Syria may receive rehabilitation from regional actors, however, it still faces isolation and continued punitive measures — asset freezes, travel bans, and continued economic pressure — from the West at large
AFP
Jordanian Foreign minister Ayman Safadi (C R) meets his Syrian counterpart Faisal Mekdad in Amman on May 1, 2023, ahead of a regional meeting on Syria.
The past few weeks of Arab rapprochement efforts — culminating in Syria’s readmission into the Arab League and a number of multilateral agreements with Damascus — have proven that the region is serious about normalisation with Syria.
The sudden wave of bilateral meetings following the catastrophic 6 February earthquake in southern Turkey and Syria have quickly evolved into multilateral coordination and momentum for full-scale normalisation with the once-isolated President Bashar al-Assad.
Officials in the region have not walked away from normalisation discussions empty-handed.
Recent multilateral and bilateral discussions have reiterated cooperation — some producing formal agreements — regarding the repatriation of Syrian refugees, access to humanitarian aid, coordination over illicit narcotics trades like Captagon, Syria’s security situation, and ultimately, a political settlement for the country’s 12-year long civil war.
Limits to normalisation
Still, while Syria’s neighbours have pointed to discussions’ momentum as a sign of goodwill from the al-Assad regime and that the region could be turning the page on Syria’s traumatic conflict, there are strict limits to just how far normalisation can go.
While Syria's neighbours have pointed to discussions' momentum as a sign of goodwill from the al-Assad regime and that the region could be turning the page on Syria's traumatic conflict, there are strict limits to just how far normalisation can go.
Genuine, effective progress for any political settlement in Syria is predicated on a discernible change in behaviour from the regime, something that has not yet been reflected in normalisation discussions and informal agreements.
Thus far, there have been more concessions on the part of Syria's neighbours, rather than the Syrian regime itself. Following the Amman Consultative Meeting, countries agreed to up humanitarian aid to Syrians, primarily through Syrian regime-approved channels despite reports of aid diversion and corruption.
Officials also agreed to begin "safe and voluntary" returns of refugees to Syria, despite continued, unsafe conditions, which helps rehabilitate the regime.
Iraq and Jordan have also formed working groups with Syria that offers Damascus considerable agency in identifying the drug lords and smugglers involved in the Captagon trade — a trade where there is significant evidence of regime-aligned sponsorship.
It has been additionally reported that some states pursuing normalisation with Syria are even considering bestowing the Syrian regime a financial 'package' that would compensate for the regime's lost revenue from the Captagon trade.
This picture taken on July 27, 2022 shows a view of sacks of confiscated captagon pills at the judicial police headquaters in the town of Kafarshima south of Lebanon's capital Beirut.
This would be on the condition that the regime successfully shifts away from sponsoring production and trafficking, despite the fact that the regime will likely (and has already) conduct cosmetic seizures to demonstrate a change in behaviour.
And officials have additionally agreed to bolster border security cooperation with the regime, offering the Syrian regime rationale to bolster increased territorial control over contested border areas like Dara'a and Sweida.
Damascus has advantage
These agreements forged in Amman, along with agenda items discussed for Arab League cooperation, have thus far offered Syria greater leverage, while not having the enforcement capacity to pressure Syria to follow through on these agreements in good faith.
It is likely that Damascus will agree to many of these agreements with little to no follow-through, given there has been no notable change in the regime's posture over concessions.
It is likely that Damascus will agree to many of these agreements with little to no follow-through, given there has been no notable change in the regime's posture over concessions.
Meanwhile, the ultimate objective for Middle Eastern actors pursuing normalisation — adopting a settlement in line with UN Security Council Resolution 2254 — will likely stall, as the resolution requires a political transition that the regime will likely not adhere to or genuinely embrace.
Opposition to normalisation
Additionally, normalisation progress in the Arab League and the region at large still faces opposition from key actors, such as Kuwait and Qatar, as well as fragmentation amongst proponents for normalisation regarding the approach with Damascus.
While Syria's readmission into the Arab League marks revived legitimacy in the region at large, it still does not bind individual state members to warming ties with Damascus.
I welcomed President Bashar al-Assad of Syria to the UAE today, and we held constructive talks aimed at developing relations between our two countries. Our discussions also explored ways of enhancing cooperation to accelerate stability and progress in Syria and the region. pic.twitter.com/QlcIWomFDE
In the case of states like Qatar, convincing officials to reverse course and make amends with the al-Assad regime is a hard feat, with no indication that Qatari officials are on course any time soon to pursue normalisation.
Kuwait has also indicated reservations of normalisation without exact conditions for a political solution. And even amongst the most vocal proponents of rapprochement with Syria, there are divergences over how to best proceed, with some states favouring a more hardline, conditional approach and others more willing to make greater concessions with Syria.
Finally, it has been made clear that the West will not in any way condone rapprochement efforts, creating an obstacle for US and European partners considering warming ties with Syria.
It was no coincidence that amidst the series of normalisation talks this spring, the US and UK announced joint sanctions designations on a number of individuals and entities affiliated with the Captagon drug trade and al-Assad regime.
This initiative, just weeks later, was reinforced by an EU announcement of its own sanctions package on Captagon traffickers and smugglers closely aligned with the al-Assad family circle, proving the West is not budging on accountability for Damascus' role in illicit activities.
While US Caesar sanctions are approaching their sunset in 2025, Washington is indicating it is far from easing sanctions on the Syrian regime — despite reported demands from Damascus in talks over the release of detained American journalist, Austin Tice.
Accountability for the Syrian regime has remained a bipartisan issue in the US Congress and it's very likely that even after 2025, legislators will seek to maintain pressure on elements of the Syrian regime.
Syria may receive rehabilitation from regional actors, however, it still faces isolation and continued punitive measures — asset freezes, travel bans, and continued economic pressure — from the West at large.
No indication of behavioural change
Syria's readmission into the Arab League is notable. It reflects that the region is serious about closing the chapter on the country's gruesome 12-year civil war and commitment to a political settlement.
(Clockwise from L) Saudi Arabia's Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan , Jordanian Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi, Syrian Foreign Minister Faisal Mekdad, and Egyptian Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry attend a regional meeting in Amman.
But while Syria's neighbours have adjusted their position on normalisation, they are still dealing with the same al-Assad regime that has not indicated any change in agenda or behaviour.
While Syria's neighbours have adjusted their position on normalisation, they are still dealing with the same al-Assad regime that has not indicated any change in agenda or behaviour.
All the while, the region and the Arab League itself (which has been criticised many times for being an ineffective institution) lack any real enforcement mechanism to pressure Damascus to make good on its promises.
Additionally, the West's continued punitive campaign against the Syrian regime, narco-trafficking networks, and officials responsible for mass atrocities against Syrians, remains unchanged, with the potential for the 2019 Caesar Sanctions package to be renewed after it sunsets in 2025.
Recent normalisation ultimately has allowed the Syrian regime to only partially unlock its way out of isolation, but there are limits to just how far rapprochement can and will go.
