For those who are committed to the rhetoric of “winners” and “losers”, the Lebanese elections are quite straight forward. March 14, the coalition of Sunni, Christian and Druze political groups including a number of independent candidates won the majority of the seats of the unicameral parliamentary system of Lebanon.
Nevertheless, Lebanese politics have always been delicate and complex and even if international and internal factors tipped the balance of the Lebanese electorate in favour of the March 14 movement, to deal with its difficult political agenda Lebanon will need a government which is as inclusive as possible. It would be a mistake to think that these elections reflect a united Lebanon endorsing unconditionally the Western and Saudi sponsors.
Looking at the disaggregated results is evident that the Shiite community is still loyal to the opposition and that Hezbollah and Amal have pretty much the same political weight they enjoyed in the previous legislature. Additionally, the Christian component of the March 8 coalition is still the major Christian party in Lebanon lead by Michel Aoun. Indeed, the victory of March 14 was undisputed and recognized by the opposition, but a prudent assessment should take into account that it was more the result of electoral arithmetic and not a straight forward turn of the Lebanese towards West.
Nevertheless, democracy is the rule of the majority but what renders difficult the application of this principle is the fact that Lebanon needs to deal urgently with political issues for which the consensus of the opposition will be vital.
The Lebanese political agenda includes a number of items, among these the continuation of the national dialogue, the revision of the electoral law, a worrying economic situation and the overlooked problem of social justice along with the widespread corruption symptomatic of a weak judiciary. Additionally, there is the delicate issue of forming an efficient Lebanese army and assuring the monopoly of force of the state on the territory. All these problems are projected into the geopolitical role of Lebanon that is under the influence of regional and international actors who do not hesitate undermining the already frail Lebanese sovereignty.
If the new government will not be widely inclusive of members of the opposition it will be impossible to address any of the above problems and any attempt to do this without widespread consensus will inevitably lead to instability.
Thus, the new government does not have many chances. So far, the most likely candidate to preside the council of ministers is Saad Hariri, the Sunni leader of the March 14 coalition and son of the former prime minister Rafiq, killed in a bomb attack in 2005 for which a special international tribunal has been set up. The opposition looks for veto power, that corresponds to a third of the number of the members of the government and which will guarantee that no major decisions of the government will be taken without the consent of the opposition. In the event this will happen the opposition will withdraw its members from the government undermining its constitutional legitimacy as happened before. Of course this is understood as a condition that will paralyze the new Lebanese government and will impede any major change.
A compromise which may facilitate the formation of the new government could be the inclusion of the presidential quota in the government which will guarantee to the opposition the possibility to restrain the range of action of the new government. President Michel Suleiman is trusted by Amal and Hizb Allah who may accept the deal especially if Nabih Berri will be re-elected in the powerful position of chair of the parliament. Probably Aoun would not be completely satisfied with this as he originally aspires to become the new president of Lebanon, a position reserved to Christians which would seal the coronation of its leadership
The major problem of this compromise is that becoming involved in the political process and being subject to the pressures of both sides the position of the president may eventually weaken. The impartiality of the president is particularly important for the stability of the country. Apart for this, the major consideration that can be made is that the present configuration of the Lebanese political scenery seems optimal for the maintenance of the status quo rather then promoting any major change.
This seems, thus far, the most likely outcome of these elections and the role of international powers goes in the same direction. Despite the opening of the US to new relations in the Middle East, this is not the case of Lebanon where the visits of Hillary Clinton and Joe Biden immediately preceding the elections made clear that the victory of the March 8 coalition would have meant the limitation, if not the suspension, of the economic support to Lebanon. Something similar would have happened with the other major stakeholder of Lebanon’s reconstruction that is Saudi Arabia. The European Union tries to disentangle from this scheme aiming to more impartial role but until now is not making a difference. On the other hand of the spectrum, whatever is the outcome of the Iranian election the support to Hizb Allah will not be subject to change while Syria seems to play a weaker role, but not enough to presume any major change. Thus the picture seems the same of the last few years.
There is also the problem with Israel, some analysts say that a March 8 government would have been a factor of risk for Lebanese security but in this regard we should remember that an Israeli government more moderate than the present one bombed Lebanon in 2006 when it was ruled by the March 14 coalition. It will be difficult to convince the Lebanese that they are safer with the present majority in power rather than with a March 8 government. Actually, Hizb Allah was much more efficient in containing the effects of the July 2006 war, while the Lebanese army is still waiting for its new supplies from the US military industry.
Lebanon is a country capable of unexpected surprises but these elections do not prepare the ground for major changes. It might be an unnecessary cynical consideration but the “winners” and “losers” scheme seems inappropriate in this case simply because there is not much to win and not much to lose in Lebanese politics, no matter which side you support.
Filippo Dionigi – London based researcher specialising in Lebanese and Middle Eastern modern politics
