Politics

How the fall of Baghdad changed the world

The arbitrary exercise of power that the world is witnessing today would not have reached this level had Baghdad not fallen as it did

Reuters

U.S. Marine Corp Assaultman Kirk Dalrymple watches as a statue of Iraq's President Saddam Hussein falls in central Baghdad's Firdaus Square, in this file photo from April 9, 2003.

How the fall of Baghdad changed the world

Houssam Itani

last update on 12 Apr 2023

It has been 20 years since Baghdad fell. The significance doesn’t lie in the amount of time that has passed, but in the extent of drastic changes that Iraq has undergone in this period.

Two decades later, the motives behind the invasion remain shrouded in mystery. However, the ramifications from the overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s regime continue to be felt in Iraq, the broader region and even the world.

The justification for the American-led invasion was based on three pillars: overthrowing Saddam Hussein's rule, dismantling Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, and pursuing terrorists who were allegedly residing in Iraq, and expelling them under the pretext of the ‘Global War on Terror’ launched in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.

However, none of these pillars were able to stand up to scrutiny.

The demonisation of Saddam Hussein was not a new phenomenon in 2003; he had been the target of an active American political and media campaign since his invasion of Kuwait in 1990.

Reuters — An armed Iraqi man watches Iraqi President Saddam Hussein speak on television in Baghdad, Iraq March 20, 2003. U.S. warplane and cruise missile attacks on Thursday hit some non-military targets, injuring a number of civilians.

Throughout the 1990s, Saddam was America's go-to enemy, targeted whenever Washington needed to turn attention away from its domestic or foreign policies.

For example, Saddam’s obstruction of international inspectors was the pretext for Operation Desert Fox in 1998, which many American politicians linked more to the impeachment of President Bill Clinton than to the work of the international commission on Iraq.

The motives behind the 2003 invasion remain ambiguous, prompting Jacques Beatty to recall the words of Holocaust survivor and French politician Simone Weil: "The great error of nearly all studies of war...has been to consider war as an episode in foreign policies, when it is especially an act of interior politics; and the most atrocious of all."

Recent American studies searching for an explanation outside of the official narrative and conspiracy theories suggest that the invasion of Iraq was an accumulation of foreign policies from previous US administrations since before the 9/11 attacks and an attempt to link Saddam Hussein to those attacks.

The invasion of Iraq resulted from centres of power vying for roles in American politics, the rise of neoconservatives and their ideological vision of the world, and America's role as a defender of freedom and democracy.

The 9/11 attacks created the ideal atmosphere for ‘retaliation’— with the George W. Bush administration positioning it as a campaign to restore American prestige that was shaken by the terrorist strike and show that the US could still impose its influence at any cost.

In this sense, and against this backdrop, the occupation of Iraq ended an era and established a new one that still exists today. However, the Arab region and entire world continue to pay the price for what happened 20 years ago — presented through various challenges.

It is essential to underscore that the ‘Republic of Fear’ established by Saddam Hussein cannot be defended for it was a deplete of virtue. It was an authoritarian regime that rule through terror and organised tyranny for the benefit of a few with crude regional and sectarian biases.

Internal coup attempts — whether by opposition parties that lasted until the mid-seventies, the Iraqi Communist Party and Dawa party attempts in the early eighties or the various Kurdish uprisings — were all successfully crushed by Saddam’s regime.

Internal coup attempts — whether by opposition parties that lasted until the mid-seventies, the Iraqi Communist Party and Dawa party attempts in the early eighties or the various Kurdish uprisings — were all successfully crushed by Saddam's regime.

These included the bargain of the Ba'ath regime with the Shah of Iran, Muhammad Reza Pahlavi, in the Algiers Agreement in 1975, which led to the elimination of the armed Kurdish movement that the Shah had stifled in exchange for territorial concessions from Iraq.

The Iraqi uprising of the Shiites of the south after the defeat of the Iraqi forces in Kuwait in February 1991, the Kurdish uprising in the north, and their outcomes, including massacres in the Shiite cities of the south, large-scale displacement in the north, and campaigns that did not stop until the establishment of the two no-fly zones, indicated that, despite the severe blow it suffered after its occupation of Kuwait, the Iraqi regime was still stronger than its opponents collectively and separately — at least militarily.

This intractability made the idea of uprooting the Ba'athist regime with the help of an external forces more attractive in the eyes of the Iraqis.

When the Americans decided to overthrow Saddam Hussein — who ruled over a regime that committed countless massacres against its citizens — it was enthusiastically accepted by the Iraqi occupation.

Their need to topple the criminal regime outweighed potential consequences of what a US invasion could produce.

This intractability made the idea of uprooting the Ba'athist regime with the help of an external forces more attractive in the eyes of the Iraqis. Their need to topple the criminal regime outweighed potential consequences of what a US invasion could produce.

What unfolded was akin to a raging bull in a china shop. The bull's horns shattered delicate power balances that existed in the region. There was little planning for what would happen after Saddam's removal, in a vital Middle Eastern country riddled with a history of painful struggles and unspeakable pain.

The US-led invasion of Iraq set a precedent for state adventurism — which was not limited to the Middle East. The overthrow of Iraq was an unprecedented act not seen since World War II that normalised the right to overthrown sovereign nations through military force.

Since the Allies' victory in 1945, recognised international borders were a red line. Even in the case of the Arab-Israeli wars, international resolutions rejected all Israeli annexations, and labelled the Golan, Sinai, and the West Bank as occupied territories.

Moscow's attempt to prevent the collapse of the Soviet Union in the Baltic states and Belgrade's efforts to suppress the independence movements in Croatia and Slovenia during the dissolution of the Yugoslav Federation were met with strict international condemnation.

The greatest irony, however, was that the most serious clash between Saddam Hussein and the West erupted over Saddam's decision to invade Kuwait in 1990.

Some observers compare the US-led invasion of Iraq to Saddam's miscalculation in Kuwait given his false pretexts for invading his neighbour which were rejected and condemned by the Arab world and the international community.

The Iraq-Kuwait dispute over oil prices, the extraction of oil from the neutral zone, and Baghdad's debts to Kuwait due to the Iraq-Iran war did not warrant the invasion of a sovereign country.

The US considered the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait to be a blow to the newly established global climate of peace after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the subsequent fall of communist Eastern European governments.

The invasion happened only a year before the collapse of the Soviet Union. The coup attempt by hardliners in the Soviet Communist Party's Politburo in August 1991 failed and dealt a final blow to the already weakened Soviet state.

Saddam's fatal mistake of invading Kuwait provoked major powers. It had all the components of what the many viewed as a challenge to international order. It was a mistake that, in hindsight, should not have been committed and in attempt to avoid taking accountability for the invasion, Saddam tried to blame his decision on a third-rank American diplomat, April Glaspie.

Global order irreparably damaged

The 2003 US invasion of Iraq exemplified the megalomania of a superpower whose domestic aspirations overrode international laws and resolutions. It is important to note that Baghdad had opened all sites requested by international inspectors a few months prior.

In late February 2003, Hans Blix, the head of the Special International Committee, declared Iraq free of all weapons of mass destruction.

However, the American decision to invade Iraq was made a year earlier, and the Iraqi opposition and many international forces were already informed of this decision.

The Bush administration's disregard for the global security system dealt a resounding blow to what remained. In contrast to former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, who managed to prevent military confrontation between Washington and Baghdad in the 1990s, the Bush administration did the opposite.

US Secretary of State Colin Powell's testimony and his infamous photo holding a tiny glass tube representing what he claimed to be a biological weapon purposely undermined the international community's intelligence. Powell later expressed regret for engaging in such propaganda.

Because of this blatant lie, France and Germany refused to join the international coalition announced by Bush to overthrow Saddam Hussein's regime. Turkey also did not allow US forces to enter Iraq from the north unless it was granted the "right" to occupy a part of Iraqi Kurdistan.

The behaviour of the world's most powerful state, which should act based on facts rather than ideological intentions and perceptions, set an example for those who sought to implement their projects by force rather than pursuing their rights through legal means.

As a result, policies from the 19th century, which supported "wars of choice" over "wars of necessity," returned. This led to "aircraft carrier diplomacy" replacing "gunboat diplomacy." The "projecting force where possible" approach was resumed without international legal or moral cover.

The rhetoric of "preemptive war" was increasingly used, but its advocates did not feel obligated to provide evidence of the enemy's plans or the urgency of preemptive strikes. Instead, they argued that revealing the evidence would harm planning and put "our soldiers" in danger.

Smaller countries that once used their fear of being subjected to unpleasant surprises as justification for their aggression against their neighbours — such as Israel — now seem to be less concerned about the level of violence they practice against weaker, less organised, and less armed opponents.

The global security system's legal and political foundations have been eroded, rendering it impossible for the United Nations and the Security Council to condemn any country that resorts to violence instead of peaceful behaviour.

How can the world criticise actions in Chechnya when it ignores what occurred in Iraq?

Is it justifiable to overthrow a government that is internationally recognised, even if its legitimacy is in question by the US military, as in the case of the Iraqi government, while also invading Ukraine and seeking to replace President Volodymyr Zelensky with a pro-Moscow regime?

The invasion of Iraq normalised the 'right by might' global mindset. The reasons offered by different nations to violate state sovereignty have little credibility. Russia's claim that it invaded Ukraine because of Nato expansion on its borders, has just as much credibility as Colin Powell's tube of poison.

The invasion of Iraq normalised the 'right by might' global mindset. The reasons offered by different nations to violate state sovereignty have little credibility. Russia's claim that it invaded Ukraine because of Nato expansion on its borders, has just as much credibility as Colin Powell's tube of poison.

Regional ramifications

Furthermore, the fall of Baghdad set the stage for a series of tumultuous events in the Arab world that continue to impact the region today. The invasion exposed the deep sectarian divisions in Arab society and failed attempts to establish a nation-state that treats all citizens equally before the law.

The US-backed government in Iraq reinforced sectarian and ethnic identities, and the country was rebuilt based on sectarian considerations among Iraq's diverse tapestry of sects and ethnicities which include Shiites, Sunnis, Kurds, Turkmen, Yazidis, Chaldeans, and Assyrians.

This approach was replicated in other countries, such as Syria, where the fall of the Baathist regime gave rise to sectarian and ethnic divisions.

It is difficult to measure the levels of sectarianism in the Arab world that existed before and after the US invasion. While the invasion may not be solely responsible for sectarianism, it cannot be absolved of its role in exacerbating existing tensions.

The US-backed government that replaced Saddam's regime, without a doubt, impeded progress toward development, social justice, rule of law, checks and balances, democracy and external interests.

"Consensus" became a prerequisite to prevent civil war, making establishing a state free of factional loyalties and its institutions and apparatuses difficult.

As evidenced by the 2006-2008 Sunni-Shiite war, sectarian and factional solidarity became the only element in nation-building, leading to a lack of diversity, even within a federal framework.

A tyrant fell; a thousand rose

The tyranny carried out in the name of Arabism, nationalism, Baathism, socialism, the liberation of Palestine, and resisting Western and "Persian" conspiracies remain firmly entrenched despite numerous attempts to weaken or dismantle it.

However, instead of toppling this tyranny, a foreign invasion took place, which brought to power a disparate group of forces that had shown little regard beyond their narrow interests.

Instead of toppling tyranny, a foreign invasion took place, which brought to power a disparate group of forces that had shown little regard beyond their narrow interests.

Now, after two decades in power, it is clear that these forces do not see themselves as part of a broader national identity. This raises the question of whether the former tyrant's survival would have been more merciful for Iraq and less dangerous for the region.

Read more: Nostalgia for Saddam era explained

What is worse: tyranny or occupation and the forms of rule and chaos that come with it?

Zooming out on the global perspective of Saddam's overthrown, every state views it through the lens of their own interests.

Some concluded that preventing a similar fate for themselves could be achieved by terrorising and exhausting society—preventing the formation of any alternative to the existing government.

The domination and arbitrary exercise of power that have become the defining features of the third decade of the new century would not have reached the level we see today had Baghdad not fallen as it did.

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