Turkey elections kill hopes for modernisation

Political parties are presenting the same programmes and conventional pledges

Turkey elections kill hopes for modernisation

The general elections looming in Turkey are the most important in the country’s modern history and they appear to be witnessing the worst kind of political polarisation.

But the programmes presented by the political parties are actually more or less the same. Ultimately, the pledges and plans made by the parties can all be classified as conventional. They are the kind of policies basically agreed upon from the founding of the republic until now.

The central role that Turkey’s state agencies play remains key, as does nationalism and sectarianism mixed with an intense suspicion of anything foreign. Important too is the marginalisation of all basic human values and rights, especially the right to freedom of opinion and conscience.

To put bluntly, despite the displays of conflict and violent political confrontations between the various forces — with their different names and ideological claims — they agree to remain loyal to the past and adhere to the standards and rhetoric of self-preservation.

It all amounts to what looks like an end to the reform and modernisation plans preached by Turkey in recent years.

A regressing nation

This election comes at a time when Turkey has become the most prominent example of political, economic, educational, and social regression in the world.

Based on various international standards, the country is currently in a much worse position than it was 10 years ago when it was at the peak of its preaching about modernisation.

At that time, especially in 2012, Turkey had reached the climax of its ambitions. It was a turning point between two completely different historical stages and contexts.

The Justice and Development Party won the country's parliamentary elections for the third time in 2011, after having amended the constitution a year earlier. This left the military, which is the backbone of nationalist ideology, at its weakest point.

New constitution symbolised hope

A new constitution was intended to create public support and overcome decades of military domination and nationalism. It was also intended to resolve the Kurdish problem and set the groundwork for European integration, economic progress, and greater space for public freedoms and human rights.

A parliamentary committee that equally represented all four parties drafted the new constitution. It brought with it the most public and free political debate and in the country’s modern history, alongside economic and human development.

But it was also in this same year that Turkey was dealing with three critical dynamics. President Erdogan, anxious as the end of his political career approached after three successive terms as prime minister, was keen on changing the constitution in a way that guaranteed his survival as leader.

The drafted new constitution brought with it the most public and free political debate in the country's modern history, alongside economic and human development. But it was also in this same year that Erdogan was keen on changing the constitution in a way that guaranteed his survival as leader. 

Meanwhile, efforts to resolve the Kurdish issue revealed that the group's ambitions exceed those of the authorities.

And as political Islam, via the Muslim Brotherhood in particular, rose as a dominant regional force during the Arab Spring, Erdogan and his ruling party dreamt of restoring imperial Ottoman ambitions and becoming the region's leading nation.

Authoritarianism prevails

All this left Turkey at an inevitable crossroads. But just like previous eras that spanned a whole century, or many centuries like the Ottoman Empire, national conservatism and authoritarianism based on one-man rule and ethnic ideology once again prevailed, rooting out any hopes for modernisation.

This trend of failing to meet sparkling promises for political and social modernisation is not new. It has held since the famous Tulip Era in the early 18th century, and it has once again emerged in modern Turkey for three main reasons.    

This trend of failing to meet sparkling promises for political and social modernisation is not new. It has held since the famous Tulip Era in the early 18th century, and it has once again emerged in modern Turkey.

First, this latest attempt at modernisation, like many others before it, was not backed by a solid social bloc that could protect and defend it. Quite the contrary, not only was the Erdogan/AKP project exclusive, it was also based on the most conservative social principles. 

AFP
In a file photo people walk past an election poster bearing the picture of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and reading "Istanbul is a love story for us", in front of the Hagia Sophia museum in Istanbul, on March 26, 2019.

The Turkish president, his party, and supporters aspired to realising the Islamist dream in assuming total power independent of the military or the secular elite. This undermined the chance for real change, that would disturb and undermine conservative groups, and help establish public freedoms, human rights, and gender equality.

Imperialist ambitions and history

Secondly, contemporary modernisation processes do not complement the imperial ambitions which have completely possessed Turkey. 

Political, educational, and economic development would turn Turkey into a normal country with duties towards its citizens, neighbours, and the world. This is not what Turkey is accustomed to, with its imperial history, exceptional geographical location, and global awareness. 

Third, modernisation would require the abdication of the Turkish state's structure, priorities, and central role, and no one in Turkish politics was ready to do that. 

In fact, there is a consensus among the various political forces that equality between the country's centre and its periphery, or between Turks and other ethnic groups, leads to the unravelling of the state, and every modernisation attempt is eventually sacrificed to avoid that.   

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