A Syrian "gift" and a Russian "road map"

The details of the "gift" and "map" are yet to be disclosed but they confirm the winds of reconciliation are blowing across the region

A Syrian "gift" and a Russian "road map"

In Cairo, a "gift" arrived from Damascus, marking the efforts made by the latter to advance the process of Arab normalisation. Simultaneously, Moscow sent a "map" to Damascus and Ankara, outlining the potential features of Turkish normalisation with the Syrian capital. The details of the "gift" and "map" are yet to be disclosed.

Arab normalisation efforts with Damascus have become evident through a series of meetings, visits, and contacts. These efforts culminated in the participation of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad at the Arab Summit in Jeddah on 19 May, following the Arab League Council's decision to resume the Syrian government's activities that had been frozen since the end of 2011.

The Arab track, based on the Amman Statement and the resolutions of the Arab League Council in Cairo, encompasses various elements. These include cooperation in combating drugs and terrorism, facilitating the return of refugees and displaced persons, providing humanitarian aid, working towards a political solution in line with UN Resolution 2254, and convening meetings of the Constitutional Committee.

The Constitutional Committee comprises representatives from different Syrian factions, including the government and opposition, and is sponsored by the United Nations.

The details of the "gift" and "map" are yet to be disclosed but they confirm the winds of reconciliation are blowing across the region.

Arab efforts inch forward

The focus has shifted to a political issue known as the "Arab map," particularly concerning the resumption of meetings of the Syrian Constitutional Committee. These meetings had been stalled for months due to Moscow's rejection of Geneva as the host city, influenced by Switzerland's stance on the conflict in Ukraine.

Simultaneously, Arab countries are trying to convene a ministerial committee meeting responsible for monitoring the implementation of the provisions outlined in the Amman Statement and the Arab League's decision.

A proposal was made to hold the Constitutional Committee meetings in Cairo instead of Geneva. Surprisingly, Syrian Ambassador Bashar al-Jaafari informed Moscow that Damascus had not agreed to Cairo as the venue for these meetings.

Even more surprisingly, the Syrian Foreign Ministry conveyed this decision to the Egyptian government, justifying it by stating that Damascus had promised the Sultanate of Oman to hold the committee meetings there.

This "gift" carries multiple implications regarding Damascus' perspective on Arab normalisation, its priorities, and the road map established in Amman.

It also sheds light on Syria's persistence in seeking Russian support to undermine the international legitimacy of the Constitutional Committee, which was initially intended to serve as a gateway for the implementation of UN Resolution 2254.

The "gift" sheds light on Syria's persistence in seeking Russian support to undermine the international legitimacy of the Constitutional Committee.

Revival of Astana track

Furthermore, this development coincided with the revival of the "four-way track" of normalisation between Syria and Turkey, with the involvement of Russia and Iran.

The Astana process will convene a new round of meetings after a long hiatus, with the deputy foreign ministers of the four countries engaging in political discussions regarding a Russian-proposed "road map" supported by Iran to facilitate Syrian-Turkish normalisation.

It is well-known that Damascus prioritises withdrawing Turkish forces from Syrian territory, expecting a timetable or an official statement, along with Ankara ceasing its support for Syrian opposition factions.

Al-Assad had previously refused to meet with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan before the Turkish presidential elections in May, as doing so would relieve the pressure of the Syrian refugee and Kurdish issues on him during the election.

However, al-Assad agreed to Putin's request to hold a meeting between the Syrian and Turkish foreign ministers in the presence of their Russian and Iranian counterparts, which took place in Moscow.

On the other hand, Ankara has made it clear that it rejects a military withdrawal from Syria until a "comprehensive settlement" is achieved and threats to Turkish national security from terrorism or the PKK are eliminated.

Turkish officials have stated that their forces will not withdraw even if the Americans and other foreign forces do so. Following his victory in the presidential elections, Erdogan is in no rush to meet with al-Assad.

Amidst the calculations of al-Assad and Erdogan, Putin appears to be determined to push for normalisation between Damascus and both Arab countries and Turkey. In this context, Moscow has drafted a "road map" for normalisation, shared with the concerned capitals before the Astana meetings held on Monday and Tuesday.

The proposed roadmap includes various elements related to security cooperation in countering terrorism, arrangements for reopening crucial economic routes and roads in northern Syria, resumption of diplomatic relations, and the re-establishment of the Turkish embassy in Damascus, which had been inactive since 2012 (while the Syrian consulate in Istanbul remained operational).

The convergence and competition between the tracks of Arab and Turkish normalisation persist, with conciliatory winds blowing across the region, underscoring the theme of regional normalisation in an ever-changing and dangerous world.

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