King Abdulaziz and the Palestinian Nakba of 1948

Neither Shukri al-Quwatli nor his Lebanese counterpart, Bechara El Khoury, had carried a gun in their lives. As for King Farouk, his military credentials were limited to brief schooling in London and an indulgence in collecting priceless swords, rifles, and guns.

However, King Abdulaziz was no stranger to battle, having spent 30 years of his life unifying Arab tribes in the Hejaz, winning all his battles. He feared that all three—al-Quwatli, El Khoury, and Farouk—would be deceived by their officers and forced to make grave mistakes in Palestine. He had genuine respect for al-Quwatli and Farouk, and the seeds of the Arab League had been developed by the Saudi and Egyptian kings at an earlier meeting between al-Radwa and Saudi Arabia.

The Egyptian king's adviser Kareem Thabet was present and recalled: "Farouk was so keen on pleasing his host and winning him over that he refrained from smoking, not only in his presence but in his private quarters as well after word reached him that King Abdulaziz hated the smell of smoke, even if lingering on clothes."

The Saudi king's commitment to Palestine far predates the war of 1948 and was deeply rooted in his consciousness as both a moral and religious duty. On 13 November 1947, just days before the Palestine Partition Plan was passed at the UN General Assembly, he received an Anglo-American committee to inquire about the state of affairs in Mandatory Palestine.  The 12-man committee was headed by British judge Sir John Singleton and included an American academic and a professor at Princeton University, among others.

King Abdulaziz could not hold back his fury but quickly regained his resoluteness. He asked the committee members for nothing but impartiality and presented each with a gold dagger as a gift of Arab hospitality. He even offered to find Sir Singleton a Muslim wife, given that the Arabic translation of his name meant "bachelor."

Saudi Arabia would soon vote against the partition plan when it was raised at the UN General Assembly. When the resolution passed, much to his dismay, Emir Faisal fumed out of the chamber with his Syrian colleague, Fares al-Khoury.

False reports

The number of Arab troops in Palestine was fixed at 20,000. Egypt came first with 5,500 soldiers, followed by Jordan (4,500). Syria and Iraq joined with a combined force of approximately 6,000 men, while Lebanon contributed with a small contingent of 2,000 troops.

This was far less than what the Arab states had promised: no less than 165,000 soldiers with 400 tanks. The Arab armies had 47 warplanes at their disposal, with 40 tanks, 300 armoured vehicles, 140 field rifles, and 220 antiaircraft weapons.

On the other side of the battlefield, Zionist forces stood at 65,000 in July 1948, reaching 88,000 in October and surpassing the 100,000-man benchmark by early 1949. Approximately 13% of Israel's population was in military uniform, and wealthy Jews in Europe and the US raised $129mn for their war effort. Of that amount, $78mn was used to purchase sophisticated arms for the newly formed Israeli Defense Forces (IDF).

As the final hour approached, signalling the end of the British Mandate and David Ben Gurion's declaration of the state of Israel on 14 May 1948, reports were being filed to Arab kings and presidents with nothing but lies and misinformation.

Copies were sent to the king's office in Riyadh. "We will throw them in the sea", boated one Egyptian officer, whereas the Syrians were telling their president that the war would be quick and Palestine would be fully liberated by Christmas.

"We have warplanes; the Israelis don't," said one report filed to President al-Quwatli. A military plan was devised by Jordanian officer Wasfi al-Tel, calling for an 11-day invasion where the Lebanese army would march into Palestine from Ras al-Naqura towards Acre while the Syrians would head from Bint Jbeil to Samakh and would meet with the Iraqis in the city of Afula, west of Nazareth.

The Iraqis were mandated with the historic Palestinian city of Bisan, east of Jerusalem, while the Jordanian army was tasked with liberating al-Llod, al-Ramla, and Jerusalem. On 29-30 April, the plan was finalised at a meeting of the Arab Joint Command in Cairo and ratified by the Arab League on 12 May 1948.

The Saudi king was unimpressed, declining to send its army to the battlefield while remaining committed to funding the Arab war effort. It also did not mind that Saudi citizens volunteered to serve with the Arab League. The war ended with a stunning Arab defeat; 6,000 Arabs were killed, with Egypt and Syria suffering 1,000 deaths, respectively. Over 400 Palestinian villages were razed to the ground, and three-quarters of one million people were stripped of their belongings and ordered out of their homes at gunpoint.

Palestine was torn off the world map. And, as King Abdulaziz had predicted, the Arabs were unprepared for war and equally unprepared for defeat.