Salim al-Huss: The black sheep of Lebanon's traditional politics

Al-Huss stands out as one of Lebanon's only politicians who was able to break into the political establishment on merit rather than family status

Salim al-Huss: The black sheep of Lebanon's traditional politics

I vividly remember a conversation with the former prime minister of Lebanon, the late Salim al-Huss, who once told me with a chuckle that our families were related. He believed that the al-Huss and Itani clans had split long ago, jokingly adding that it was part of a "corrective movement." This exchange took place during an interview I conducted with him – alongside my late colleagues Suhail Abboud and Mustafa Yassin – just weeks after his resignation in October 1990.

Al-Huss’s resignation paved the way for Omar Karami to form a new government as prime minister. At the time, Lebanon was recovering from the defeat of General Michel Aoun, who had stubbornly held out in the Baabda Presidential Palace, defying the Taif Accord that ended the civil war.

During our conversation, al-Huss candidly shared his reflections on the turbulent period when two competing governments ruled Lebanon: his own civilian government and the military government led by Aoun, which included two of his high-ranking officers. He spoke of the "liberation war" that General Aoun had launched, a campaign that only deepened Lebanon's devastation.

I had the privilege of covering al-Huss from his office, conveniently located in the same building where he lived. Once he finished his meetings and other duties, he would brief journalists on the latest developments.

It was a dark time marked by the invasion of Kuwait by Saddam Hussein and the subsequent catastrophe that engulfed the region. In one of the briefings, a colleague who had recently returned from Kuwait recounted his harrowing experience, along with that of others who had been forced to flee the Iraqi occupation. Al-Huss listened intently to every word. He was known for his attentiveness and willingness to answer any question, no matter how trivial.

About a year and a half later, in 1992, I witnessed a telling moment at the entrance to a polling station. It was during the first parliamentary elections held after the civil war and the constitutional amendments of the Taif Accords. A policeman engaged in a friendly conversation with those waiting to vote and casually asked them, "Who will you vote for?" The unanimous answer was al-Huss.

While this exchange might have breached democratic norms and the secrecy of the ballot, the atmosphere was one of camaraderie. One policeman, responding to this chorus of support, remarked: "If you cut your finger, your blood would chant for Salim al-Huss."

In Lebanon, where money is crucial to political success, al-Huss's modest means set him apart.

Although I did not stay in touch with him due to changes in my work circumstances, I continued to follow al-Huss in his various positions and kept abreast of his opinions after Rafic Hariri's dramatic arrival in office. The 1996 parliamentary elections were particularly challenging for al-Huss. At that moment, all the forces contributing to his leadership's decline seemed to converge, overshadowed by Hariri's dazzling ascent.

Modest background

Al-Huss broke into Lebanese politics, lacking what was traditionally needed to succeed. An economist from a modest family, he was imbued with the spirit of the late President Fouad Chehab's era, which was the only time there was a genuine movement to dismantle its traditional routes to leadership. Al-Huss stood as an example of how this was achievable.

Lebanese politicians usually attain their positions of power because they come from an influential family. Due to the dissolution of tribal and clan affiliations among the Sunnis along the Lebanese coast, feudal lineage became the second-best route to attaining power. Sunni families from northern Lebanon followed this path, while other political families set a similar trajectory.

Al-Huss was never a man of wealth. Although his previous role as a financial and economic advisor afforded him a comfortable standard of living, it did not allow him to accumulate the substantial wealth necessary to cultivate leadership in Lebanon.

In a nation where money is crucial for attracting support, maintaining loyalty, and commanding unwavering allegiance – regardless of how extreme or irrational a leader's views may be – al-Huss's modest means set him apart and endeared him to the people of Beirut and other Sunni communities. Unlike his Sunni counterparts, al-Huss set out on his own path, distinguished by his exceptional academic achievements, composed demeanour, and a deliberate distance from the bombastic rhetoric of the political discourse of the 1960s and 1970s.

He believed in a political philosophy that revered the state, its institutions, and the principle of public service. He shared this vision with his friend, President Elias Sarkis, who appointed him prime minister following the first two tumultuous years of the civil war (1975-76). It was a moment in Lebanese history when the prospect of achieving political reconciliation seemed within reach.

Al-Huss believed in a political philosophy that revered the state, its institutions, and the principle of public service.

Enter Hariri

But Hariri's entry into the political scene in the early 1990s upturned everything. With his vast fortune and intricate web of connections with powerful Arab and international officials, Hariri was the antithesis of al-Huss.

His credentials were further bolstered by an unprecedented Arab and Western consensus to rebuild Lebanon and forge a political settlement—particularly after the ousting of Aoun and the marginalisation of the Lebanese Forces and the Kataeb Party, the primary Christian factions in Lebanon.

It is widely believed that al-Huss perceived Hariri's rapid rise and his dominion over the Sunni sect as a direct threat to his own political career. Much has been written about this. This realisation led al-Huss to take a series of oppositional positions, most notably accepting the premiership from President Emile Lahoud, Hariri's chief rival.

This decision was part of a broader strategy of settling scores orchestrated by certain Syrian officials loyal to the then-rising figure of Major Bashar al-Assad, who was being groomed to succeed his ailing father.

Al-Huss, however, entered this game of political intrigue without the intention or the means to reap the wealth, positions, or privileges that others sought. This choice proved catastrophic for him, both in terms of his legacy and his reputation. The Sunni community in Lebanon, steeped in a tradition of leadership that coveted wealth, power, and the display of strength—qualities that resonated with the era—ultimately abandoned him.

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