Definitions of militias vary, but dangers uniform

The Arab world is more used to drawing the kind of distinctions that can add nuance to such definitions.

Should a militia be perceived as a militia because it fights in exchange for money? Or should the definition be that it takes up arms under orders that do not necessarily come directly from a nation or a government? After all, national armies pay their soldiers.

In the Arab context, the term militia has long had negative connotations.

The term conjures images of a Palestinian organisation that operated in the 1970s and 1980s, shrouded in mystery then, and now. This portrayal of militias depicts them merely as fighters working for the highest bidder, or as Patrick Seale famously put in in the title of his book: "Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire."

But this narrow definition differs from the broader meaning of the term, as found in Arabic dictionaries, which aligns with its historical and academic roots.

For instance, the Almaany comprehensive dictionary has a more nuanced definition, defining a militia as being an armed force composed of citizens, formed either for defending the homeland or for countering oppression by a government, regular army, or fanatical majority.

One definition found in American constitution

The term's usage differences arise from how it has appeared in modern history. The concept of militia was initially employed to refer to forces parallel to the army in the First Amendment of the United States Constitution, ratified in 1791. The amendment stated that "a well-regulated militia necessary to the security of a free state."

Accordingly, militias in states, cities, or towns were regulated within the confines of the law until what remained of them was incorporated into the National Guard in 1916.

However, the term took on a more uneasy feel in modern times, covering right-wing militias, including those in direct opposition to the federal government.

They became even more of a cause for concern as they aligned themselves with the stand-off created by Donald Trump's refusal to acknowledge the outcome of the 2020 presidential election and the subsequent attack on the US Capitol.

Militias, therefore, can be a quasi-regular force operating within the framework of the state, and they may even function as regulated parallel armies with defined roles.

But even at the height of their association with state authority, they may rebel against it, either due to the non-regular nature of their original formation or due to inherent contradictions that are difficult to avoid with the official army.

This contradiction can intensify due to one or both of two reasons. Firstly, militias' power may grow to a level that pushes them to seek greater gains. Secondly, the military leadership may become wary of them and attempt to weaken or subjugate them.

Wagner and the Rapid Support Forces

And so we arrive at the rebellions of the Wagner Group in Russia and Rapid Support Forces in Sudan.

Both of them enjoyed a specific legal status and had a close relationship with state authority, making them akin to parallel armies, and both ended in opposition to the regular forces from which they remained distinct.

Wagner was registered as a private military security company in 2014. It began its operations in eastern Ukraine in early 2014, via agreements and contracts with the Russian government, and the Ministry of Defence.

It later expanded its activities, including to Syria. Under the leadership of Yevgeny Prigozhin, Wagner grew significantly. Right from the beginning, it operated under the auspices of the government, unlike many other smaller security firms in Russia.

On its part, the Rapid Support Forces also grew into a stronger position in Sudan, from origins as the Janjaweed, which initially fought in Darfur on behalf of the government.

Later, it was restructured under the name Rapid Support Forces and was assigned military and security tasks throughout the country, particularly in border areas.

Its role culminated in recent years when its leader, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti,  became the deputy chairman of the Sovereign Council, making him the second most powerful figure in the country.

Both the Wagner Group and the Rapid Support Forces rebelled against their national governments after their rising influence fed the ambition of their leaders.

The Wagner Group's success on certain fronts in Ukraine – particularly their costly battle to control Bakhmut, – bolstered the profile and the confidence of its leader, Yevgeny Prigozhin.

Read more: How Prigozhin's overestimation ended in his humiliation

When he felt did not receive the recognition this success deserved, he escalated a clash with the traditional military command. And so Wagner's breakthrough on the battlefield simultaneously raised mistrust among the military leadership.

Prigozhin went public with claims of insufficient ammunition supply to his forces. Additionally, reports have claimed that some of Wagner's positions were mistakenly targeted by friendly fire from the Russian army, although there is currently no concrete evidence or indications to support this claim.

There are clear similarities with the trajectory in Sudan of the Rapid Support Forces.

The growing ambition of its leadership was a driving force behind senior figures in the regular army insisting on integrating it into their ranks. This may have been an attempt to diminish its influence after it had reached a significant size, or a bid to consolidate power and influence during a highly challenging transitional phase in Sudan.

Read more: Sudan's leaders stoop to new levels of vanity

But whatever else,  rebellion became the choice for the Rapid Support Forces leadership as if it was a matter of all or nothing for them.

That was not so in Russia. For all the similarities between the two militias and their respective rebellions, they led to vastly different outcomes.

The Wagner rebellion was officially declared over within hours, with no conclusive evidence of the mysterious deal struck between Putin and Prigozhin, mediated by the President of Belarus, that allegedly brought an end to one of the most severe crises in Russia since the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

The undisclosed information contained within the black box of this rebellion could potentially alter certain patterns of political and military interactions in Russia, as Putin's position was shaken like never before in nearly a quarter of a century.

Read more: Wagner 'coup attempt' reveals cracks in Putin's delicate power balance

Meanwhile, the rebellion of the Rapid Support Forces continues unabated, and the ongoing fighting in Sudan has left the country going from bad to worse.

Indeed, these rebellions resulted in two different outcomes, making them among the most significant events of 2023. However, what they share, in addition to their motivations, is the inherent danger posed by armed groups transforming into parallel armies.

This latent danger may surpass the risks posed by militias opposing governments. Therefore, a rebellion by those close to the established authority can potentially be more dangerous than one from more distant forces.