FOCAC at 25: How a China-Africa forum is moving beyond trade

The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation brought together over 50 heads of state, including Xi Jinping. Its success shows that there is an alternative to the West’s development values

African leaders applaud Chinese President Xi Jinping (C) after his speech at the opening ceremony of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in Beijing’s Great Hall of the People on September 5, 2024.
Greg Baker / AFP
African leaders applaud Chinese President Xi Jinping (C) after his speech at the opening ceremony of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in Beijing’s Great Hall of the People on September 5, 2024.

FOCAC at 25: How a China-Africa forum is moving beyond trade

The main international group bringing China and African nations together marked its 25-year anniversary this month in a display of its unique convening power and influence.

The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) gathered 51 African heads of state or government alongside President Xi Jinping of China, UN Secretary-General António Guterres, and the chair of the African Union’s commission, Moussa Faki Mahamat. The leaders present represented 27% of the UN’s membership and a third of the world’s population, showing the reach of this tri-annual summit, which has sought to draw the roadmap for relations between China and Africa for a quarter of a century.

Growing significance

The forum has been a source of deep insight into geopolitical and economic changes as African nations’ global significance has increased, and this was its first face-to-face gathering since the pandemic. In the 25 years since its establishment, China has registered transformative economic progress across the continent, including via Beijing’s huge infrastructure investment programme in the Global South: the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

The forum is now seen as one of the most pragmatic and successful of its kind, but although its success is apparent, some wonder whether it is still best-placed to advance African interests, with questions about Western influence on the continent.

The founding idea for FOCAC actually did not come from China, which was not always ubiquitous in African development. Rather, it stemmed from a proposal in the 1990s from a former foreign minister of Madagascar, Lila Ratsifandrihamanana, who said China should emulate other major economies in establishing a means of cooperating with Africa.

Around the turn of the century, the global economic picture was very different. Less than a decade earlier, the US and USSR were still locked in the Cold War. In 1998, China was just catching up with sub-Saharan Africa in terms of economic size. Gross domestic product per capita in China in 2000 was $959, with sub-Saharan Africa at $638. The two were at near-parity in terms of economic development. Both were net exporters of labour and net importers of foreign capital and technology, heavily reliant on Western markets. This meant that, as FOCAC emerged, its members' ambitions were limited to enhancing mutual trade and political support on the international stage. Today, the global economy is very different.

China and Africa's growing stature and influence have, in turn boosted FOCAC's own reputation. By helping members combine their soft and hard power, its scope now spans trade, investment, health, education, politics, security and technology.

ADEK BERRY / AFP

The forum has adapted to changing internal and global conditions, shifting its own policy objectives over time, fashioned along the lines of China's well-established Five-Year Plans for the country's own national economic development.

Over the last 25 years, FOCAC's stewardship of relations between China and Africa has evolved from a trade-centric partnership, as globalisation itself has also changed. Five main pillars have been involved in this process: trade partnership, recalibration of supply chains, multi-dimensional infrastructure development in Africa, technology and knowledge transfer, and China's soft power.

Pillar 1: Trade partnership

FOCAC's modest initial intentions were to enhance mutual trade relations and strengthen political and diplomatic trust between China and African nations as peers in the developing world.

In 2000, China was a burgeoning global exporter with very little financial leverage to invest internationally. The size of its economy just about surpassed that of Italy and trade between Africa and China was a meagre $10bn. By 2008, that had expanded by a factor of ten, with China being Africa's largest trading partner ever since. In 2015, trade levels were 20 times higher, at $200bn. In 2023, two-way trade passed $282bn, meaning trade had grown 28 times bigger in 23 years.

Throughout China's rise to become the world's leading exporter, Beijing has placed great emphasis on enhancing its national imports from Africa. As early as 2003, China offered tariff-free imports from Africa's least developed countries (LDCs).

Over time, zero-tariff imports from LDCs that have diplomatic relations with China have grown dramatically. They now cover 100% of imports from 33 of Africa's LDCs. As the numbers clearly demonstrate, trade has been central to the mutual development of China and Africa and will always be a key part of FOCAC's work.

As globalisation changed, FOCAC's stewardship of China-Africa relations has evolved from a trade-centric partnership 

Pillar 2: Recalibration of supply chains

An inflexion point between the West and China was reached around 2008. As the West retrenched its investments in Africa after the global financial crisis, China stepped in and became the principal investor in the continent.

But China's investment in Africa began even earlier. When FOCAC met in 2006, for instance, Beijing doubled its financial aid programme, offering $5bn in concessional loans and credit to Africa over the next three years. The China-Africa Development Fund was established in 2007, boosting China's foreign direct investment (FDI) across Africa. However, large-scale and systematic Chinese investments in Africa only accelerated in the 2010s.

At first, Chinese FDI was primarily made in sectors such as agriculture, energy, utilities, and mining, in projects led by Chinese state-owned companies. As China grew into a net importer of food and energy, it grew heavily reliant on global markets for raw materials to support its domestic industries and the livelihoods of its workers. Investing in the world's resource-rich regions became an economic necessity.

By the second half of the 2010s, Chinese companies had become world leaders in medium- to high-end manufacturing supply chains. After China launched its industrial policy Made in China 2025, Chinese companies became dominant in sectors such as electronics, equipment and machinery, and telecoms, and the likes of Huawei, Alibaba, Transsion, and Sany became prominent investors in Africa.

Africa's growing middle-class population created demand for better healthcare, education, financial services, entertainment, and real estate—areas in which China's private sector now had expertise. Chinese firms could meet this new demand in part because China had experienced very similar socio-economic conditions during its own rapid development and urbanisation in the preceding decades. They felt they could help Africa replicate the changes.  

A wave of investment in Africa followed, 90% of which has come from China's private sector since the start of the 2020s in a process no longer led by state directives but by economic incentives.

Demographics are also reshaping ties. With its ageing population, China no longer has excess labour, whereas Africa has 1.3 billion people with a median age of 18.9. China, therefore, looks to Africa's young, dynamic workforce, its growing indigenous market, and global trade from Africa's free trade zones.

AFP
Construction workers work on a highway construction site near Abidjan on September 4, 2024.

Pillar 3: Multi-dimensional infrastructure development

Chinese investments in Africa's infrastructure grew since the launch of Beijing's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), its global infrastructure development strategy.

China's BRI investment in Africa began with rails, roads, ports, industrial parks, and special economic zones, with the transport links connecting Africa's resource-rich inland to its coastal regions. This has helped unite Africa into an integrated single market. Infrastructure programmes are conducive to wider economic growth and are needed to provide the transnational connections to achieve the vision set out for an Africa Continental Free Trade Agreement, or AfcFTA.

Beyond transport, Chinese telecoms firms have helped develop Africa's communication networks and undersea cables, providing the infrastructure for Africa's digital economy. China's BeiDou satellite positioning system also operates in Africa.

Pillar 4: Technology and knowledge transfer

Since the launch of Made in China 2025, Beijing has accelerated its technological ties with the global south, with exports seen in digital tech and telecoms, renewable energy, and advanced manufacturing.

At this month's latest FOCAC meeting, China showed more ambition, promising to create 20 digital flagship programmes, 30 clean energy projects, 20 joint research labs, five China-Africa industrial cooperation zones, and ten industrial parks. It also offered to work with Africa on joint explorations of deep space. This amounts to a new industrial policy for Africa—one the continent needs to catch up with the wider global industrial development curve via a focus on agriculture and value-added manufacturing.

The diffusion of technology into Africa and a trained workforce will be central to its industrialisation. At the 2021 FOCAC, China offered to create 800,000 technical jobs in Africa over the next three years. It now wants to create 1 million jobs in Africa by 2027. The skills training programme for the continent, funded and run by China, is called Luban Workshops.

Throughout China's rise to become the world's leading exporter, it has boosted imports from Africa.

Pillar 5: Chinese Soft Power

China's global influence has been much defined by its hard economic power during President Xi Jinping's tenure, but Africa has also experienced the successful advance of China's soft power, more so than any other region of the world.  Since the 2021 FOCAC, many cooperation mechanisms have been formalised between the Communist Party of China and African political parties, respective legislative bodies, think tanks, media organisations, police forces, and top military brass.

The 2024 FOCAC highlighted the importance of political cooperation, showing how the forum has changed. It is no longer a mechanism strictly focused on economic cooperation. Political solidarity has become an important part of the FOCAC agenda.  

This has left Africa's FOCAC members having to take a position on Taiwan, which the West sees as an independent sovereign state but which China sees as a breakaway province that is part of China. Its views are contained in its One China Policy.

At the conclusion of the 2024 FOCAC, the Beijing Declaration endorsed the country's One China Policy and proclaimed China's support for Africa to tackle its security "the African Way." Beijing joined Africa's call for reforms of the International Monetary Fund and supported Africa's desire to create its own credit rating agency.

China also encouraged African nations to seek accession to the BRICS+ bloc of nations, which is now expanding from the group of five emerging market nations that gave it its name: Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. The group is also keen to move away from dependence on the dollar by widening the use of local currencies in trade and finance.

Beijing also encouraged African nations to raise finance via so-called Panda Bonds, which are denominated in renminbi, China's currency but issued to other countries. These moves are all steps toward deeper economic integration across the global south and further de-risking from the global financial system, which is still largely denominated in the dollar.

Ewan White

Read more: Can a BRICS currency really compete with the US dollar?

Should the West worry?

The 2024 FOCAC revealed a more symbiotic relationship between China and Africa. With the launch of an African industrial strategy, the Chinese global value chain will deeply connect with Africa's. Over time, this will tie the two manufacturing economies and their markets more closely together.  

The FOAC has also become a political symbol. This year's meeting emphasised that economic development is a fundamental human right, in sharp contrast to the Western definition of human rights ensured by civil liberty. The forum made clear that the continent's development and security must be achieved by the African Way, an implicit rejection of the West.

The change toward a "my region, my way" approach to forge a new economic order shows how FOCAC is part of the wider global geopolitical changes underway.

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