Whenever Israel’s devastating war in Gaza concludes or drastically subsides, Washington will most likely restart the US-led process of Saudi Arabia normalising ties with Israel. Saudi’s condition, which it has made public, is that Israel takes irrevocable steps to help create an independent Palestinian state.
But that is only what is required of Israel.
On the American side, Riyadh has made its requests equally clear. It wants to hammer out a strategic bilateral defence pact with the United States.
As his administration sees it, US President Joe Biden’s transformational plan for the Middle East indeed requires the cooperation and historic concessions of all three parties, making it incredibly difficult.
However, let us assume that all the ingredients of this three-way deal become available; what form should a US-Saudi defence pact take?
Before I examine this issue, let me be clear that I am neither judging the costs and benefits of a US-Saudi defence pact nor assessing its chances. I have discussed those matters in some detail elsewhere.
My chief interest here is to explore what is required to make a US-Saudi defence pact most effective and credible for both parties in the eyes of friends and foes.
In other words, I am starting off with the assumption that political leaders in Washington and Riyadh have agreed to move forward on this issue. The question I now wish to address is how they can build a mutually beneficial defence structure to support the pact.
Saudi Arabia and the United States should not sign a defence pact that is neither credible nor effective. In this case, they are better off with the status quo.
A weak US-Saudi defence pact will work against its intended objectives: instead of deterring or defending against Iranian aggression, it might encourage it.
A weak US-Saudi defence pact will work against its intended objectives: instead of deterring or defending against Iranian aggression, it might encourage it.
After all this media hype about a US-Saudi defence pact, both nations should want to come out with something rock-solid. Anything else would be pointless.
The credibility of a US-Saudi defence pact, or any other defence pact for that matter, is crucial. Such credibility has many layers, but the most important are military effectiveness and political commitment.
Saudi Arabia and the United States can sign a defence agreement that brings a ton of firepower and connective tissue to bear, but it is much less useful if neither side is formally committed to defending the other.
In a similar vein, if Washington and Riyadh formally agree to help each other in the event of an attack against either but have not committed sufficient and powerful military resources to operationalise their political understanding, it will make little practical difference.
The importance of congressional support
Saudi Arabia and the United States should want to communicate to adversaries – primarily Iran – that they are both willing and able to defend against aggression.
Ensuring the credibility of political willingness requires signing a legally binding agreement. This means that the United States would form a treaty alliance with Saudi Arabia, which would require the approval of two-thirds of the US Senate.
This matters a great deal for a defence pact because it clearly communicates the United States' resolve to Iran (and Saudi Arabia). When the political costs of terminating a formal agreement are high for any American president, it sends a strong message to Iran (and Saudi Arabia) that the United States is serious about its defence commitment toward its ally.
The US Navy's aircraft carrier USS Dwight D. Eisenhower transits the Strait of Hormuz on November 26, 2023.
This suggests that a US-Saudi defence pact should not be based on a presidential declaration or an executive order. Congressional buy-in is key to guaranteeing that the executive and legislative branches of the US government are in lockstep on this issue and that the defence pact can survive political administrations in Washington.
When Iran sees that a US-Saudi defence pact is based on a healthy and durable political consensus in Washington, it will likely think twice before pursuing hostile actions.
Entrenching the treaty
After the politics and the laws of a US-Saudi defence pact are negotiated in accordance with the above, the next step – or ideally simultaneously – is to work on the legs of such a treaty. This is where the national security bureaucracies and armed forces of both nations weigh in.
Here, there are two key components to a defence pact: the institutional and the military. It is critical to have the right amount and the right kind of US and Saudi military resources to support a defence treaty.
Without the necessary strategic consultative mechanisms, joint planning constructs, and information-sharing systems to guide and activate those resources during times of crisis and peace—and especially during a crisis when speed is of the essence—combat power loses much of its relevance.
If deterrence fails and Iran attacks, the United States and Saudi Arabia must be able to act both powerfully and quickly.
Whether a US-Saudi defence pact should be modelled after NATO or any other treaty alliance the United States enjoys around the world is beside the point.
A US-Saudi defence pact should work and make sense for the Americans and the Saudis only, which is why it should be fully tailored to the needs, capacities, and other peculiarities of this special relationship.
There is no harm in getting inspired by principles or borrowing some general elements of the United States defence pacts with Japan and South Korea—as Washington seems to have been doing of late—but copying either model should be avoided.
The amphibious assault ship USS Bataan (front) and the landing ship USS Carter Hall (back) travel through the Red Sea on Tuesday, Aug. 8, 2023.
A more coordinated security approach
Riyadh and Washington need a more coordinated approach to security, which can be built by working together on elements of Saudi Arabia's ongoing defence restructuring project, conducting joint US-Saudi contingency planning, and investing in all the institutional requirements of a competent defence apparatus beyond military equipment.
All of this requires that Saudi Arabia continues to implement defence reform and an effective US posture in the kingdom to support that commitment.
The United States should build a new defence advisory infrastructure in the kingdom.
As I argued in a recent report, this infrastructure would require two main elements, neither of which currently exists: a base operating support integrator and a security cooperation office.
A base operating support integrator would serve as a "garrison command," coordinating with all parts of the US security cooperation posture in the host nation. In doing so, it would provide mission support resources for all US forces operating on host-nation soil.
The security cooperation office would coordinate across Saudi national security agencies — not just the Ministry of Defence but also the Ministry of National Guard and the Ministry of Interior — and the US security-cooperation enterprise. It would also oversee the programmes that would provide locally informed advice that is tailored to Saudi Arabia, as opposed to concepts and processes borrowed or copied from the American system.
Following civilian guidance from the Office of the Secretary of Defence and military input from US Central Command, the security cooperation office would execute a country security cooperation plan that would take applicable phase zero, or peacetime, activities or requirements and overlay them on the Saudi defence transformation effort.
Washington must help Saudi Arabia achieve at least the key goals of its defence transformation plan to ensure that it can effectively meet its obligations under a defence pact with the United States.
Saudi Arabia may be required to create a joint military that can conduct effective operations by itself and with the United States. It also should develop and manage its human resources because this is where the political, economic, and cultural issues of defence reform all come down hardest.
The Saudi military would benefit by working with CENTCOM to develop a bold plan to train on operations focused on maritime security and air and missile defence
Bilateral action in the region
Saudi and US forces must operate consistently in the region. Indeed, joint military exercises must be more frequent if they are to build trust, mutual understanding, and interoperability.
For example, the Red Sands exercise—the first joint counter-drone exercise to be completed on March 24, 2023 by the Saudi and American forces—is promising, but it could be more effective if paired with daily operations that can build muscle memory and real capability.
The Saudi military would benefit by working with CENTCOM to develop a bold plan to train on operations focused on maritime security and air and missile defence (and the supporting elements, including a shared air and maritime picture and fused intelligence).
It is important to continue to debate the merits and challenges of a US-Saudi defence pact. People on both sides will disagree on this sensitive issue for a host of reasons, some legitimate, some politically motivated.
But what should not be contentious is the following: should leadership in Washington and Riyadh agree to sign a formal, mutual defence pact, it must be done right. Rushing into something so serious could have serious consequences for both nations and regional security.
