The massive American embassy in Baghdad enjoys a prime location looking over the Tigris River, but many of its offices are empty. It was built for a staff of over 1,000, and when it opened in 2007, representatives from 14 different American government ministries and agencies worked there.
I was standing near Ambassador Ryan Crocker at the opening ceremony when he said the new embassy would launch a new era in American-Iraqi relations. But 17 years later, many of those agencies and departments have departed: the Treasury Department, the Agriculture Department, the Commerce Department, and others have quit Iraq.
Frequent Iranian-backed militia attacks against the embassy are one reason, but starting with the Obama administration, American interest in Iraq soured, and Washington’s attention shifted towards Asia and Europe.
The strategic framework agreement that Crocker signed rarely gets the kind of high-level attention in Washington that fighting between pro-Iranian militias and American forces in Iraq receives.
Prime Minister Mohammed Shia' Al Sudani is visiting Washington next week to try to energise the agreement, but he finds many American concerns about Iranian influence in Iraq.
A new security relationship
After the ISKP attack in Moscow, some American officials again warned about the terrorist group’s threat, but a joint report from the State Department and the Defense Department in February concluded that the threat from IS in Iraq is “largely contained.” According to the report, IS “is prioritising its own security in Iraq over executing frequent attacks.”
The report added that “Iraqi security forces continued to weaken the group's ability to restore its insurgency’s core capabilities and restrict its freedom of movement.”
This assessment—which comes from American officials on the ground in Iraq—shows why Al Sudani thinks the international coalition to fight IS in Iraq has succeeded in its mission.
In addition, the report warned that American drone strikes against Iranian-backed militias were having a “negative effect on relations between American advisors and Iraqi partners.” Facing both unhappiness within the Iraqi security forces and the militias and their political allies, Al Sudani wants a change in the way the American military is operating in Iraq.
However, the prime minister does not want to exaggerate the change despite statements from his office and the Iraqi army earlier this year that ongoing negotiations between the Iraqi government and the international coalition would lead to the withdrawal of American forces.
A senior Iraqi general told al-Arabiya late in March that Iraq does not need “big international forces.” This suggests small forces will stay.
On the American side, officials will emphasise that they are not under pressure from Iraq—or from Iran—to withdraw all their forces from Iraq, and their mission to build Iraqi capabilities will continue.
In his 15 April meeting with Al Sudani, Biden will not want to discuss details of the future mission of American military advisors in Iraq.
Instead, Biden and the Pentagon will want Al Sudani to accept the conclusions from the Iraqi coalition military technical committees that are evaluating Iraqi security force capabilities in planning and control of military operations and exploiting intelligence.
The Biden administration does not want to propose the exact number of future American advisors in Iraq until it understands what missions those advisors would have.
On the Iraqi side, Al Sudani wants continued American military assistance and training. Baghdad needs help maintaining its F-16 warplanes and Abrams tanks. The Iraqis want this help under a bilateral agreement.
There is already an office of security cooperation from the Defense Department in Washington in the American Embassy that could, in theory, take on this role, as occurs in bilateral American military agreements with other countries such as Egypt and Jordan.
Al Sudani, however, will have to convince the militias and their allies that some American soldiers are still needed even for a reduced advising mission in Iraq. The militias and their Iranian patrons will wonder how many lethal drones the Americans would keep in Iraq with their reduced presence.
