Inside Al-Hol Camp: IS threat lingers as world stalls repatriation

Upon visiting the camp, one immediately notices that women significantly outnumber men in the shopping areas. The bearded men, dressed in traditional attire, respond to greetings from "visitors/strangers" in a reserved manner. They rarely engage in conversation, decline interviews, and discreetly instruct the women accompanying them to look away.

Curious about the availability of goods in the camp, we inquire with the owner of a produce shop. He explains that his supplies are sourced through wholesale merchants from the nearby city of al-Hol, who have contracts with the camp management.

Every morning, these merchants transport around 100 trucks loaded with vegetables, fruits, meat, and other goods, which are then sold to the camp residents. A similar arrangement exists for various other products.

The camp's management has established a vital commercial exchange system, facilitating trade between external wholesalers and the camp's local shopkeepers and vendors. This dynamic is particularly evident in the two main markets situated in the Syrian and Iraqi sectors, as well as the temporary market in the "Foreigners Sector."

The temporary market operates for a few hours during the day and must be dismantled, prompting the sellers and merchants to leave that sector promptly.

Access to funds

We asked the local merchant about the source of money for the camp's residents. He told us that there are several money transfer offices in the camp that allow people to receive funds from their relatives around the world.

Those who do not receive regular financial assistance or family support, may receive modest monthly allowances from the camp administration or various humanitarian organisations operating within the camp.

This assistance comes in the form of essential supplies and allowances for both individuals and their family members. Additionally, the camp administration provides some residents with specific jobs within the camp, particularly in shops, mobile carts, and other services.

In practical terms, the residents of the camp do not require substantial amounts of money. This is because public services such as electricity, heating, water, bread, accommodation, medical care, and transportation are provided free of charge.

Additionally, all residents receive weekly food baskets, and some receive monthly financial support. Money is primarily needed for purchasing certain "luxuries" like clothing and communication expenses.

Iraqi majority

According to exclusive and detailed information obtained by Al-Majalla, the Al-Hol Camp currently houses approximately 49,000 residents, divided into three main sections. Half of the camp's population consists of Iraqis, totalling 24,400 residents, most of whom are complete families. A majority of these Iraqi residents have been in the camp since before 2019.

Syrians make up the next largest group with 17,200 residents, and a small percentage of them are men. The remaining residents are foreigners, consisting entirely of women and children. They reside in a separate sector in the southern part of the camp, isolated from the other units.

Syrians and Iraqis, however, are allowed to interact and meet in designated sectors to the west of the camp during the day.

Children account for 67% of the camp's population, totalling 33,000, while men make up less than 15%. Most of the male residents are Iraqis who have been in the camp since before 2019 when it served as a reception centre for Iraqi refugees from provinces like Anbar, Nineveh (Mosul), and Salah al-Din during the civil conflict in Iraq. There are approximately 14,000 women residing in the camp.

Education and rehabilitation challenges

We approached Jihan Hanan, the civil director of the Al-Hol Camp, to discuss the mechanisms in place for addressing the challenges associated with such a large number of children living in this unique social and environmental setting.

Within the camp, there are 29 schools and educational centres that follow the curricula provided by the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF). These educational institutions teach in the Arabic language.

Additionally, there are numerous psychological support and rehabilitation centres for children, many of which utilise extracurricular activities. Alongside these initiatives, there are training and development courses available as well as a sports centre.

However, the camp administration faces difficulties due to the prevalent "aggressive" behaviour and rhetoric among a majority of the families in the camp. As a result, many families refuse to send their children to school, encouraging them to reject education.

According to information from sources close to the Autonomous Administration in North-eastern Syria (AANES), the camp administration has initiated a specialised form of "rehabilitation" for the children in the camp as they reach adulthood.

This decision was prompted by the troubling discovery of several cases of recent adult male rape. As a result, the camp administration has made the decision to relocate adult males to three dedicated rehabilitation centres: Urkesh, Hori, and Halat. These centres are situated in the cities of Qamishli, Qahtaniya/Tirbesiyah, and Al-Hasakah, respectively.

Within these centres, the teenagers undergo intensive and structured educational programmes while also participating in mental, sports, recreational, musical, and cultural activities.

The aim is to provide a comprehensive environment that supports their development and well-being. The teenagers are allowed weekly visits to their families and are granted one phone call per week to maintain contact.

Jihan Hanan, the administrative director of the camp, acknowledges that the "rehabilitation" programmes have not fully achieved their objectives yet, partly due to the limited timeframe.

The families of IS fighters have only been residing in the camp since 2019, following the Battle of Al-Baghouz. The accommodation in the camp was carried out at the request of the IS fighters themselves, who were engaged in fierce battles against the Autonomous Administration and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in the Al-Baghouz region in the spring of 2019.

Al-Baghouz was the final stronghold controlled by IS, and after their surrender, their families were transferred to the Al-Hol Camp.

It is important to note that the influence of IS still persists in the camp. Initially, the camp's population exceeded 65,000 residents, but many were subsequently expelled, particularly individuals from the Syrian Jazeera region. These expulsions occurred following interventions and assurances from local leaders.

Unfortunately, some of those who returned to their original areas later reconnected with IS organisations and cells, launching attacks on institutions and members of the SDF. Remaining in the camp did not necessarily indicate a complete disassociation from their past affiliations.

IS lingering influence

The camp's population initially exceeded 65,000 residents, but a significant number of them were subsequently released from the camp, particularly individuals from the Syrian Jazira region. This release occurred following interventions and assurances from local leaders.

Unfortunately, many of these individuals reconnected with IS and carried out attacks on institutions and members of the SDF. Their presence in the camp did not indicate a complete break from their past affiliations.

Read more: Visit to IS camp stark reminder of hidden but ever-present terrorist threat

The ideology and organisational structure of IS remains intact among the families of IS fighters, as highlighted by the camp's administrative director. Security officials within the camp have attested to this fact, and it is this lingering influence that hampers rehabilitation efforts.

Over the past years, criminal inspectors have uncovered the existence of an internal judicial system within the camp known as "Al-Hisbah." This system is enforced by networks of camp residents and applies to all individuals who violate the standards and laws imposed by IS.

These rules include prohibitions on gender mingling and listening to music, among others. The system also forbids cooperation with the camp administration or engagement with international organisations, including sending children to schools and educational centres.

Punishments under the Al-Hisbah system within the camp range from execution by slaughtering to "imprisonment in tents by chaining," as well as various corporal punishments such as stoning and limb amputation.

In the past, some female leaders of the Hisbah would flee the foreign residents' sector to enforce judicial rulings on convicts in other sectors. However, this practice has ceased entirely since the camp administration isolated the foreign residents' section from the rest of the camp.

In addition to the Al-Hisbah system, there exists a covert "political" organisation within the camp that operates with its own platform, discourse, and daily directives. The camp authorities believe that the leaders of this internal organisation maintain contact with IS cells and networks outside the camp.

They acknowledge the difficulty of achieving complete isolation from the outside world due to the availability of modern communication devices, whether legally obtained or smuggled into the camp.

Combat training and security gaps

However, the most concerning aspect of the camp's organisational landscape is the combat training exercises that have been witnessed. Supervisors have observed residents engaging in regular physical exercises, as well as training in camouflage and concealment operations.

These activities sometimes span years, during which they managed to hide prisoners and children and even smuggle weapons. Recent inspection campaigns have uncovered smuggled weapons, convicts, and adult individuals.

In fact, during a campaign conducted in March, two Yazidi Iraqi girls named Wafaa (17 years old) and Sawsan (26 years old) were liberated. They had been hidden as "captives" within the camp for all these years, a testament to the logistical capabilities of the camp's residents.

In terms of security presence, the camp lacks a permanent force of security personnel. They are primarily responsible for guarding and securing the perimeter of the camp from the outside. Occasionally, patrols are conducted using armoured vehicles, and general inspection campaigns targeting the entire camp are carried out.

The security forces, referred to as "strangers" by the camp's residents, are vulnerable to nighttime attacks. There have been incidents such as the torching of an international organisation's office and an assault on a security guard within the camp using a sharp object. Even foot patrols face attacks in the form of stone-throwing, verbal abuse, and threats of retaliation.

A significant security gap arises from the absence of identification documents for a large percentage of the camp's residents, especially in the foreign residents' sector. While Iraqis and Syrians possess identification cards that have been developed in the past year with eye recognition technology, many divorced foreign women refuse to disclose their true identities to avoid potential repatriation.

They fear trials and penalties, including the possibility of capital punishment, which is not enforced in the territories of the Autonomous Administration in North-eastern Syria (AANES).

The presence of Iraqi residents constitutes a significant security dilemma for both the camp and the entire AANES region. They comprise half of the camp's population, and their repatriation by the Iraqi government would alleviate the camp's issues to some extent, including overcrowding, troubles, and costs.

However, they vehemently reject the idea of returning due to their complete lack of trust in the promises made by the Iraqi authorities. Residents who were present before 2019 anticipate receiving court judgments in absentia for the majority of them. Iraqi families associated with IS also fear potential sectarian and revenge killings if they were to return.

Camp authorities are deeply concerned about the resurgence of IS in Iraq, as the camp is only 25 kilometres from the Iraqi border. This increases the risk of the camp facing potential invasion by IS forces.

Lack of global coordination

Furthermore, the Iraqi government's cooperation with the AANES is minimal, if at all. The repatriation process for residents is extremely slow, involving extensive and detailed vetting procedures that often result in refusals based on secondary or incidental reasons.

Moreover, the Iraqi government does not officially recognise the AANES and does not provide any financial assistance or support, including the opening of border crossings or commercial routes that could help alleviate the siege imposed on the region by Turkey and the Syrian regime. Security cooperation between the two entities is also limited.

Similar challenges exist with the rest of the international community, including the Syrian government, which does not cooperate in the process of repatriating over 17,000 Syrians to their areas under regime control.

The Syrian government's security services do not provide records, archives, or bureaucratic cooperation to facilitate the return and integration of these Syrians into public life in their original areas of residence. This is particularly significant as the camp houses families associated with IS and individuals linked to various extremist organisations affiliated with the Syrian opposition.

European countries are hesitant to cooperate in repatriating their citizens from the camp due to concerns about their respective judicial system's ability to handle these cases, especially in the absence of substantial incriminating evidence.

Likewise, many Arab countries, such as Tunisia, have large numbers of their citizens within the camp but refrain from cooperating due to the broader Syrian political polarisation. The Russian Federation, which has the highest number of foreign residents in the camp, faces similar challenges in terms of cooperation.

Ensuring a humane environment

Since there is no end in sight to repatriating camp residents, the camp's civil director, Jihan Hanan, emphasised the importance of creating a "humane" environment for the residents.

In her conversation with Al Majalla, Hanan highlighted the efforts made by the camp administration to win the residents' confidence and change their perceptions toward the administration, surrounding society and the world as a whole.

"We have done everything we can to ensure the residents' basic rights are protected. They are treated equally regardless of their nationalities, past actions, political aspirations, or genders," she explained.

"This is evident through the services provided, such as comprehensive and free medical care. The camp boasts four hospitals and numerous mobile clinics to cater to residents' medical needs."

"Specialised treatments and surgeries are also available, with the camp administration contracting with hospitals in Hasakah, namely Al-Hikma and Al-Shaab, to provide these services free of charge. Residents have access to accommodation, medical care, and medications for extended periods."

Similarly, the camp provides space for religious practices, with five mosques available for residents to perform their religious rites and worship. Collective prayers and weekly sermons take place regularly. The camp also respects residents' cultural, moral, and customary choices in various aspects of life, including births, private parties, and deaths.

It is worth noting that even the civil and security administration within the camp has agreed to accommodate women's religious preferences by wearing the niqab (full veil), demonstrating a willingness to avoid religious conflicts.

In conversations with camp residents, Al Majalla observed a general satisfaction with camp services and security. However, there remained a general discontent with the camp's overall vision and discourse.

A source close to the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) explained in an interview with Al Majalla the dual relationship and responsibility of the SDF towards the camp.

"All parties recognise their commitment to international standards in dealing with situations like this, including IS fighters themselves, who maintained contact with the SDF for months to ensure the safety of their families."

However, the camp's continued existence poses a significant burden on the civilian population, who widely criticise the mechanisms employed to address the issue.

At present, none of the countries involved fully bear their political, security, and economic responsibilities in this regard. The fragile entity of the Autonomous Administration of North-east Syria is left to bear the psychological, political, and security burdens on behalf of the global community.