Ayatollah Khomeini[/caption]
[inset_left]Becoming Enemies: U.S.-Iran Relations and the Iran-Iraq War, 1979–88
By James Blight, janet M. Lang, Hussein Banai, Malcolm Byrne, John Tirman, and Bruce Riedel
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It is often quite difficult to develop a new understanding of a historical event years after it occurs. But a group of scholars at the National Security Archive (NSA), a Washington-based, non-profit organization, have sought to overcome this obstacle by employing a fascinating new methodological tool known as Critical Oral History (COH). The idea is simple: bring together policymakers who were involved in the event, leading academics to provoke the policymakers and hold them to account, and historical documents to help refresh the policymakers’ memories of the events while offering them a new perspective on what their colleagues were thinking at the time. [caption id="attachment_55234188" align="alignright" width="199"]
Becoming Enemies[/caption]
With the support of the Rockefeller Foundation and MIT’s Center for International Studies, in 2008 the NSA brought together a group of foreign policy actors, including former State Department and CIA officials, and leading scholars at a resort in Georgia with the objective of reconstructing a history of US-Iran relations and the Iran-Iraq War, known as the Musgrove Conference. The results of these discussions were just published in a book, Becoming Enemies: U.S.-Iran Relations and the Iran-Iraq War, 1979-88 (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2012).
This book tackles a number of highly contentious topics with remarkable clarity and, considering that the participants were predominantly American, with considerable empathy to the Iranian point of view. It argues that central to US-Iranian hostility are the “original sins” of both antagonists: for Iran, America’s original sins stem from the CIA’s overthrow of Mossadeq in 1953 and for admitting the Shah into the US following the revolution. To the revolutionaries in Iran, these two sins are unforgivable and contribute heavily to the anti-American ideology that dominates Iran’s ruling class. To the Americans, Iran’s original sin was the seizing of the US Embassy in November 1979 and the 444-day hostage crisis that ensued. The Iranian regime’s support for the students who seized the embassy was a gross violation of the rules of diplomacy and exacerbated Iran’s isolation from the international community. So disturbed was the international community by this unprecedented act that nothing was said when Iraqi forces stormed across the Iran-Iraq border on 22 September 1980.
After a detailed explanation of Critical Oral History, Becoming Enemies provides a thorough examination of a number of key aspects of the war. Even for someone familiar with the subject, this book offers incredible new information on topics including the Iranian Revolution, the hostage crisis, the alleged US “green light” for Iraq to attack Iran, the US tilt toward Iraq, Iraq’s use of chemical weapons, the Iran-Contra affair, the US role in the Tanker War in the Gulf, the downing of Iran Air 655, and the UN’s role in bringing the war to an end.
Beyond these incredibly insightful discussions, Becoming Enemies also provides copies of the key historical documents referenced in the discussions, giving the reader a chance to analyze the documents themselves. This is an unusual but highly welcome feature of this book.
Perhaps the most interesting revelation is the discussion on the Reagan administration’s sharing of tactical intelligence with Iraq. With great fortune, the NSA managed to convince Tom Twetton, a career CIA officer who eventually rose to the rank of Deputy Director of Operations (i.e. he was in charge of managing spies and covert operations), to participate in the talks. Significantly, it was in 1982—just after Iran had ejected the Iraqis and was preparing to invade—that Twetton and an agency analyst traveled secretly to Baghdad to provide Saddam and his generals with tactical intelligence on the impending offensive. According to Twetton, when he showed the Iraqis the intelligence, which consisted of satellite imagery of Iranian battle lines, “It was obvious . . . that we had provided them with something they regarded as very significant to them.” And it was US intelligence that helped Iraq pinpoint exactly where the offensive was coming and allowed them to prepare adequate defenses for when the Iranian onslaught against Basra began. In short, it helped Iraq prevent Iran from taking Basra, which could very well have resulted in an Iranian victory and the destruction of the Ba’athist regime—but on Iran’s terms, not America’s.
Another unique feature of Becoming Enemies is that it also offers a detailed discussion of potential missed opportunities to bring about an improvement in US–Iraq relations. As a result, this book is a must-read for US policymakers charged with devising America’s policy toward Iran. Indeed, it should help them empathize with the Iranian point of view and the roots of the deep antagonism felt between the two countries.
There is no question that Becoming Enemies is a brilliant addition to a woefully-understudied historical subject that is of both great importance and relevance to today. The authors of the book have made it clear that they wish to employ the exact same methodology with Iranian policymakers, but have met resistance from the Iranian side. Hopefully, as former Undersecretary of State Tomas Pickering observed, by “bearing all” in Becoming Enemies, “we may be able to get our Iranian colleagues to understand that there is value in looking at a period which is now past, but which has vast potential relevance for the future.”
