Saddam formed a four-way alliance and suggested unifying armies and intelligence

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"We uphold our principles of non-interference in the internal affairs of others," he said. "If we all continue to interfere in each other's internal affairs, there will be a general sense of mistrust, and the issue of interference in internal affairs will become a matter of personal interpretation (ijtihad)."

However, this doesn't mean that Saddam's interference in the internal affairs of others was right or more justified than that of al-Assad's. He also called on the Arabs to mobilise their armies to fight Iraq if it attacked any Arab country or interfered in its affairs.

Regarding the invasion of Kuwait, it is difficult to determine precisely when it became a realistic option in Saddam's mind. However, the statements from this meeting suggest that he was already involved in regional power struggles and conflicts and that the idea of using a campaign against Syria to camouflage his true intentions could have been a part of his broader geopolitical strategy.

Regional formation

In late 1988, discussions between Iraq and Jordan commenced with the aim of establishing an Arab regional formation that would include both countries, along with other Arab nations.

As the talks progressed, Egypt and Yemen were also brought into the fold, and the four countries reached an agreement to form the Arab Cooperation Council. However, the endorsement of this council by Damascus was met with hesitation, primarily because its founders intended to give it an economic cooperation focus, considering the political differences among the four nations.

The formation of this bloc gave rise to numerous questions, particularly since, apart from Iraq and Jordan, there was no apparent geographical connection among the member states.

Additionally, border disputes between certain countries and their neighbours added to the complexity of the situation. Syrian Vice President Abdul Halim Khaddam, in a document found in his personal archive, which he took with him to Paris in 2005, provided an analysis of the bloc.

The content, obtained by Al Majalla, reveals his perspective: "We ruled out the possibility of Syria becoming the target or being isolated due to our relations with Egypt, despite our disagreements after President Anwar Sadat's visit to Jerusalem."

"Both countries have refrained from conspiring against each other, and our differences have remained at the level of politics and media. Moreover, Syria's relations with Yemen are on good terms, with no reasons for disputes. On the contrary, the Yemenis appreciate Syria's assistance."

"Furthermore, Iraq is aware that involving itself with Syria would be costly, particularly in military involvement, given their knowledge of our military capabilities and concerns about a potential Iranian extension towards Baghdad."

"Our conclusion was that this council would likely lead to a series of crises in the Arab arena, as three of its members harbour aspirations concerning Saudi Arabia and Kuwait."

Al-Assad moves to thwart the formation of regional bloc

Amidst the backdrop of the Soviet Union's waning influence and its eventual disintegration, movements on Syria's eastern and southern borders triggered a countermove by al-Assad to thwart the formation of the regional bloc.

Summit meetings were organised between al-Assad and Gulf leaders to address the situation. One Gulf leader recalled his surprise at the late Jordanian monarch, King Hussein's silence on the formation issue during their regular visits.

"We were actually surprised by the situation. King Hussein used to visit us regularly, sometimes several times a month, and we were aware of the issue of its formation."

"I waited for him to bring it up, but he didn't say a word. I was puzzled and wondered why he didn't mention it. They said it was a purely economic grouping, and we said that was fine."

However, al-Assad's envoy intervened, emphasising that the connection between Iraq, Yemen, Egypt, Jordan, and Syria "was not merely economic or geographic but rather driven by political objectives. In this context, Ali Saleh presented a draft agreement that had been negotiated between Saddam and al-Assad."

During one of King Hussein's visits to Damascus, he broached the possibility of Syria joining the Arab Cooperation Council. However, the Syrian president declined the offer, citing the tense relationship with Iraq.

"The Arab situation," he argued, " calls for unity, not fragmentation or the formation of such councils. These councils will lead to disintegration in the Arab arena, with the Gulf Cooperation Council, the Arab Cooperation Council, the Maghreb Union, and so on, all vying for power. We might as well announce the dismantling of the Arab League."

After al-Assad inquired about the Gulf countries' stance on the proposed Arab Cooperation Council, King Hussein revealed his efforts to address their concerns during his visits. He said, "I intentionally travelled alone to avoid causing any embarrassment and reproached the Emir of Kuwait, Sheikh Jaber, about the living conditions and lack of development in Kuwait."

King Hussein continued his campaign to reassure the Gulf countries, who were expressing fear of Iraq, by emphasising that Iraq was a force and a supporter of these nations, according to the minutes of the meeting between al-Assad and Hussein.

Following King Hussein's visit to Damascus, al-Assad reviewed the outcomes with his advisors and concluded that the Jordanian king's account was not entirely accurate. Al-Assad believed that King Hussein's understanding of the background information leading to the establishment of the council differed from his own.

From the beginning, they were aware that the council would present a problem for the Gulf countries, as they had expressed their fears. King Hussein's reassurances were seen as an attempt to mitigate those fears.

King Hussein also shared his thoughts with the Syrian Prime Minister in Amman, revealing that the "brotherhood in the Gulf countries held regular meetings and had formed committees. Likewise, the Maghreb countries were attempting to create a union. For us, we must do something and rely on us."

He believed that if they could establish a strong relationship similar to Syria's connection with Iraq, they wouldn't have dared to do what they are doing now."

King Hussein revealed that he discussed the idea of an economic union with President Hafez, assuring him that Syria would have a safeguarded and distinguished position within it.

He urged caution at the beginning and suggested announcing the union as an economic grouping, highlighting Syria's resources and people as essential assets that would preserve its significant position.

A night visitor and intel collaboration

In the context of the relationship with Saudi Arabia, King Hussein told al-Assad: "At the Islamic summit in Kuwait, from which Saddam Hussein was absent and dispatched his deputy in his place, I asked the Iraqi vice-president, Izzat Al-Douri, about the reason for Saddam's absence."

"Al-Douri responded that they had received a message from Saudi Arabia requesting Iraq not to participate because President al-Assad would be present at the summit." King Hussein perceived this as an attempt to prevent a meeting between al-Assad and Saddam and concluded that Saudi Arabia did not want such an encounter to occur.

According to Khaddam, when he and al-Assad discussed King Hussein's conversation with the Syrian Prime Minister, "Al-Assad wanted to understand the motives behind the message sent by King Hussein and the potential gains for Saudi Arabia in preventing Saddam's attendance, especially when Saudi Arabia had been making efforts for reconciliation."

"The conclusion reached was that the goal was to sow doubts and uncertainties between Syria and Saudi Arabia and provide Iraq with a justification for Saddam Hussein's non-attendance in Kuwait. However, despite these efforts, King Hussein eventually visited Iraq on 2 August 1990", in a different context that later unfolded with Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.

In the aftermath of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, Egypt took a strong opposing stance against the invasion. According to a Syrian document, President Hosni Mubarak, in a closed meeting with al-Assad, expressed concerns about the "ill intentions behind the proposal for establishing a military force by Iraq and Jordan."

Mubarak was surprised by the request for the unification of intelligence agencies in the four countries, and he firmly rejected the proposal. Instead, he suggested cooperation and coordination among the nations, "but the complete unification of their intelligence agencies is a dangerous matter."

In a second attempt to dismantle the Arab Cooperation Council, Khaddam reached out to Yemen, a member of the council. On 13 September 1989, al-Assad dispatched Khaddam to Sana'a. There, he had "two friendly and candid meetings with President Ali Abdullah Saleh. I observed that two conflicting factors influenced his (Saleh) positions."

"The first factor was his partnership with Iraq in the war against Iran, within the framework of the Arab Cooperation Council, and in their joint efforts to encircle Saudi Arabia."

"The second factor was Saleh's strong connection with Syria and its leadership, which had supported Yemen during its most challenging times, played a significant role in resolving conflicts with the Aden government, and fostered deep emotional ties between the Yemeni and Syrian people."

The conversation began with President Saleh inquiring about the Non-Aligned Movement summit held in Belgrade earlier that month. Khaddam said that the summit was generally good but raised concerns about the Quartet Council.

When Saleh asked if Khaddam was referring to their ambassador, Muhammad Rabie, Khaddam clarified that he meant the "Quartet Council itself. Although you established, or rather declared, that it was an economic council, it eventually transformed into a political axis."

Saleh responded by acknowledging that everything in the world is inherently political.

Notably, during the discussions, President Saleh attempted to mediate between Saddam Hussein and al-Assad and even presented Khaddam with a reconciliation document aimed at resolving the tensions between the two leaders.

To be continued tomorrow