Baluchestan: Iran's Tragic Frontier

Baluchestan: Iran's Tragic Frontier

[caption id="attachment_55246456" align="alignnone" width="620"]An Iranian border guard looks through a pair of binoculars to monitor a border area for drug trafficking activities on July 19, 2011, in Milak, southeastern Iran.(ATTA KENARE/AFP/Getty Images) An Iranian border guard looks through a pair of binoculars to monitor a border area for drug trafficking activities on July 19, 2011, in Milak, southeastern Iran.(ATTA KENARE/AFP/Getty Images)[/caption]The Iranian armed forces suffered one of the largest single attacks recorded in the past two decades last week. Predictably, the attack took place in Iran’s southeastern province of Sistan and Baluchestan, the country’s most impoverished and lawless region. A total of fourteen young Iranian conscripts were left dead after the ambush. In the darkness of the night, the assailants fled across the border into Pakistan. The group behind the attack is believed to be Jaish Al-Adl (the Army of Justice), an ethnic Baloch and Sunni group that insists it is fighting the central government in Tehran because of what it calls anti-Sunni practices. In retaliation, in what amounted to revenge killing, the Iranian authorities hurriedly hanged sixteen individuals allegedly linked to the attackers.

Many Iranian officials have quickly turned on Pakistan and are again making the case for taking a tougher line with Islamabad. The Pakistanis are accused of not doing enough to protect the border and bring to an end the seemingly endless parade of deadly border incursions. But what do such stern Iranian notices amount to? Anti-government attacks have been fairly frequent in this part of Iran during the past decade. They almost always involve Pakistan as the gateway for the insurgents into Iran. Each time, officials in Tehran huff and puff and threaten to retaliate, while the Pakistanis pledge to look into the matter. Nothing comes out of it, and a new cycle of bloodshed begins.

Reaction to this latest attack has been like before. Iran has delivered its typical admonishment while the Pakistanis dodge any responsibility. This is despite the fact that the latest agreement on border security cooperation between the two states was signed earlier this year. However, nothing has changed. Nobody should expect the cycle of violence to come to an end any time soon—at least not at the whim of either Tehran or Islamabad.

While emotions are rightfully running high, it would be prudent to put this latest attack into historical perspective. Doing so is an admission that there is no easy solution to violence in this part of the world. From Tehran’s viewpoint, Pakistan’s powerlessness or unwillingness to control its border should be a secondary concern. Firstly, the Iranian government needs to look inwards.

The Baluch people in Iran do have genuine grievances, something that successive Iranian governments have acknowledged. In fact, Baluch anti-government militancy began in Iran as early as the 1950s, during the time of the monarchy. Back then, it was a leftist-nationalist movement. Today most of Iran’s Baluch militants—unlike those in Pakistan—have embraced Sunni Islamist extremism. The Jaish Al-Adl attackers had wrapped themselves in the flag of Al-Qaeda. This is a mistake on their part if they want—as they say they do—to defend Sunni religious rights inside Iran, for the Baluch people of Iran are not at all a good host community for Al-Qaeda’s ideology.

This, in itself, is an opportunity for the Iranian government. By more candidly and forcefully admitting that local Baluch in Iran have genuine socio-economic grievances, Tehran can prevent the message of the likes of Jaish Al-Adl taking deeper root. Political developments in the past two decades show that mainstream Baluch society wants Tehran to extend a hand to them. Reformist political candidates from urban and liberal backgrounds have always done well in this faraway, and in many ways most traditionalist, of Iran’s provinces.

Mohammad Khatami carried the province by great margins in both the 1997 and 2001 elections. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad lost a lot there, both in 2005 and 2009, and he in fact once survived an assassination attempt there. The contradiction stems from reformists—such as Khatami and the new present, Hassan Rouhani—openly admitting that greater respect of minority rights along ethnic and religious lines is much overdue in the Islamic Republic.

By all means, the Iranians are entitled to press the Pakistanis to do something about the dismal performance in securing their side of the border. However, Tehran cannot dictate, nor apparently shape, Pakistani actions, as over a decade of pleading with Islamabad shows. On the other hand, there is nothing standing in the way of President Rouhani making a high-profile trip to the province and taking concrete measures to reach out to this very disgruntled community. It has been tried before, but there is no alternative to push ahead on this path once again. That is the only way Tehran can pull the rug from under the feet of extremists such as Jaish Al-Adl.

All views expressed in this blog post are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of, and should not be attributed to, The Majalla magazine.
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