Is a new Israel-Hezbollah war looming?

As Israeli deterrence has waned, Hezbollah has become increasingly emboldened In this regard, the 2022 maritime agreement with Lebanon was a watershed moment. During the negotiations, Hezbollah threatened to attack a floating production system rig in Israel's offshore Karish natural gas field if Israel started pumping before a deal was reached.

Israel had announced earlier that it would begin extracting in September, regardless of the status of the negotiations.  Under threat of attack, however, Israel delayed pumping for two months until the deal was signed.  Putting aside the advantageous terms of the agreement for Lebanon, Israel's capitulation on Karish vindicated Hezbollah's approach.

Domestic turmoil in Israel emboldens Hezbollah

Hezbollah has also been emboldened in recent months by the ongoing turmoil in Israel. Indeed, the militia has understood the enormous protests in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem against the government's judicial reform initiative as evidence of the demise of a once cohesive Israeli polity. 

The organisation has no doubt also been encouraged by reports that hundreds of Israeli Air Force reserve pilots are refusing to serve — potentially undermining IDF readiness.  In short, Hezbollah sees Israel at a vulnerable juncture.

Long list of provocations

Whatever the rationale, over the past year or so, Hezbollah has changed its posture, dramatically increasing tensions along the border. While the militia has long maintained a significant presence in South Lebanon, historically, it did not flaunt its military operations that violate United Nations Security Council Resolutions.

But this is no longer the case.

Today, Hezbollah maintains military bases and watchtowers on the border, as well as active live-fire shooting ranges, and conducts overt military exercises, including by the group's elite "Radwan" unit, in the south.

The list of Hezbollah provocations over the past half year alone is staggering. 

Palestinian groups fired missiles into Israel from Hezbollah-controlled areas in south Lebanon; Hezbollah launched drones into Israel and shot an anti-tank missile across the frontier; the militia set up a two-tent military outpost on Israeli territory; Hezbollah operatives attempted to compromise the border fence, and; the group detonated a roadside bomb in the Israeli town of Meggido, 64 kilometres south of Lebanon.     

Hezbollah faces little repercussions for provocations

Israeli responses to all of these incidents were proportional, measured, and non-lethal.  Understandably, Israel's priority focus is Iran, which is progressing apace on its nuclear weapons programme. Hezbollah, while important, is relatively speaking, currently a second-tier, non-existential threat.

Still, Hezbollah has paid little, if any, cost for its recent transgressions, effectively pushing the envelope further on the kind of operations it can undertake without consequence.

Meanwhile, in the absence of a clearly established understanding of Israel's limits, the chances for renewed hostilities increase.  After the 2006 war, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah famously said "Had I known…that the operation (to kidnap three Israeli soldiers) would lead to such a war, would I do it?  I say no, absolutely not."

The fact was, at the time, Israeli reactions to Hezbollah provocations were, like today, indecisive.  Given the precedent, Nasrallah had no reason to suspect the kidnapping operation would elicit such a ferocious response. Regrettably, like 2006, the chances now for miscalculation are considerable.

This renewed threat of hostilities likely provided the impetus for Hochstein's August trial balloon-offer to mediate land-border negotiations between Israel and Lebanon. 

While the motive may be noble, the initiative is ill-advised. Amidst a crippling economic crisis in Lebanon, Hezbollah could no longer oppose the demarcation of the maritime border, which would allow Beirut to start exploiting prospective natural gas resources in the Mediterranean.

But the militia has no interest in resolving the land border, an outcome that would end claims of Israeli occupation and the need for Iranian-backed "resistance" forces on Lebanese territory.  And Israel should make concessions — like it did on the maritime deal — under Hezbollah pressure, that would further undermine deterrence.   

Concurrent with floating this trial balloon, last month the Biden administration succeeded during the mandate renewal debate for the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon or UNIFIL, in maintaining language allowing the force to conduct patrols without coordinating with the Lebanese army.

The passage was important because the LAF has colluded with Hezbollah in denying UNIFIL access to militia-controlled areas in the south.  Even with this language in the mandate, however, it is doubtful that UNIFIL will expand its patrols to include so-called "private property," i.e., Hezbollah military bases.                    

The onus is on Israel to change the dynamic with Hezbollah. Recent understandings between Tehran and Riyadh mitigating toward regional de-escalation do not involve this Iranian proxy or theatre of operations.

In fact, all the talk about a potential Saudi-Israel normalisation agreement may, in part, be driving Hezbollah's latest hostile activities. At the end of the day, to defer — if not prevent — the next war with Hezbollah, Israel is going to have to re-establish deterrence. 

Given the current trajectory and Israel's ongoing domestic distractions, it won't be easy.  Restoring deterrence could itself risk an escalation but, absent a more robust Israeli approach to Hezbollah provocations, the next war seems inevitable.