Unpacking the puzzle: Israel’s killing of Hezbollah’s commanders

The US government offering rewards for information about designated terrorists listed him as "a close associate of now-deceased Hezbollah commander Imad Mughniyah".

The missiles unit that Shukr headed was under the direct command of Mughniyah (also known as Hajj Radwan) until his killing in Damascus in 2008.

Urgent calls have grown for foreign nationals to leave Lebanon, which would be on the front line of a regional war, as Iran and its allies readied their response to high-profile killings blamed on Israel.

Mughinyah's role as the sole military adviser to Hezbollah's Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah was then handed to Mustafa Badreddine, but after Badreddine's killing in 2016, there was no direct replacement.

Instead, the role of adviser was given to Hezbollah's Jihadi Council, which is composed of several key figures. Shukr was one.

'Great Jihadist Leaders'

It is notable that Hezbollah used the same description (in 2008, 2016, and 2024) in its communiques about the respective deaths of Mughniyah, Badreddine, and Shukr. All three were referred to as "the great jihadist leader".

Hezbollah has not used this description to refer to others, which implies that Mughniyah, Badreddine, and Shukr were similarly highly ranked, but unlike Mughniyah and Badreddine, Shukr's name was not well known publicly.

Followers of Hezbollah's military affairs knew about him, but otherwise he drew little attention. Mughniyah was different. His name was well-known when he was alive, in part because Israel named him as involved in smuggling missiles to Gaza.

Demonstrators hold Hezbollah and Palestinian flags during in a protest condemning the killing of Hamas chief Ismail Haniyeh, in Sidon, Lebanon August 5, 2024.

After his assassination in 2008, Hezbollah labelled him as the "leader of the two victories", in reference to his supposed roles in Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000, and Hezbollah's self-declared victory against Israel in 2006.

The group even renamed its special operations force unit after his nickname. So, since his death, the unit has been called the Hajj Radwan Force.

Though Mughniyah was replaced by Badreddine, Hezbollah did not create a similar public persona for Badreddine, neither during his lifetime nor on death.

His name only became well known publicly after his 2011 indictment by the Special Tribunal for Lebanon for the assassination of former Lebanese prime minister Rafic Hariri. Later, when Hezbollah intervened in Syria, Badreddine played a leading role.

Nasrallah's lost aura

Unlike 2000 and 2006 (that Hezbollah frames as victories), Badreddine's activities brought Hezbollah the wrong kind of attention, so the group's focus stayed on Mughniyah's martyrdom and achievements, invoked on special occasions.

It also tried to keep public attention on Nasrallah, despite Hezbollah's intervention in Syria ten years ago having eroded his image as a charismatic Arab leader. Over time, Nasrallah's once captivating speeches lost their impact.

After Lebanon's 2019 financial crisis and the associated political crisis, Nasrallah truly lost his aura when—for the first time—he and Hezbollah were included in public criticism of the country's leadership responsible for the economic catastrophe.

This was further cemented with the Beirut Port explosion of 2020. Many in Lebanon blamed Hezbollah at least in part because of its links to the vast stock of ammonium nitrate that detonated after being inappropriately stored there. 

With its unwanted association with this series of calamities, Hezbollah changed tack, seeking as little public attention on its leaders as possible. Conversely, it is Israel that has aired the identities of the Hezbollah officers it has eliminated.

Not all have fallen

These deaths follow Israel's targeted killings of the group's high command in Lebanon and Syria. While Shukr was among the most senior, other key commanders remain alive and well, seeking to evade Israeli intelligence.

A girl attends a march called by Palestinian and Lebanese youth organisations in the southern Lebanese city of Saida, on August 5, 2024, to protest against the assassination of a Hamas chief and a Hezbollah military commander.

They include Talal Hamiyah, who heads Hezbollah's security apparatus within the Jihadi Council. Within this apparatus is Unit 910, which undertakes external operations for Hezbollah abroad and certain domestic operations like assassinations.

It was previously headed by Mughniyah and Badreddine, but due to changes to the role of military adviser to Nasrallah after Badreddine's death, Hamiyah cannot be characterised as a direct replacement.

Hamiyah's leadership in Hezbollah's military and security operations makes him the de facto highest profile military commander within the organisation. The US values him even higher than Shukr, offering $7m for information leading to his arrest.

Unit 910, which he commands, is responsible for Hezbollah's operations in Syria, including military activities on the Syria-Israel border.

Mixing and matching

One of Hezbollah's strengths as an armed group is that it combines elements of militias and armies. For instance, the group's security and military operations are not separated and distinct, as they might be in an army.

In Hezbollah, both come under the jurisdiction of the Jihadi Council, where high-level commanders oversee both activities, the Hajj Radwan Force working in tandem with military units, for example.

Memories of death and destruction during the 2006 war between Hezbollah and Israel are still ripe among Lebanese people who have yet to recover.

Likewise, Hezbollah's deployment in warzones does not adhere to the deployment of armies, but merges with the deployment of militias in asymmetrical warfare.

Israel's systematic assassinations of Hezbollah's top brass is undoubtedly limiting its abilities, but the militia still has a vast military arsenal and invaluable battle experience, and its organisational structure offers a degree of resilience following the loss of individual commanders.

Its main challenge is not the risk of collapse. It is that the precision targeting shows how Israel has thoroughly penetrated the group's communications. Unless and until that penetration ends, it will have the upper hand.