Russia fumbles its tactics toward a multi-polar world

Putin has long craved an end to US hegemony but seems blind to the new world order before his eyes, not least after his own invasion of Ukraine

Russia fumbles its tactics toward a multi-polar world

Russia’s President Vladimir Putin been promoting an end to US hegemony since he came to power.

But a legitimate hope for a new, multi-polar world has been badly handled, causing problems for Moscow which look familiar to the Arab world, and some which have affected it directly.

Putin has invaded Ukraine twice, in 2014 and 2022, and is still locked in conflict to dominate the former Soviet republic. Russia intervened in Syria in 2015 and set up military bases there, opening a sphere of influence for the Kremlin in the Mediterranean via the Assad regime.

The issues with Putin's ambitions for a multipolar world lies in his hubris, detachment from reality, and eagerness to restore the glory of the Russian empire and the former Soviet Union.

The issues with Putin's ambitions for a multipolar world liesin his hubris, detachment from reality, and eagerness to restore the glory of the Russian empire and the former Soviet Union.

He fails to recognise Russia's structural weaknesses – which mean the country will struggle to reach Putin's goal – and are apparent from all angles other than the vast size of its territory and its enormous natural and military resources.

Imperial mentality

Another issue is that Russia still has an imperial mentality, unlike other former great powers such as Britain, Spain, Germany, and even the Austro-Hungarian empire, which retreated back within their national borders.

Putin mourns the loss of Russia's Soviet territories, which left it with a replacement of sorts for the international element of the Romanov Tsarist dynasty.

That angle on the sweep of Russia's history has constrained the political, social and economic forces that have swept away empire elsewhere. Russia was left with socialist internationalism, proletarian dictatorship, and a one-party system.

From this perspective, Putin seems blind to what already looks like a multipolar world, one where the US can no longer impose its will independently on others, such as Europe, Japan, China and even Russia itself, albeit to a lesser extent.

Putin either does not realise or does not want to acknowledge Russia's diminishing status on the international stage and relative decline in economic, scientific, and technological terms. In a properly multipolar world, it is more difficult to identify which power centres can truly be treated as equals.

In a complex and shifting international picture, the only real support for Putin's desire for Russia to be seen as a global power in its own right is its status as a major nuclear nation. That military status has been highlighted since the invasion of Ukraine.

Since Moscow's tanks rolled toward Kyiv, Russia's vast oil and gas reserves are no longer an advantage. Europe has successfully found alternative energy sources, neutralising Russia's energy threat to the continent and speeding the transition toward green energy and the investments in renewable power.

The only real support for Putin's desire for Russia to be seen as a global power in its own right is its status as a major nuclear nation.

Foreign policy overhaul

Russia's recently overhauled foreign policy strategy have highlighted many issues. One of the most significant is its view of the US as the primary source of threats to Russian security, with Moscow prioritising the elimination of the remnants of US hegemony. 

Putin's world view is divided along the lines of how countries reacted to his invasion of Ukraine. Few nations support Russia, including Belarus, Syria, North Korea, and Eritrea.

Other countries, including China and even Iran, have chosen not to support the invasion but stopped short of condemning it. But the vast majority of nations have condemned Russia's attack.

Moscow's redrawn international strategy places great emphasis on its relationship with China, more than any other country, even after Beijing stopped short of supporting the Ukraine war. Russian trade with China, worth around $200 billion a year, goes some way to explaining why. But not all the way.

The $800 billion question

Trade with the US is worth much more, at $800 billion, as is trade with Europe  at $600 billion. Additionally, China's dependence on advanced technology from the West may limit its alignment with Russia.

There are also complications within the upcoming nations in the shifting new world order. India, a rapidly rising power, is closely tied to several economic and security systems with the US and has expressed concerns about the ramifications of Russia's invasion of Ukraine. 

Russia's moves to establish itself as an alternative international power centre for Asia, Africa, and Latin America also face natural limits. Moscow's strategy of "expanding the participation of developing countries in global economic governance," is limited by its own capabilities, amounting only to just over 3% of the value of the global economy.

An emphasis in the new foreign policy strategy on "confronting the West" on issues related to freedom, democracy, and human rights, aims to present a different image of Russia to influence perceptions of the country in global public opinion.

An emphasis in the new foreign policy strategy on "confronting the West" on issues related to freedom, democracy, and human rights, aims to present a different image of Russia to influence perceptions of the country in global public opinion.

But this stance does not ring true, or amount to a genuine effort on Russia's part to provide a better model on freedom, democracy and citizens' rights, to distinguish itself from the West.

Economic realities

Its strategy overstates Russia's ability to compete with the West, despite the country's  large size and abundance of natural resources.

Russia is not among the top ten most robust economies in the world, with a GDP of $1.7 trillion, less than that of South Korea or Italy, and significantly behind China's $17 trillion, Japan's $5 trillion, and Germany's $4.5 trillion. 

The strategy also overlooks Russia's increasing isolation, particularly following its invasion of Ukraine, and the inability to secure international or regional alliances that align with its economic, political, and security objectives.

Putin's strategy resembles the failed approach of the al-Assad regime in the 1980s and 1990s, which focused on achieving a "strategic balance" with Israel without the necessary capabilities or conditions to achieve it, leading to a failure to gain popular support.

This could be a potential outcome for Russia if it continues down this path.

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