Five years ago, on 10 September 2004, Yemeni authorities were able to kill Hussein Badr El-Din Al-Houthi who led a violent armed revolt in Saada. At the time, many breathed a sigh of relief and there prevailed a general feeling that President Ali Abdullah Saleh managed for the second time to overcome one of the most formidable challenges he had ever faced throughout his long rule of Yemen. This is particularly the case given the relatively long time it took to quell the Shiite revolt (3 months) which was led by the son of one the most distinguished Shiite and Zaidi authorities in Yemen. This can be compared to a quick showdown in the summer of 1994 that culminated in the defeat of Southern separatists in a shorter period of time (two months and few days).
Yet unfolding developments in the subsequent few months proved that this was a misleading feeling. The revolt jumped to the forefront of events again, this time under a younger and more determined leader, with a greater resolve to carry out the project started by Hussein Al-Houthi. The movement was met with great sympathy and patronage on the part of his father, Badr El-Din, the well-known Zaidi authority.
With Hussein's younger brother, Abdul Malik Badr El-Din Al-Houthi taking the helm since 2006 at leading the revolt opposed to the rule of president Ali Abdullah Saleh, a qualitative development took place in the revolt's performance, on the political and organizational levels and in the media. It also became more fierce, within a few days new rounds of conflict with a weak central government erupted and the revolt expanded geographically away from its major centre in Saada to neighbouring areas in the governorates of Omran and Goof. Gradually, it came closer to the midi district overlooking the Red Sea.
Though Abdul Malik Al-Houthi's name has often been mentioned in recent years as the leader of the Houthi Movement, his persona is still shrouded in mystery and so little about him has been known that it is impossible to form a clear picture about the young man who has led four rounds of fighting against the Yemeni government.
However, it is known that he was born in Saada in 1979, making him only thirty. He grew up in a conservative rural family with an interest in following local and international affairs. During his childhood, he moved alternately between Maran and Gomaa Ibn Fadil neighbourhoods in the mountainous Haidan district, where he received his education in the Zaidi religious schools. He is married and has several children.
Until recently, Abdel Malik Al-Houthi was a familiar name among the Yemeni people, but his face was unknown to many of them. Since 2005, the media in Yemen has circulated an amorphous portrait of the man, in which he wears a grim child's face and a beard so thin that it seems as if it sprang up suddenly. His looks seem completely average. When Abdul Malik Al-Houthi's information office distributed a portrait of him in late 2008, this was considered an important media landslide, given his well-defined contours, though he looked older. His picture had a spectacularly emblematic significance, as he posed an elegant gesture, with a Palestinian cape round his neck, and an array of microphones in front of him while he was standing before a pulpit adorned with plastic flowers. As some accurately remarked, these are appearances hardly to be found in the remote Saada governorate.
In contrast to his late media appearance, the fame of Abdul Malik al-Houthi as one of the leaders of the Houthi mainstream, started relatively early. At the start, his name appeared next to the name of Abdullah Eida Al-Razami, who was a former parliament member and field commander of the Houthis. Al-Razami soon resumed the rebellion movement in Saada and fought a second round of battles against the Yemeni army between March and May 2005. But immediately at the start of the following year, with the third round of war against the Yemeni army, Abdul Malik al-Houthi managed to assert his leadership of the Houthi current. He surpassed Al-Razami and other prominent figures in the stream, including a number of his elder brothers.
It is believed that his father, who supervised the second war, managed to remove senior leaders and field commanders, who were key aides to his son in the first war and before it during the founding phase of the movement. Al-Houthi, the father, removed the leaders and commanders from the field and political leadership front and mobilized supporters of tribes and field commanders loyal to his son Abdul Malik. He could ally in particular those who belong to Hashemite families and the movement or those who have kin and marriage relationships with the family of Badr el-Din.
This process crowned Abdul Malik Badr al-Din as the de facto leader of the rebellion movement and gave him absolute support of the majority of movement members, its followers and supporters in Yemen.
Abdul Malik Al-Houthi enjoyed choosing his representatives to the negotiating rounds with the government and mediation committees, including the Doha Agreement, which was officially signed in February 2008 under the auspices of the state of Qatar, but its regulations did not last for long.
Those who are close to Abdul Malik Al-Houthi almost agree that he possesses many qualifications which have enabled him to lead an armed rebel movement with a revivalist doctrinal approach. It is said that he has a strong personality with real prudence and common sense. He has a talent for public speaking and enjoys a charisma that has gained him many supporters. They justify their views by citing what happened in March 2009 when Abdul Malik Al-Houthi made use of the Celebration of the Prophet Mohammed's birth to address thousands of his followers. He spoke in an orotund voice, condemning the alliance between Yemen and the U.S. He also accused the Yemeni authorities of betrayal because of their loyalty to foreign powers at the expense of the national interests. He warned the Yemeni authorities that they would lose if they launched a new attack on Al-Houthi's movement. Al-Houthi was aware of his movement’s capacity to muster significant support, as they had already organized demonstrations against Israel and the U.S. during Gaza War in January 2009. These demonstrations were resounding with the traditional slogans of the Believing Youth.
Abdul Malik Al-Houthi realizes to what extent the media is necessary for his fight against the Yemeni authorities. As a result, he launched Almenbar, a website to communicate his movement's views to the world. Unlike his elder brother Hussain, he manages the rebellion in a way that manifests his ability to manoeuvre the media. Despite his skilfulness in defending the Houthi’s proposals, his media and political discourse imply a kind of flagrant populism. Consequently, his discourse is often tinged with many of contradictions that significantly underestimate these proposals. While he has stressed in many occasions that he, along with his men, are loyal to the Republic and its constitution. Further, he argues that the Houthis do not wish to replace the government in Saada, although he describes President Saleh's regime as illegitimate. Al-Houthi has never given an explanation of his refusal to take recourse to the constitutional institutions to express his opposition to the Yemeni president. He has always repeated his favourite excuse that the Houthis are obliged to fight the government in order to defend themselves.
When asked about the reason why the government waged a war against his group, he cleverly responds as if he were in public relations, repeating the Houthis' traditional excuse that the group is raising slogans which condemn America and Israel. He accused the Yemeni regime of loyalty to the Americans and the Israelis. He seemed to shut his eyes to the fact that the formal Yemeni stance has always supported the Palestinian cause and has openly backed the resistance in Palestine, Lebanon and Iraq.
Similarly, Abdul Malik Al-Houthi does not seem to become weary of his repeated denial of not having any kind of relationships with Iran. He also frequently stresses that his movement does not get any kind of financial aid or support from any Iranian Shiite authorities. He argues instead that the Houthis tried to imitate the Lebanese Hezbollah because they admired this party and consider it a resistance model exactly as they admire the Palestinian movement, Hamas. The justificatory discourse of the Houthis' leader disregards the fact that if the entire occupation of Palestinian and the partial occupation of Lebanon may justify their resistance and the taking up of arms beyond the control of the state or the authorities, this cannot be applied to Yemen since it is an unoccupied land, and the spread of arms and the fragile authority of the government are among its most important problems and challenges.
With the continued armed confrontations with Abdul Malik Al-Houthi and his supporters, the inability of Yemen’s government to put an end to the rebellion in Saada, the mutual accusations between the two sides of the conflict, as well as the involvement of internal and external forces, it does not seem that the Houthi rebellion will settle down soon. Whatever the fate of the prominent men of the movement led by Abdul Malik Al-Houthi, the Yemeni dilemma will unfortunately persist. It is exacerbated by entrenched political, economic and security crises of the country's north and south, and this of course is a source of relief for the forces opposing the Yemeni regime since these forces are pleased to see the regime sink into chaos, without caring about the future of the country which is slowly getting closer to the edge of the unknown.
