A real test of the 'rules of engagement' in Lebanon

But Israel regarded the rocket attack which killed the children in Majdal Shams as a violation of all its red lines, justifying a retaliatory strike.

In response, communication channels were swiftly activated, and mediators stepped in to craft a measured response that would appease all parties.  For their own reasons, the parties involved on both sides are unwilling or unable to engage in a full-scale war at this time.

This mode of measured warfare serves the interests of the powers involved by keeping the conflict within the established rules of engagement.

There are specific criteria which are understood by mediators and publicly acknowledged: Beirut, the capital, should not be targeted, as that would provoke a retaliatory strike on Tel Aviv. Additionally, the strike should avoid causing mass civilian casualties and refrain from damaging sensitive infrastructure.

Hezbollah follows the same guidelines when it retaliates.

From the Lebanese perspective, if the current conflict diverges from these accepted norms – which are being tested more now than at any time since 7 October – there is little chance of any political advantage for Hezbollah.

That is a change from the July 2006 war, which was skillfully leveraged by Hezbollah to consolidate its control over Lebanon and thwart efforts to oust it from power following the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafic Hariri.

No more glorious war

The 2006 conflict was portrayed as a "glorious war" effectively used by Hezbollah to outmanoeuvre  and discredit its internal opponents, exposing their political vulnerabilities.

But now, after Lebanon's deterioration under Hezbollah's rule into a place struck of a series of crises, the group is reluctant to provoke a full-scale war, and will only escalate the conflict of there is action from Israel that is so severe, it cannot be withstood or ignored.

Many Lebanese feel detached from the war and the conflict that has raged in the south of their country for over ten months, except when it disrupts their daily lives.

Lebanon's ongoing collapse since 2019 has affected not only state institutions but also the shared spaces of social life. As a result, internal groups, or sects, have withdrawn into their respective enclaves, creating ethnically defined micro-territories like the so-called bantustans of apartheid-era South Africa. Each community is seeking safety and insulation from perceived hostile outsiders.

A fractured state

The irony in this situation is that a significant portion of the Lebanese population will remain largely unaffected by the anticipated Israeli strike. Aside from Beirut airport and a few public facilities, there is little that unites the country.

Electricity is now generated locally, a necessity after the state failed to address this issue for decades. The country's infrastructure is barely functional, with roads, bridges, water and sewage systems, and internet services all in a deplorable state, operating more on inertia than any real maintenance or planning.

Thus, it is likely that when it comes, the Israeli strike will primarily affect its intended targets, leaving the already diffuse social fabric relatively intact, albeit in its current weakened state.

The Lebanese people have become increasingly fragmented, seeking refuge within their respective communities, regions, and enclaves, where they find protection from other groups. Former fellow citizens are now defined by their differences.

As a result, any Lebanese civilians who lose their lives will be mourned within their own groups, rather than under a unified national identity. These victims will be hailed as martyrs within their specific communities and political parties rather than as having made a sacrifice for the nation.

This underscores the deep divisions now apparent in Lebanese society.

Perhaps this is what has been referred to as a "blessing in disguise," now that the foundations of national unity have crumbled, undermining Lebanon's version of the grand consensus that functioning states are built on.

Perhaps. There is apparent disinterest among the Lebanese in rebuilding a state that would merely mirror the current quagmire – a sinking swamp marked by complacency, complicity, and a pervasive sense of helplessness – back on a national scale.