was scheduled—and then hit by an Israeli strike. The level of infiltration is deeper than they know.
People gather in front of a building targeted by an Israeli strike in Beirut's southern suburbs on September 20, 2024.
Additionally, Hezbollah has lost the trust of its own community. If it cannot protect itself, many are asking, then how can it protect its constituency and supporters? It will be very difficult to assure its community of safety and security while walking—and exploding—among them. Worse still, the group is no longer Iran's success story in the region.
The fact that Israel could kill Shukr and Akil in the middle of their stronghold in the southern Beirut suburb of Dahiyeh is a big breach. However, what is a lot more troubling for Hezbollah's leadership is its loss of the element of surprise, which has always been part of its military strategy. Israel knew exactly when and how Hezbollah was planning to retaliate for Shukr in August, as the IDF launched a preemptive strike against the group's infrastructure, including the launchers it had prepared for the operation.
All these losses, in addition to the group's incapacity thus far to conduct an effective military response against Israel, is both humiliating and embarrassing for Hezbollah. But on the military level, it is worse: Hezbollah is more deterred than ever.
The group could eventually recover from these losses, rebuild its communication network, counter Israeli intelligence, and regain trust among its community. But this is all going to take a long time, a luxury that Hezbollah might not be able to afford.
Today, any response to Israel's escalation requires the militant group to resolve the following concerns:
First, without a proper communications system, Hezbollah cannot coordinate on targeting, responses, or logistics. It also cannot easily use verbal or written communications—similar to the system that Hamas is currently using inside Gaza's tunnels. Lebanon is much bigger, and without an efficient and fast communication system, Hezbollah's military capability to conduct war is largely diminished.
A man holds a walkie-talkie after removing the battery during the funeral of persons killed when hundreds of paging devices exploded in a deadly wave across Lebanon the previous day in Beirut's southern suburbs on September 19, 2024
Second, many top Hezbollah officials have been killed or injured. The pagers that exploded hit many of the group's senior and mid-level operatives. The shipment contained 5,000 pagers, and Hezbollah's fighting force alone has been independently estimated to comprise at least 20,000 militants. Pagers were provided to officials and fighters with special skills and missions; that is, those who need to be protected. Families of Hezbollah members of Lebanon's parliament and high-ranking commanders, in addition to high-level security personnel, were among the casualties—not to mention Iran's ambassador to Lebanon, who was reportedly in close proximity to an exploding device.
Finally, Hezbollah still hasn't figured out how deeply infiltrated by Israeli intelligence it is. Sources close to its inner circle have told Foreign Policy that the group's leaders are looking into every single piece of electronic gear they own, and that they are worried that their cars, motorcycles, and even their advanced missile factories are booby-trapped and could go off any minute.
The group will have to conduct an in-depth investigation to make sure that other items have not been infiltrated or compromised by the Israelis, which will take weeks. And if Hezbollah fears that its missile facilities are booby-trapped or monitored, it will be logistically very difficult to safely move these weapons in order to launch them.
The Israeli government seems to think that Hezbollah's setbacks are a good opportunity for the IDF to launch a war to further erode the group's capabilities. But a war similar to that of 2006 might cause Israel real damage without leading to the elimination of the Hezbollah threat. Moreover, it could lead to more international isolation and more civilian casualties on both sides, as well as risk a regional war from multiple fronts.