New Gaza Nakba deepens Palestinian divisions and differences

This situation is further aggravated by the fact that both factions rely heavily on foreign support rather than support from their own people. This dependency frees them from accountability to Palestinians. They owe their allegiance to external powers.

This dilemma is not new. It has plagued the Palestinian national liberation movement since its inception and continues to undermine its effectiveness and unity.

Shifting narratives

The popular division among Palestinians began with the shift in narrative from the First Nakba (the 1948 establishment of Israel, which shaped their national identity) to the Second Nakba (Israel's occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967).

This changed the goal of the Palestinian national movement from the liberation of all Palestine or the establishment of a secular democratic state from the river to the sea, to the establishment of a Palestinian state on the territories occupied by Israel in 1967.

The former goal was the foundation upon which most factions were established before the 1967 occupation.

This new narrative was cemented with the Oslo Accords, which concluded a series of secret negotiations in 1993, and the establishment of the Palestinian Authority (PA) in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1994.

However, these Accords left key issues unresolved, including the cessation of Jewish settlements, borders, the future of East Jerusalem and of refugees, and Israel's recognition of the Palestinians' right to establish an independent state.

Ultimately, due to Israel's evasions and manipulations, Palestinian leaders were unable to establish an independent state, barely maintaining the Palestinian Liberation Organisation's (PLO) structure. Consequently, the PLO's legitimacy, influence, and activity declined among Palestinians.

This reality has perpetuated a divide between Palestinian refugees living outside historic Palestine, and the PA, each living in its own separate realm.

The division of the PA into two competing authorities (in the West Bank and Gaza) has significantly deepened political and popular divisions. Many Palestinians now feel disconnected from the PLO, the PA, and the rival factions.

Each Palestinian community has diverged, developing distinct priorities, interests, and needs. Hamas elevated Palestinian division to a new level, particularly following its victory in the 2006 legislative elections and its subsequent split with the PA in 2007.

Different approaches

Hamas, affiliated with political Islam and the Muslim Brotherhood, has struggled to define its identity—oscillating between being an Islamic movement, a national Palestinian movement, an authority, and a national liberation movement.

Fatah is secular, focused on settlement and negotiations, while Hamas is religious and uses the Gaza Strip as a base for armed struggle aimed at liberating Palestine and defeating the occupation, regardless of feasibility or sustainability.

Both are very different, and it is this duality that has created a complex and fragmented political landscape, further complicating the path to Palestinian unity and liberation.

Palestinians' political and emotional division was exacerbated by a statement from PA president Mahmoud Abbas, a Fatah man in the West Bank, after Israel killed 300 people in the suburbs of Khan Younis while trying to free hostages.

His statement said the Israeli government was "fully responsible, as well as the US administration, which provides all kinds of support to the occupation and its crimes", yet it also blamed Hamas for "evading national unity".

Many argue that blame should be laid at the door of Palestinian leaders for their role in weakening the legitimacy of Palestinian institutions and democratic processes.

The statement, criticised for its hasty and confused nature, conflated Hamas's responsibility for Israeli crimes with its methods of struggle and political choices—an issue that should be subject to Palestinian debate and consensus.

Vision and strategy

For over six decades, the Palestinian national movement has lacked two essential pillars: a comprehensive national vision, and a feasible long-term strategy that the Palestinian people can sustain and invest in.

Hamas's decision to transform the Gaza Strip into a base for liberation has proven to be an unsustainable strategy.

A lack of natural resources and an Israeli blockade means that Gaza cannot bear the immense burden imposed on it, particularly when Israel enjoys the backing of world powers.

This has not been direct battles between two equal armies. Rather, it has led to a new nakba, comparable to 1948. Calls for support from the Arab and Islamic worlds, and from Palestinians in the West Bank and Israeli, have not altered the outcome.

Despite everything, Hamas now wants a return to the pre-7 October status quo, even though people, structures, and nature have all been irrevocably altered.

While the sacrifices and heroism of its fighters are respected, the Hamas leadership has made some terrible choices.

Leadership choices

Abbas's statement overlooked Fatah's own abundant miscalculations, such as in 1978, when Fatah fighters hijacked two Israeli buses, killing 38 civilians, including 13 children, and wounded dozens more.

In response, Israel invaded southern Lebanon in a military campaign that led to the deaths of up to 2,000 people, mostly Lebanese and Palestinian, and weakened the PLO to such an extent that it had to withdraw from the area.

In July 1981, after PLO fighters in Lebanon fired rockets into Israel, the two-week response resulted in the death of up to 300 people and the displacement of many more on both sides of the border.

A year later, Israel invaded Lebanon, in June 1982, killing thousands. It did however succeed in undermining the PLO's military structures, which led to its eventual exit from Lebanon.

Abbas, then a member of the Fatah Central Committee, published a book titled Investing in the Victory, in which he lauded the Palestinian war effort for forcing the evacuation of Israeli settlements in the north.

He urged Palestinians to leverage this "victory" politically, but the Palestinians failed to capitalise. Instead, the PLO and its factions went into exile.

During the Second Intifada (2000-04), the Fatah and Hamas leaderships transformed the uprising from a popular movement (1987-93) into militarised confrontations dominated by bombings.

Israel responded with force, launching two military campaigns, in 2002 and 2003, which killed thousands of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Around 1,060 Israelis were also killed during this period.

This period was the peak of Palestinian armed resistance, before the later Gaza wars. In the West Bank, Israel built a separation wall, fragmented the territory, increased settlements (particularly in Jerusalem), and tightened security control.

Israel also unilaterally withdrew from Gaza in 2005 and imposed a blockade on the Strip. This soon became a significant problem for the Palestinians.

Moving forward

The Palestinian national movement can overlook the sacrifices of its people, under slogans like 'Towards Jerusalem we are heading, millions of martyrs,' or 'It is a jihad, either victory or martyrdom.'

This fatalistic spirit dominates both Fatah and Hamas. Leadership choices appear sanctified. They are never subject to review, accountability, or criticism. This has led to ineffective politics and the alienation of Palestinians from their leaders' policies.

Palestinians in the West Bank, Gaza, and the 1948 territories have long needed a cohesive strategy that unites their struggle and supports a national vision based on the unity of the land, the people, and the cause. It is more obvious now than ever.

This strategy should be managed by an inclusive national entity that facilitates consensus and navigates disagreements.

The responsibility for this lies with Palestinian leaders, including the PLO, the PA, and Fatah, which hold the keys to change in the Palestinian political sphere.

It is likely that Palestinian political dynamics will have been sharply altered by the war in Gaza. It will also have changed forever Palestinians' perception of themselves and their cause.