New document shows where and how Moscow aims to exert influence in the Middle East amid signs it is rediscovering old habits
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Soldiers of a Russian military convoy and their US counterparts exchange greetings as their patrol routes intersect in an oil field near Syria's al-Qahtaniyah town in the northeastern Hasakah province, close to the Turkey border
On 31 March 2023, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a document titled ‘The Concept of the Foreign Policy (FPC) of the Russian Federation’. It fleshes out the Russian National Security Strategy adopted in August 2021, prior to the war in Ukraine.
It is described as a “strategic planning document which provides a systemic vision of [Russian] national interests” in foreign policy, basic principles, strategic goals, major objectives, Russian foreign policy priorities.
With the war in Ukraine and increasing confrontation with the West, some important changes were introduced in the FPC compared to the Strategy. Of these changes, some can be considered fundamental alterations.
Published after the Biden administration signed off on the United States National Security Strategy in September 2022, the Russian FPC can in some ways be seen as a response to the White House’s Strategy.
US President Joe Biden during an address at the Royal Warsaw Castle Gardens in Warsaw, Poland, on Tuesday, Feb. 21, 2023.
Of particular interest, however, is Russian policy in the Middle East as detailed in the FPC. To analyse this, it needs to be seen within a general overview of the FPC. For yet more perspective, it is useful to compare Russian policy with that of the United States.
Putting the document in perspective
Like any document presenting a country’s foreign policy, the FPC sets out national interests, strategic objectives, priorities, and what it intends to do to realise these goals. Interestingly, it prioritises security (political, economic, and military) over cooperation.
The document is steeped in Russian history and culture, borrowing concepts and terminology from both pre-revolutionary Tsarist Russia, and the Soviet era. It speaks of Russia’s 2,000 year history and its tradition as a multiethnic and multi-religious society, with deep historical ties to both European and Eurasian cultures.
The document borrows the concepts and language of pre-revolutionary Tsarist Russia as well as from the Soviet era.
More striking is its emphasis on Russian traditional values and Russia's unique civilisational role, presenting Russia as a particular "state-civilisation" with a "unique mission in maintaining [the] global balance of forces" for the "majority of humankind".
This echoes the messianic streak in Russia's political culture, derived from for the role of the Orthodox Church, as the 'third Rome' and custodian of Christian values and heritage. This resurrects a fundamental principle of Russian foreign policy during the Tsarist era.
Russian President Vladimir Putin chairs a Security Council meeting via video link in Moscow, Russia, 31 March 2023.
As per the Soviet era, there are references to "neocolonialism", Russia's "decisive contribution to victory in the Second World War", its "peaceful progressive development of humanity", and "the hegemony of the West", which it sees as waning.
Taking on the West
This combination of historical optimism (the imminent end of Western hegemony) and deep concern (the West will fight back with added ferocity) is vaguely reminiscent of Stalin's famous dictum about the sharpening of the class struggle.
The FPC emphasises that the international order is undergoing a deep transformational shift in that it is moving towards a multi-polarity.
It talks about "shifting the development potential to new centres of economic growth and geopolitical influence", of "promoting the democratisation of international relations", and of "the deepening crisis in globalisation", adding that the West is trying to maintain its hegemony.
#UPDATE President Vladimir Putin on Friday signed off on a new Russian foreign policy strategy aimed at curtailing Western "dominance" and identifying China and India as key partners for the future ️ https://t.co/etFVcEPOA8pic.twitter.com/ZeQFoG9pg3
For the first time since the collapse of the USSR, the language of confrontation with the West overshadows Russia's desire for cooperation. Yet while it considers the West in general as its main adversary, its main rival is clearly the US and the Anglo-Saxon world.
Europe is considered to be temporarily hostile, but a potential future partner, indicating that Russia is keen to keep the door open to Europe in line with the strategic goal of creating a Eurasian space, as long as Europe decouples its strategic interests from those of the US.
A rocket launches from missile system as part of a ground-based intercontinental ballistic missile test launched from the Plesetsk facility in northwestern Russia.
In contrast, the 2022 Biden strategy describes Russia as "declining and battered", adding that it "poses an immediate and ongoing threat to the regional security order in Europe and a source of disruption and instability globally."
Among Russia's strategic goals is to "develop ties with compatriots living abroad and render them full support in exercising their rights, ensuring protection of their interests and preserving all-Russian cultural identity".
Russian recruits take a train at a railway station in Prudboi, in Russia's Volgograd region, Thursday, Sept. 29, 2022. President Vladimir Putin announced a partial mobilization, the first since World War II, amid the war in Ukraine.
In doing so, Russia may have one eye on Israel. There are 1.3 million Israeli citizens who immigrated from the USSR, comprising roughly one sixth of Israel's population. They have growing political influence in Israel and many still retain strong ties to Russia.
Russian-Israeli relations are currently as strong as they have ever been and with the growing influence in Israel of former Soviet citizens, this is likely to continue. While Moscow and Tel Aviv may differ on Palestine and Syria, they still cooperate on a wide range of issues, including in areas where they draw different conclusions.
Based on the FPC, Russia's only allies are Belarus and the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Yet it has strategic partners, cooperative partners, and friends, although the lines distinguishing each is not always clear.
Like in Soviet times, there is a sense that states are divided into tiers of support. The first includes members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), countries of Central Asian region and of the Caspian Sea zone.
Leaders of the Commonwealth of Independent States pose for a photo on the sideline of the Summit of leaders from the CIS, in Astana, Kazakhstan, Friday, Oct. 14, 2022.
The second tier includes members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), China, and India, with the latter two considered strategic partners. In the third tier is the Asia-Pacific region, the Islamic world, Africa, Latin America, and the Caribbean.
Russia in the Middle East
The FPC is light on detail when it comes to regional policies and Russian interests, in contrast to the US Strategy, which offers a more detailed policy framework.
For Russia, the Arab world and/or the Middle East are not separate but come under the more general 'Islamic World' heading, which even includes Israel. This may be a nod to the enhanced geopolitical importance of Iran, Turkey, and perhaps Indonesia. It may also be in recognition of Russia's own sizeable Muslim population of 20 million.
Deputy foreign ministers from Russia, Turkey, Syria and Iran complete talks in Moscow aimed at restoring ties between Ankara and Damascus, in a step aimed at easing the international isolation of President Bashar al-Assad https://t.co/V90e0f122f
Regarding international terrorism, the FPC says Russia will intensify its "multifaceted cooperation with allies and partners… providing them with practical assistance in counter-terrorism operations, including for the protection of Christians in the Middle East". This aims to further justify Russian involvement in the region and echoes Tsarist policies.
To enhance its international positioning, Russia attaches importance to the development of transportation routes, particularly through the Arctic and a North-South corridor through Iran and down to the Gulf, which has implications for several Middle East states and is likely to be competition for the Suez Canal.
Russian President Vladimir Putin, left, Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi, center, and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan pose for a photo prior to their talks at the Saadabad palace, in Tehran, Iran, on July 19, 2022.
The FPC notes that Russia's goals include "full-scale and trustful cooperation with Iran", giving "comprehensive support" to Syria, and "deepening multifaceted, mutually beneficial partnerships" with Turkey, Saudi Arabia, the Egypt.
Playing the peacemaker
It also hopes to establish "a sustainable comprehensive regional security and cooperation architecture in the Middle East and North Africa". To this end, Russia wants to implement its 'Collective Security Concept for the Gulf Region'.
Russia hopes to play peacemaker by "reconciling differences and normalising relations" between member states of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), and between OIC states and their neighbours, notably involving Iran, Israel, and Arab states. It even hopes to find "a comprehensive and lasting solution to the Palestinian question".
Russian President Vladimir Putin attends a meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing, China February 4, 2022.
Furthermore, it aims to "resolve and overcome consequences of armed conflicts in the Middle East, North Africa, South, Southeast Asia and other regions where Member States of the OIC are located", with a view to "unleashing the economic potential" of OIC states and to establishing the 'Greater Eurasian Partnership'.
In comparison to US strategy
Russian policy is to deepen relations with its allies and partners, resolve conflicts, normalise relations between countries at odds with one another, and intensify cooperation with Islamic countries to create an integrated Eurasian space.
On Iran, Russia wants to "reconcile differences and normalise relations", which stands in stark contrast to the US, which clearly considers Iran an adversary, promising to "enhance [allies'] capabilities to deter and counter Iran's destabilising activities".
Russia is helping Iran gain advanced digital-surveillance capabilities as Tehran seeks deeper cooperation on cyberwarfare, adding another layer to a burgeoning alliance https://t.co/OW7YlsRqXG
On Israel, Russia wants to help it reconcile with Arab states, while the US seeks "to extend and deepen Israel's growing ties to its neighbours and other Arab states, including through the Abraham Accords, while maintaining our ironclad commitment to its security".
Although Russia mentions certain countries such as Syria, Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt, it does not mention the United Arab Emirates, with which it maintains very close relations. In contrast, the US refers to Arab countries collectively when discussing Israel.
Russian President Vladimir Putin puts on protective glasses as he visits a military training center of the Western Military District for mobilized reservists in Ryazan Region, Russia, Thursday, Oct. 20, 2022.
On the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the FPC is vague and generalised, hoping for a "comprehensive and lasting solution" but with no reference to a two-state solution, something that the US Strategy specifically mentions.
Deciphering priorities
In conclusion, the FPC is heavily focused on managing the adversarial relationship with the West in general and the United States in particular, leaving little room for details on Russia's relations with the rest of the world.
But some elements of its national interests and goals stand out as potentially having long-term implications for Russia's policy in the Middle East, including the development of relations with Russian-born Israeli citizens, a focus on Christians in the Middle East, and the transposition corridor to compete with prized routes through some Arab states.
Some elements of Russian national interests and goals stand out as potentially having long-term implications for its policy in the Middle East, including the development of relations with Russian-born Israeli citizens and a focus on Christians in the Middle East.
Together, they provide a foundation for future Russian policy in the region, but the lack of detail elsewhere suggests that 'the Islamic World' is not a priority. For instance, it does not deal with concrete interests within the region.
This is particularly so when it comes to cooperation with the Gulf states in energy and investment, with Israeli in technology, and with Egypt in offering a bridgehead into Africa. All of these are fundamental to forming last relations in the region.
If the US National Security Strategy appears to deprioritise the Middle East, there is nothing in the FPC to suggest that Russia wants to take advantage. Still, the relatively close geographical proximity of Russia and its being of the Eurasian space means that Moscow is likely to prioritise the Middle East more than the United States does.
