Minimum understandings regarding Syria between the United States and its allies on the one hand, and Russia and its partners on the other hand, face significant challenges.
Since mid-2017, there has been an agreement between Washington and Moscow to prevent military clashes by coordinating aircraft movements and forces; the United States controls the eastern part of the Euphrates, while Russia controls the western part. Additionally, since 2014, there has been an understanding to pass an international resolution for the delivery of cross-border humanitarian aid to the Syrians.
The confrontation between the two sides in Ukraine has impacted these two understandings. Russia has escalated its military engagement against the international coalition forces led by the United States. Additionally, the two parties have, so far, failed to reach an agreement in the Security Council to extend the resolution on humanitarian aid, which expired on the 10th of this month.
What is the resolution on humanitarian aid?
The international mechanism for humanitarian aid dates back to 2014 when a UN resolution was issued allowing to transfer aid across Syrian borders through four border crossings with Jordan, Iraq, and Turkey.
After the government forces returned to the south as a part of the US-Russian-Jordanian agreement and the expansion of US allies east of the Euphrates, Washington and Moscow agreed on Resolution 2585. This resolution enabled the delivery of aid through a single border crossing (Bab al-Hawa), which connects Turkey to northwestern Syria, where approximately four million Syrians, half of whom are displaced, reside.
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Following the understanding reached between Presidents Joe Biden and Vladimir Putin in Geneva in mid-2021, secret negotiations were held between the envoys of the two presidents. These negotiations resulted in American concessions in favour of Russia by opening up the international resolution and allowing funding for early recovery projects in areas such as health, education, and sanitation, and facilitating cross-line assistance between different areas of influence, provided that the Secretary-General of the United Nations, António Guterres, presents a positive report on tangible progress in the early recovery projects and cross-line aids.
With the renewal of the resolution for another six months, the United States and its allies made further concessions by including a provision for funding electricity projects within the early recovery basket, as well as establishing a mechanism for cross-line assistance.
What does this mean?
On its part, Damascus wants to have the resolution on aid in its hands, with Moscow supporting it in that. They want to send aid to other areas of influence in northwestern and northeastern parts of the country, with the aim of regaining full sovereignty over Syrian territory. They also want to dismantle the wall of Western sanctions and break the political isolation.
As for Western countries, they set three conditions, or three Noes: no to reconstruction, no to lifting of sanctions, and no to normalization before achieving progress in the political process according to UN Resolution 2254.
The diplomatic war of words surrounding the international resolution centers on these political aspects. Moscow conditions its consent to extend the resolution every six months on the West’s provision of linguistic concessions in terms of form, political concessions in terms of content, and other concessions related to the language to align the resolution with supporting Damascus's authority and sovereignty, and to engage the United Nations and donors in financing reconstruction and development efforts.
Is there anything new?
The earthquake that struck Turkey and northwestern Syria last February introduced a new element to the Russian-Western diplomatic discussion and negotiations. Arab-UN mediation resulted in a new deal: President Bashar al-Assad allowed the opening of two border crossings with Turkey; namely, Al-Rai and Bab al-Salam, to provide aid to those affected by the earthquake. In return, the United States granted sanctions exemptions to help the earthquake victims.
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The international resolution expired on July 10th of the current year. The opening of the other two border crossings and the sanctions exemptions are scheduled to end in mid-August.
Also, there is an additional factor: there is a track of normalization between Ankara and Damascus with Russian-Iranian support, and a track of Arab-Syrian normalization with Russian support.
In these two tracks, priority has been given to the repatriation of Syrian refugees, surpassing other political considerations. This repatriation is linked to reconstruction efforts, development, and aid provision. Undoubtedly, the refugee issue holds significant importance for Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey. The return should be free, voluntary, safe, and in line with UN standards and classifications, in exchange for flexibility from Arab countries.
Therefore, a proposal has emerged to establish a UN-supported fund that would enable funding of projects related to refugee return. There is also a proposal to hold a donor conference in Arab countries as an alternative to the Brussel donor conference, where the donors impose political conditions.
It is important to note that the conference, led by the United States, is the largest contributor to humanitarian aid in Syria.
Russian-American Confrontation?
Negotiation rounds were held to discuss the extension of the international resolution that was approaching its expiration date. Initially, it was expected that there would be a diplomatic confrontation leading to a technical extension of the current resolution for six months. However, this did not happen. So, what unfolded instead?
It is evident that there are significant disagreements between the two parties, Russia on the one hand and the United States and its allies on the other. These disagreements revolve around cross-line aid, the duration of the resolution, sanctions, and funding for reconstruction and development.
Switzerland and Brazil, as co-penholders, have submitted a draft resolution, of which Al Majalla has obtained the text. The draft proposed: "Encouraging efforts to improve the cross-line delivery of humanitarian aid and urging all relevant parties to continue working on unhindered humanitarian access to all parts of the country, in line with the United Nations' assessments of needs."
The draft resolution further suggested a nine-month extension for the Bab al-Hawa crossing, along with a call to increase "activities related to WASH, health, education, and electricity, wherever necessary to restore access to vital services, and humanitarian tasks related to demining, shelter, and early recovery projects carried out by humanitarian organizations.”
It also called upon other international humanitarian agencies and concerned parties to enhance their support. Additionally, it urgeed "all relevant parties to enable cross-line delivery of humanitarian aid to all parts of the country, including by providing timely security guarantees to ensure the safe passage for convoys and humanitarian workers."
This draft resolution faced a veto from Russia and an abstention from China. In response, Moscow presented its own draft resolution that did not garner enough votes.
The draft, obtained by Al Majalla, suggested a six-month extension of the resolution, specifically for the Bab al-Hawa border crossing. It requested the Secretary-General to provide a special report on the impact of unilateral sanctions on the humanitarian situation and needs in Syria, no later than December 10, 2023. It also included the "necessity of maintaining sustainable cross-line access from Damascus to all parts of Syria".
Furthermore, it called for "intensifying further initiatives to expand humanitarian activities in Syria, including in the areas of health, education, electricity, mine clearance, shelter, early recovery, and sustainable development initiatives aimed at facilitating the safe, voluntary, and dignified return of Syrian refugees and internally displaced persons to their original places of residence.”
The draft resolution also urged all Member States, international humanitarian agencies, and relevant parties to provide support to the returnees.
A Syrian Surprise
An Arab state attempted to reconcile the two directions by taking into account the Syrian delegation's observations and requests regarding early recovery, cross-border aid, funding for development projects, and reference to Secretary-General Guterres' statement on the repercussions of sanctions. They proposed a six-month extension with a guarantee of a subsequent technical extension for another six months. However, this did not result in a quick agreement.
Suddenly, the Syrian representative to the United Nations, Bassam Sabbagh, handed a letter to the Security Council. The letter, obtained by Al Majalla, contained a decision from Damascus to open the Bab al-Hawa crossing without UN authorization, but under many conditions.
The letter stated: "In light of the intransigence of some countries in the Security Council and their persistence in refusing to introduce any serious improvements to the draft resolution to extend the effects of Security Council Resolution 2672, which was submitted by the humanitarian co-penholders in the Security Council, and their obstruction of the adoption of the Russian draft resolution, which resulted in the expiration of the effects of that resolution, the Syrian Arab Republic has made a sovereign decision to grant the United Nations and its specialized agencies permission to use the Bab al-Hawa crossing to deliver humanitarian aid to civilians in need in northwestern Syria, in full cooperation and coordination with the Syrian government, for a period of 6 months, starting from July 13, 2023."
The list of conditions included "the United Nations and its representatives and staff should refrain from engaging with terrorist organizations and the illegal administrative structures associated with them in northwestern Syria, including the so-called Transitional Government or the Rescue Government," which are affiliated with the opposition or Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham that the Security Council classifies as a terrorist organization. Additionally, Damascus will continue to collaborate with the United Nations and its institutions "in the humanitarian and developmental fields, achieving early recovery, rehabilitating and reconstructing damaged infrastructure and civil facilities, including homes, schools, health clinics, roads, power stations, and demining."
In this context, the letter emphasized the necessity of preventing unilateral sanctions from impeding humanitarian relief operations that benefit Syrians or their access to essential services.
What happens next?
It is clear that Damascus has linked the fate of the Bab al-Hawa crossing to the Bab al-Salam and al-Rai crossings, meaning that the decision to open them lies in the hands of Damascus rather than New York. It also linked this issue to the continuous extension of the exemption from US sanctions and the normalization path with Ankara, demanding to take control of Bab al-Hawa crossing, like what happened at the Nassib crossing with Jordan in 2018. However, at the same time, the refugee issue, which Amman and Beirut prioritized, was pushed back.
How will Western countries respond? Will they return to the negotiating table to make additional concessions in the international resolution draft and extend it for six months? Will they activate "Plan B," which has been developed by Britain, the United States, France, and Germany - activating an alternative to the international mechanism for aid delivery through Bab al-Hawa without a UN resolution? What is Ankara's stance on the Syrian surprise and the Western plan?
