Moscow benefits most from the current stalemate between Iran and the West—providing it does not escalate into war or lead to Tehran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons. For this reason, Russian officials in recent months have altered somewhat their positions regarding Iran’s nuclear policies and Russia’s possible sale of advanced air defenses to Iran. At bottom, however, continuity rather than change characterizes Moscow’s Iran policies.
Russia derives several advantages from the persisting confrontation between Tehran and Western governments. These tensions preserve Russia’s status as Iran’s major economic partner and allow Russian diplomats to mediate and balance between Tehran and the West, with the parties seeking to secure Moscow’s assistance against the other. Tehran’s alienation from the West also helps prop up world energy prices by keeping Iran from contributing its territory or energy resources to Western-sponsored trans-Caspian energy pipelines that would reduce European dependence on Russian-controlled supplies.
Several developments during the past year have threatened Russia’s favorable position. On the one hand, the new Obama administration has sought to engage the Iranian government diplomatically in an attempt to resolve bilateral differences. Fortunately for Moscow, the endeavor failed to reconcile Washington and Tehran, largely due to the chaotic situation within Iran since the June presidential elections. On the other hand, Iran has been making further progress toward developing the capacity to manufacture a nuclear bomb. For this reason, Russian policy makers have adopted a slightly more confrontational tone toward Iran, as seen in Russia’s policies towards Iranian sanctions and Russian arms sales to Iran.
Since last September’s revelations that Iranians had been constructing a secret uranium enrichment facility at Qum, Russian officials have been demanding greater transparency regarding Iran’s nuclear activities. Whereas previously Iranian officials had indicated they would only support additional sanctions if the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) provided “hard proof” that the Iranian government was seeking a nuclear weapon, since Qum they had been placing the burden on Tehran to provide additional evidence that they were not pursuing a nuclear weapons program.
As long as talks continued about Iran’s possibly allowing foreign governments to enrich its uranium further under international supervision rather than do it itself, Russian officials could argue against sanctions on the grounds that they might disrupt the delicate negotiations. Now that the Iranian government has proceeded to enrich uranium itself to 20%, close to weapons grade, and now that the IAEA has concluded that Iran might be developing nuclear arms, Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman Andrei Nesterenko has said “we cannot completely rule out” starting work on drafting another round of UN Security Council sanctions.
Even so, Russian officials have offered a variety of assessments regarding whether Moscow would back further sanctions on Iran, and what these might cover. While Russian policy makers have indicated that Moscow might accept some additional sanctions designed to slow down Iran’s nuclear program, they have made clear that they would oppose the “crippling” sanctions advocated by Israel and some Western governments. “If we go with the sanctions,” Russian Foreign Sergey Lavrov explained in a late February interview with the Russian RIA Novosti news agency, “we'll not go beyond the goal of our purpose of defending the nonproliferation regime. We don't want the nonproliferation regime to be used for ... strangling Iran.” Although Russian officials cite humanitarian considerations, they clearly want to avoid harming Russian business interests in Iran by measures that would affect the everyday economy.
In addition to lobbying for harsh sanctions against Iran, another purpose of Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanhayu’s visit to Moscow in February was to keep Russia from fulfilling its 2007 contract to deliver S-300 air defense systems to Iran. For years, Israeli and Western officials had warned that actually delivering the S-300s surface-to-air missiles could force Israel to attack Iran’s nuclear targets before the systems became operational because their high effectiveness could considerably increase the threat to Israeli pilots.
Until recently, Russian officials had insisted that they would deliver the S-300s since the interceptors represented a defensive weapon and since their sale would conform fully with international and Russian law. But after years of rumors about when the deliveries would proceed, and after recurring Russian statements that it was just a matter of resolving some financial and technical difficulties before the transaction could occur, Lavrov finally acknowledged in February that, while Russia had the legal right to consummate such a sale, political considerations weighed against its taking place anytime soon.
Given that Russia’s arms exports are at record levels, with $34 billion worth of orders already booked, Moscow can afford to defer the S-300 for a few more years. Lavrov pointedly noted, however, that Moscow expected other governments to act with comparable restraint, a warning to Israel and the United States to constrain their own weapons sales to Georgia.
Richard Weitz
– Senior Fellow and Director, Center for Political-Military Analysis at the Hudson Institute, Washington DC.
