Impact of October War still felt 50 years later

Solidarity and transformation

The victory highlights the importance of effective strategic planning and leadership. It also demonstrates the power and effectiveness of Arab solidarity, which reached unprecedented levels during the war — particularly when the late King Faisal of Saudi Arabia took the historic step of imposing a comprehensive embargo on oil shipments to the US.

The October War also had an impact beyond the battlefield. It effectively flipped the script of a protracted and violent struggle and led to a peace process that followed just four years after the war began.

This transformation began a mere three months after the ceasefire took effect on 28 October 1973, when Egypt and Israel signed the Separation of Forces Agreement in mid-January 1974. A similar accord was signed on the Syrian front in May. Egypt and Israel signed a third agreement on 1 September 1975 following arduous negotiations.

Under its terms, both governments agreed that "disputes between them or within the Middle East shall be resolved through peaceful means." Furthermore, they expressed their shared intent "to achieve a just and lasting settlement through negotiations."

The second article of the agreement pledged mutual commitments "to abstain from the use of force, threats of force, or military blockades against each other."

Notably, the use of the term "dispute" in this context marked a departure from the prevailing Arab political discourse, which had been dominated by the term "conflict" since 1948.

Political breakthrough

And so, the agreement made the October War politically unique. It allowed for the pivot toward the pursuit of peace. While this trajectory has always been challenging over the last five decades, it has remained the direction of travel.

The government of President Anwar Sadat – in collaboration with the administration of Menachem Begin in Israel – initiated this transformation. There was hesitant, timid, and short-lived Palestinian involvement at the time.

Peace negotiations began with high hopes in the Arab world but were later met with widespread disapproval and rejection. Efforts to prevent that change in perception were unsuccessful, both before and after the signing of the Egypt-Israeli treaty in March 1979.

On its part, the Palestinian leadership embarked on a unilateral path towards peace 20 years later, joining negotiations in Oslo with the government of Yitzhak Rabin under Norwegian mediation. These talks produced the Declaration of Principles covering self-rule in mid-September 1993.

Read more: 30 years after Oslo, Palestinian state elusive as ever

This was another vital moment, following the October War and its subsequent pivot to peace. The Oslo Accords broadened the horizon of peace from being something seen as exclusive to Egypt and Israel.

Another distinctive change came with it: the sharp shift in US policy— from unwavering support for Israel to active mediation for peace. That transition would have been unlikely without the October War.

From saving Israel to pressuring it

Henry Kissinger – the shrewd and cunning US Secretary of State – saw the opportunity presented by the October War.

Capitalising on it demanded a transformation. The US needed to move from being Israel's saviour at the war's outset to a mediator, adeptly brokering the initial agreements during the early phases of the peace process in 1974 and 1975.

Kissinger was arguably the one who saved Israel during the surprise Egyptian and Syrian joint attack on 6 October 1973.

At the annual UN General Assembly in New York, he received the alarming news at 7 a.m. local time. His assistant, Joseph Sisco, urgently delivered a message from Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir, warning of an imminent attack. The news spread even faster than Meir had anticipated. It reached Kissinger within minutes.

Kissinger had emerged as the most influential figure in Washington following the Watergate scandal. He had to respond swiftly. After informing President Nixon, he coordinated with military leaders to establish an airlift bridge to supply Israel with desperately needed weaponry and equipment.

This was an attempt to offset the Egyptian military's early dominance, amid substantial Israeli losses, including hundreds of tanks and dozens of aircraft. The airlift bridge commenced operations on 7 October, delivering anti-tank missiles and ammunition, followed by additional weapons in the ensuing days.

Kissinger's intervention was timely and decisive and had a tangible impact, averting a potentially far more significant Israeli defeat.

A month after the war, Kissinger again demonstrated his knack for foresight and quick decision-making. He seized the opportunity to move from being Israel's saviour to the broker of a broader peace.

In a discreetly conveyed letter from President Sadat – sent through a covert channel just before the war's end – Kissinger found his starting point for this transformation. He embraced the role and hastened the transition from conflict to peace using a careful, step-by-step methodology.

Strategically, Kissinger allowed Israel to capitalise on its military gains in the Defreswar area, enhancing its military and political standing.

This does not imply that the US role as a mediator erased its bias towards Israel. Instead, Kissinger worked diligently in his peacemaking efforts to ensure Israel's security and maintain its status, creating an impression that Israel had not suffered a defeat in the war.

In Sadat, he found a partner whose responsiveness exceeded all expectations. In his recent book Leadership: Six Studies in World Strategy, published last year, Kissinger lauds Sadat as a man with a strategic vision that went beyond existing situations and transformed them.

Kissinger wasted no time.

On 7 November 1973, he went to Cairo, seeking the kind of careful, diplomatic wording that would allow both sides to see enough potential to keep talking.

Before successfully orchestrating the initial ceasefire agreement, he received an overture from Sadat, which came in the form of a concise handwritten, yet significant, letter to Golda Meir.

In it, Sadat said: "When I speak of peace, I mean my words sincerely. Though we have not met before, we now have the efforts of Dr. Kissinger. Let us employ them and exchange views through his mediation."

Carter era and winding path to peace

Kissinger's frequent travels between Cairo and Tel Aviv became known throughout the world as "shuttle diplomacy." They were a means of progressing with his incremental plan, which laid the groundwork for the significant shift towards peace.

But Kissinger had to leave his position as secretary of state at the beginning of 1977, ahead of what was to be an even more significant shift in US policy. It came during Jimmy Carter's presidency.

Carter's was an exceptional era. US policy leaned toward neutrality and a more objective stance was adopted. Carter succeeded in securing another dramatic shift when Sadat visited occupied Jerusalem in late 1977. 

The US president personally intervened to ensure a landmark moment in the peace process, signing the Egyptian-Israeli Treaty. Carter had kept pressure on Menachem Begin, helping ensure the Israeli prime minister eased a hardline stance against evacuating Sinai settlements that could have scuppered an agreement.

It was another important point that would not have been reached without the October War.

The path to peace after the October War was not easy. There were setbacks as well as significant steps forward.

It also took time – approximately 20 years – to reach the second major step, the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993. But then, surprisingly, the pace picked up. Only one year later, the third major step came with the signing of the Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty in 1994.

The peace process progressed smoothly during this period, with ambitious and idealistic projects proposed to shape a new Middle East. Initial efforts were made to broaden the scope of peace to involve other Arab nations. However, amid these optimistic aspirations, challenges began to emerge.

Cold peace follows Rabin assassination

In 1995, the moves toward peace lost one of its key figures to violence. Israel's Yitzhak Rabin – who led the process alongside Yasser Arafat of the Palestinians and King Hussein of Jordan – was assassinated.

The Israeli right wing subsequently managed to slow the peace process to a halt by targeting the Oslo Accords and capitalising on the significant gaps within them. The right wing also thrived on the escalating tensions with the Palestinians.

There was a change in the prevailing circumstances, leaving no room for peace moves. Constraints came from a cold peace between Egypt and Israel, clashes in the West Bank and Gaza, the fragility of trust between Amman and Tel Aviv, and the implications of Hezbollah's growing strength in Lebanon.

Nevertheless, the existing peace treaties between Egypt and Israel and Jordan and Israel remained intact.

Even the 2006 Lebanon war concluded without sparking further regional conflicts. But the priorities of Arab states had changed, and the Palestinian issue lost the paramount significance it once held.

And there is another legacy of the October War and the imperfect peace process it opened up: a return to the era of open conflicts and wars remains unthinkable to the present day, even in Israel.

Elites there have become increasingly concerned about the lives of citizens and the progress the peace process has achieved, even if it is stalled. It has become natural to expect the next move to return to the peace process, even if the conditions are now significantly more challenging.

The October War provided the driving force for this shift. Though it happened long ago and to some is only a distant memory, it continues to resonate, especially through the lasting peace between Egypt and Israel.

The agreement between those two nations – in terms of its continuity, stability, and the way it was transformed into a model – has convinced an increasing number of Arab governments that the region cannot bear more destruction.

There is a growing realisation that resuming the transition towards peace is necessary.

Trump's impact

The administration of former US President Donald Trump also made significant strides in this direction — albeit uniquely.

There were breakthroughs in 2020 for the first time in over a quarter of a century. Agreements were reached between Israel and three other Arab countries, the UAE, Bahrain and Morocco. 

They came in less than five months and opened doors for other Arab nations to consider similar moves when conditions allow.

The political landscape of the Middle East looks vastly different five decades on from the October War. It did much more than liberate lands that were occupied in 1967. It was a turning point away from armed confrontation to the negotiating table.

This was a profound transformation that surpassed all expectations. A military win for the Arab world led to the first peace agreement with the Israelis.