Sheikh Muhammad Al-Yaqoubi in 2010. (Courtesy of Sacred Knowledge, the Sheikh’s foundation.)[/caption]Whether the West likes it or not, many Syrian Muslims fighting the regime view the conflict in religious terms, invoking the banner of “jihad” to give their cause moral authority. However, jihad is an elusive concept, and thus using this language brings its own problems. In history, the declaration of jihad has depended on so many factors, including political power, geopolitics and local circumstances, that nailing down a precise definition is a serious undertaking. Historically, it has had many connotations: expansionist, defensive, pre-emptive, collective, and individual. In the modern world inhabited by nation-states, non-state actors and religious revivalist movements, the discourse of jihad has become even more complicated.
This is particularly true in the case of Syria, where all the currents of jihadist thought run amok. For policymakers looking for a side to back, Syria seems like the ultimate riddle, forcing them to contend with questions about whether it is possible to try to separate ‘good’ jihadists from ‘bad’ ones. There is also the problem of containment, with the violence in Syria already threatening to spill over into other countries. Whatever the case, those advocating this jihad must deal with three crucial issues that worry policymakers: how and when to conduct a jihad, how it affects the sectarian balance in Syria, and what threat the Salafist brigades present to their goals and objectives.
Ask an expert
One person who can shed light on these questions is Sheikh Muhammad Al-Yaqoubi. Yaqoubi is a Syrian Sufi and a pedigreed scholar, having studied in Sweden and the UK. He is one of the few scholars who openly defied the Syrian regime by condemning it for killing demonstrators. Consequently, he fled the country after the regime tried to silence him. He is currently in exile in Morocco, helping to deliver humanitarian aid, and is in regular contact with Syrian fighters who consult him on the moral and spiritual issues raised by their struggle.
In an interview with The Majalla, Yaqoubi explained that jihad is primarily about defending the land when it is invaded by a foreign power. In the case of Syria, he says that “religion serves the purpose of defending the country and motivates fighters. The role of religion here is positive, as long as the main slogan of the war is defending the country or getting rid of oppression.”
Aware of the danger of the jihad turning against a specific people or religion, he believes that it is necessary to make a distinction between Hezbollah and Shi’ites. In his opinion it is necessary to fight the former, because “they are now involved as much as the Syrian regime in the killing of Syrians.” However, he insists that Shi’ites are not to be blamed, as he says “there are several Shi’ite voices speaking loudly against the Assad regime and Hezbollah's involvement: figures like Sheikh Subih Tufayli, the founder of Hezbollah, who declared that any Shi’ite who dies while fighting the Syrian people will go to Hell.”
When The Majalla raised the issue of the risk that some jihadis might target minorities like the Alawites, Assyrians, Druze and other communities, Yaqoubi responded: “Up to now, there is no fear of a wide-spread sectarian conflict; people still listen to the voice of reason. The more the regime, Hezbollah and Iran kill Syrians the more hatred there will be.”
He added: “The longer the conflict goes on, the more difficult it becomes to heal the wounds and bring the nation back together. We, as religious leaders and clerics of orthodox Islam, don’t hold any sect responsible for the oppression the regime exerted on our people for over 40 years; nor do we hold the Alawites responsible for the massacres which the military committed during these two years or in the past.”
Yaqoubi went on to clarify the role of Salafist jihadis in the Syrian conflict, who are usually accused of harboring animosity towards minority communities. “Not all Salafi groups are fanatical,” says Yaqoubi. “They are part of Syrian society and their struggle is part of the nation's struggle against oppression. Salafism is an intellectual, theological movement which has grown large and splintered. There are subjects of dispute with mainstream Sunni Islam; nevertheless, they have co-existed. In Syria we have had several prominent Salafi figures over the past fifty years; none of them ever called for the destruction of any shrine.”
Going astray
However, he criticizes jihadist groups who do not take account the fact jihad has rules and regulations that govern when it can be declared and how it should be prosecuted. “They see the UK as an enemy of Islam and they encourage military attacks on UK interests anywhere in the world.” He says: “This is wrong. Animosity against a state cannot be declared by individuals or groups; no Islamic government is in a state of war with the UK; they all have diplomatic relations and therefore, any attack against UK citizens or interests would be deemed as un-Islamic and illegal in the Shari'a, regardless of whether we approve of UK policies or not, or its government.”
Yaqoubi also rejected the propensity of some jihadist groups towards the act of takfir, or declaring someone an apostate. “The jihadis consider any government who rules by man-made laws a disbelieving [i.e. secular] government; the people who work for it and support and accept it and do not move to change are also disbelievers and apostates,” he explains. “According to them, they all deserve to die. This has been rejected by Muslims scholars and Institutions such as Al-Azhar in Egypt and Muftis around the world, but found fertile ground in the areas where the West intervened, such as Afghanistan.”
His solutions to these problems are, in a word, ambitious. When asked whether the influx of foreign fighters coming into Syria is perhaps aggravated by fatwas by the likes of the Qatar-based preacher Yousef Al-Qaradawi, Yaqoubi is pragmatic. He wants the Free Syrian Army (FSA) to open a register in which fighters, civilians and administrators can be organized and given an identification number. He also thinks there should be recruitment centers in major towns and cities in the Middle East to pre-empt individual efforts, where those who want to fight can be vetted and trained under FSA supervision.
His plans for resolving the conflict in Syria are likewise ambitious. As well as an international registry of fighters and the creation of a kind of Arab or Islamic ‘Foreign Legion,’ he also emphasizes the need to create mechanisms for transitional justice during the conflict. “In fact, it is needed now more than ever, to prevent fake prosecutions and military tribunals which some military groups are holding against the regime's affiliates,” he says. His solution lies in refocusing efforts on the FSA, because “the FSA consists mainly of former soldiers and officers; they defected from the Syrian Army. They work for the best interest of the country. They are not lead by ideologies. They are motivated by the injustice inflicted on our people. The FSA will be, after the collapse of the regime, integrated in the Syrian Army.”
He is also in favor of international intervention, saying that these things should be accompanied by military intervention by Jordan and Turkey. However, without the help of the Friends of Syria in establishing no-fly zones and opening up access to disaster zones such as Homs, this may not be possible. Bearing this in mind, it seems only one thing is truly indisputable when it comes to jihad: No matter how it is defined or understood, for every person who undertakes it, it is a hard road to travel.
