How Prigozhin's overestimation ended in his humiliation

Implications for the future

This article looks at the latest mutiny and attempts to understand what led to the Wagner uprising and its implications for the future of the country. It is not about the merits or demerits of Russian policy towards Ukraine nor is it an attempt to justify or vilify its motives for the invasion of its neighbour.

But it will offer a contrarian analysis of what happened – and more significantly why – as the world continues to look on, seeking an understanding of the fast-paced and opaque events that shook a nuclear superpower.

Whatever else, last weekend in June 2023 redrew the global outlook on Russian politics, which now looks more precarious. It has upended perceptions of the balance of power in Moscow. Many are weighing in on what will happen next and how this will impact Russia's war in Ukraine.

The Wagner insurrection highlights the dysfunctional nature of the Russian state and has played into predictions of the country's demise as a great power.

There is little doubt that the war in Ukraine has exposed the vulnerabilities of the Russian state – and particularly its military – which has been unsuccessful in subduing a relatively weak neighbour.

But it is still too early to jump the gun. And so, in order to get a rounded overview of what happened, it is useful to look at an alternative – and even contrarian –  explanation for what happened in those few, fateful hours from Friday, 23 June to Saturday, 24 June.

A long build-up to a brief mutiny

First, let's look at the publicly available facts. No one can dispute that Wagner did the work of the Russian state, at least up until that weekend.

The group performed important and dangerous tasks that the national political leadership needed, but for which Moscow was unable, unwilling or unprepared to take direct responsibility.

Wagner was active in a range of global trouble spots, from the Donbas region to Crimea, from Syria to Africa and most recently, into Ukraine. It stopped being secretive and ended up with an undisputed public face: Yevgeny Prigozhin.

Read more: Putin's private army threatens his survival

He was very well connected in the Kremlin as a close associate of President Vladimir Putin since the leader's early days in politics in St. Petersburg.

Nonetheless, Wagner's day-to-day, on-the-ground management was clearly undertaken by staff with professional military experience, which Prigozhin lacked. As long as it served Russian interests, he was allowed considerable leeway both operationally and in the public sphere when conducting his business.

Then came a turning point for Wagner, not least in its relationship with the established Russian military: The war in Ukraine. 

With the original plans for a swift "special military operation" to take full control of Ukraine within days left in tatters, Wagner was called upon to undertake damage control. That set it on a collision course with the Ministry of Defence in Moscow.

Wrath and verbal abuse

The relationship between the mercenary group and the military establishment worsened with Prigozhin using his public profile to insult and berate the defence ministry with Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu and Chief of Staff Valery Gerasimov bearing the brunt of Prigozhin's insults.

As Wagner made some progress on the battlefield, its leader became emboldened, especially after capturing the town of Bakhmut.

Throughout, it was no secret that Prigozhin's political views were closely aligned with Russia's right-wing nationalists. It is also true that the real and effective opposition to Putin is not the liberals, but rather the nationalist right.

Then, it looked like Prigozhin overestimated the strength of his relationship with Putin while underestimating the power of Russia's Deep State establishment. He came to think he could help Putin overcome the restraints supposedly imposed on him.

After completing the campaign in Bakhmut and withdrawing into Russia, there was little Wagner could do other than wait for new orders from Moscow. When they arrived, they didn't receive a warm welcome. 

Instead, the defence ministry ordered the victorious and bellicose mercenaries to integrate into the ranks of the establishment army. Then came the first signs of mutiny – Prigozhin refused and publicly pledged to continue to resist.

And so the stage was set for the explosive conditions that reverberated around the world on 23 June 2023.

Winning Bakhmut weakened Wagner

Here is the account of that seismic mutiny, by which time Prigozhin had clearly already overplayed his hand.

After Bakhmut, Wagner's public face was no longer performing a function required in Moscow. Winning the battle there, in effect, weakened Wagner. It depleted its manpower and exposed the group's leadership to the kind of stress that would make it easier to dismantle once it had served its purpose.

The battle for Bakhmut had little in terms of military-strategic value, either for Russia or Ukraine. But it had attained symbolic importance, in the fight for hearts and minds within the long-drawn-out clash between the countries.

Hindsight makes Bakhmut look like a distraction. The bitter fight for it between Wagner and Ukraine now looks to have served the interests of the establishment Russian military, allowing it to regroup and prepare for the anticipated Ukrainian counter-offensive and, at the same time, leave Wagner exposed and depleted.

The established version of events recounting the battle also looks overstated in Wagner's favour: The mercenaries were only able to win after the Moscow-controlled military intervened, very late in the battle, to protect Wagner's flanks from Ukranian attacks.

By then, the Russian military establishment, could not allow the public rift with Wagner to continue. Having tolerated Prigozhin's insults for a certain period of time, they were ready to get rid of him.

Setting Prigozhin up for humiliation

But it was not enough to get rid of him, they wanted to completely humiliate him. That need could explain what happened next in Rostov-on-Don. Wagner was allowed to capture the city – the main southern base for the Russian army – without encountering any resistance.

That fuelled Prigozhin's belief that he had considerable support amongst the right-wing members of the military and the government.

Then came even more over-reach.

His lack of fully-fledged military experience combined with his own brand of over-confidence led him to make the decision to move an armoured column toward Moscow without any air support for a distance of over 500 kilometres.

This goes beyond bad military tactics into the realm of outright folly. The Wagner column was a sitting duck for the Russian air force. The only logical explanation for it was that it amounted to political posturing designed to appeal to far-right sympathisers in the general public and the Deep State.

That too soon proved to be illusory. Putin quickly condemned the move by Wagner. And there was no public support. Without his main sponsor, Prigozhin was publicly exposed and humiliated. He was then swiftly offered a deal he could not refuse. The alternative for him would have been much worse.

Business as usual 

This mutiny did not result in any discernible change in the Russian military posture and tactics in Ukraine. According to The New York Times, the Russian military fired more than 50 missiles before dawn on Saturday. So it seems that the prosecution of the war in Ukraine will continue without change.

As for Wagner's overseas operations they will simply be rebranded and will continue under a new leadership.

Why would Russia's authoritarian president allow this situation to develop over the past few months and, most particularly, over the June weekend?

Most likely, Putin reached the conclusion that it was the least-worst option among a series of even bleaker alternatives. Allowing the mutiny to continue would have further exposed the weakness of not only the Russian military but the state as a whole.

Since Prigozhin's failure, Putin and the Deep State have overcome the worst of the perceived threats they were, for a time, facing. What the immediate future holds will become clear relatively soon – in the next few weeks.

Putin needs to reassert control

Some concerns are immediate: Russia's president needs to re-establish his authority and prove that he is in complete control. This will require not just proper numbers of personnel, but also an overhaul of political management.

Read more: Are Putin's days numbered?

Attention now turns to how Putin will deal with the Deep State – particularly the military which has emerged stronger from this episode – but also with the nationalist right-wing which has tried to present itself as distinct from the Deep State, seen by many as omnipresent in Russia, be it under Czarist, Communist or post- communist rule.

This time around, the Deep State has prevailed and protected the office of the president. From now on, and for next time, Putin must prioritise the Deep State, now that it is clear that those longer-established and more traditional forces were the ones that kept him in power after Wagner's overreach.

Speculation will surround the medium-to-long-term ramifications of the Wagner mutiny. Those who oppose Russia will spare no effort in poking holes in Putin's armour to prove their self-fulfilling prophecies of the demise of Russia as a great power.

Read more: Wagner 'coup attempt' reveals cracks in Putin's delicate power balance

Those without an axe to grind with Russia view it as a worrisome yet inconclusive development. But even Moscow's closest ally cannot reasonably deny that what happened on 23 June 2023 has diminished the reputation – or dented the armour – of a Russian state that so recently looked at least stable and to some, seemed all-powerful.