Politics

What Comes Next?

What Comes Next?

Majalla: The Leading Arab Magazine
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On 14 January 2011, the first president to fall at the hands of protests in the Middle East departed Tunisia. The next twelve months have since become a historic period of profound transition and evolution for the region. It is a movement still in the process of realization.

It all began when, on 17 December 2010, Mohammed Bouazizi—a fruit vendor driven to desperate measures by corruption and abuse endemic across Tunisia—set the whole region aflame by dousing himself with paint thinner and striking a match. His death two weeks later became a tragic inspiration that rallied Tunisians to continue his protest against unemployment, rising food prices, and an autocratic government that was seemingly indifferent to their suffering.

Funerals for those killed in clashes with the armed forces became the flashpoints for more battles.  More and more clashes occurred in small towns similar to Bouazizi’s home of Sidi Bouzid. Back then it was being called the ‘Jasmine Revolution.’ Acts of defiance like Bouazizi’s would occur all over the region over the subsequent weeks.

Egypt would turn the Jasmine Revolution into the ‘Facebook Revolution’ when protestors—organizing themselves on social media—made Cairo’s Tahrir Square the new flashpoint to watch. When Mubarak resigned on 11 February, the jubilation was as contagious as it was short-lived.

One month later, fighter jets sweeping Benghazi, Misrata, and Brega in Libya brought a heavy sense of dread to the once hopeful outburst of resistance. The movements in Yemen and Libya tested the endurance of protesters—protesters that became rebels and rebels that became rebel armies. A NATO intervention and tens of thousands of lives lost in Libya brought Western powers front and center in the Arab Spring.

After Qadhafi’s dramatic and televised demise and Saleh’s departure, the violent face of the Arab Spring was unmasked: peaceful protesters with placards were now rebels with rocket-propelled grenades. Meanwhile, Syria’s long and bloody standoff continues to claim lives as the world waits for the right agreement with the Arab League to tip the scales in Damascus.

It was a long road the Middle East traveled down in 2011. One year later, the question of what comes next has no confident answer. In this series, The Majalla asks who won. And who lost? What needs to happen now? Country by country, we review the Arab Spring and bring you our predictions and highlight the things we will be watching this year.


Tunisia


The Little Country that Could


Despite moderate progress in Tunisia since the ouster of President Ben Ali, the country still faces extreme difficulties. The poor economic situation that initiated anti-government protests has yet to be adequately addressed, and the rise of political Islam has yet to be properly accounted for.



Despite the widespread hyperbole that has generally surrounded events in Tunisia this year, it is more proper to urge caution and consider that only moderate progress has been made in the country since the ouster of former President Zine El-Abidine Ben Ali.

It is true that the relatively efficient organization of national elections contributed to the establishment of a national assembly, and in good time the drawing-up of a new constitution ought to help the country flourish. The appointment of President Moncef Marzouki, a competent politician and calming influence, has given cause for hope. Likewise, the appointment of Prime Minister Hamadi Jebali has brought stability.

Despite these successes, the ailing national economy and extreme discontent over unemployment—a root cause of the January uprising—have not been adequately addressed. What is more, Tunisia must now bring about civil reconciliation, in order to move on from the trauma of a year in which over 300 Tunisians died.



The country must also come to terms with the ascendancy of the Islamist Ennadha party, the group which has gained the most from a turbulent year and which topped the polls in October elections. The amorphous youth movement—which agitated to such a great extent at the beginning of the year to overturn the government—might well be disappointed that their idealistic voice has not carried far. Likewise the people of Sidi Bouzid, so vociferous in dissent, have not seen their situation change a great deal.

A sound policy for the future would see the new president issuing a formal pardon to those associated with the old regime. This would both aid the reconciliation process and help the country get over its economic slump by taking advantage of the expertise of former members of the old ruling party. To guard against the religious overtones of the new dominant party, it would be wise to hold a referendum to celebrate the secular achievements of the past. Tunisia is rightfully proud of its status in matters of women’s rights and family law, and it would be a backwards step to diverge from that path.



Egypt


The Military With a State


It has never been so clear that Egypt’s military is almost inseparable from the state. Mubarak’s administration came to a dramatic end, but the de-militarization of Egypt’s government is a long way off. While the generals and the people face-off, one of the world’s critical economies has been almost frozen in time. In reconstruction, however, there may be an opportunity for innovation—if given half a chance.



It appeared for a brief while that Egypt would quickly bounce back from its upheaval that ousted President Mubarak from 30 years of rule. After 18 days of heated battles that transformed the major Cairo thoroughfare Tahrir Square into a pile of rubble, Egyptians came out in full force the morning after Mubarak’s resignation to clean streets and wipe graffiti from walls, a new day had come.

One year and three prime ministers later, the speed of progress exhibited in cleaning the city would not be echoed in the restoration of governance. In late October, Coptic Christians clashed with the Egyptian military, resulting in the deaths of dozens of demonstrators. In November, the tension reached its height when protesting Egyptians reclaimed Tahrir Square and fought bloody battles against the Egyptian military—once the stewards of the people’s revolution.

The electoral success of Islamist parties in December was greeted as a triumph by those who praised the democratic process, but was met with caution by those who fear that conservative ideologies might form a barrier to progress in a destabilized country.

At the center of the challenges facing Egypt’s stabilization has been growing antagonism towards Egypt’s military. The arrest, trial, and imprisonment of popular activists by the army led to demands for the immediate end of military control. Plus, in February the grave scenes witnessed at a football match between Al-Ahly and Al-Masry in Port Said, during which 74 people lost their lives, prompted a resurgence in street protests across the country and widespread anger directed towards the army.



With improved security, Egypt could turn to the task of rebuilding its stalled economy. On 25 January 2011, as the scale of the protests demanding the end of Mubarak’s rule became apparent, the Egyptian stock exchange plummeted 6.25 percent. At the end of trading on 27 January, the regional benchmark EGX 30 Index had plunged 16 percent. It closed that day and remained closed for a record-breaking 54 days. The exchange reopened on 23 March to another day of losses (8.9 percent on reopening). In total, the Egyptian revolution cost the Egyptian stock 45 percent of its volume. Slow and steady reassurance that volatility is diminishing might bring back much of that traffic, but not unless the threat of stock market closures is off the table.

With new images of street violence in Egypt emerging daily, the country’s once-booming tourism industry is now reporting losses of 40 million US

dollars a day. Nevertheless, opportunities remain to encourage growth as—outside of the most famous attractions—there exist untapped opportunities for tourism and entrepreneurship.


Libya


A Long Road from Ruin


Qadhafi may be gone and fighting ended, but the peace is increasingly fragile. Four months into an envisaged 18-month transition plan, it is doubtful that Libya can endure a power vacuum for the plan’s duration. Yet Libya lacks the basic political and administrative capacity commensurate with the most basic standards of popular legitimacy and good governance. With oil production resuming at a staggering pace, macroeconomic recovery is on track, but the pace of job creation is less clear.



Libya is not yet out of the woods. Qadhafi may be gone and fighting ended, but the fragile peace that followed Qadhafi’s demise is increasingly strained. The appointment of a provisional government under Prime Minister Al-Keib has given structure and stability to the transition plan—but even if all aspects of the transition stay on schedule and if all the volatile factors in play remain within manageable limits, Libya still won’t see elections for at least eighteen months. And those are big ‘ifs’.

It is doubtful that Libya can endure a power vacuum for another six months, let alone a year or more. Already last October wartime Prime Minister Mahmoud Jibril voiced his concerns about rivalry between rebel factions and in November advocated shortening the transition period to a mere six months. Jibril’s concerns have proved warranted. Rival militias have fought sporadically in Tripoli, and several have consolidated their strongholds outside the capital, notably the Zintan militia who still hold Saif Qadhafi and are suspected of the recent torture and death of Omar Brebesh, Libya’s former ambassador to France.

Yet filling the power vacuum is very difficult. After 42 years of misrule, it will take far longer than six months to build a political infrastructure that meets even basic standards of popular legitimacy and good governance, two of three measures by which Al-Keib’s government wants to distinguish itself from the Qadhafi regime.



The third measure is economic performance. Here, the challenge is not simply generating economic growth—a relatively easy task given that Libya is unconstrained by foreign debt and its vast oil and gas reserves are a stone’s throw from European markets. Rather, Libya’s economy must produce jobs that will stimulate domestic demand and inject cash into local economies. But there are supply-side issues that also must be addressed. Al-Keib’s government is keenly aware that Libya’s chronic shortage of affordable housing—an important contributing factor to the uprising—has been made worse by the fighting and counts among the medium-term flashpoints that could galvanize protests once again.

Undoubtedly convincing militias to disarm and join a unified national project is the most pressing immediate challenge. Yet looking ahead Al-Keib’s government must grapple with several dilemmas. Militias must be coaxed into laying down arms and supporting the government, but the impression of political favoritism and horse-trading must be avoided. The power vacuum must be filled as soon as possible, but it takes time to build a legitimate political infrastructure and negotiate a new constitution. The economy needs kick-starting, but care must be taken to ensure economic growth is inclusive and the wealth generated is shared equitably. Jobless growth would spell disaster.

These dilemmas require careful management, but it is too early to say with certainty whether Libya is making progress towards that end.


Yemen


The Longest Day


Yemen’s slide towards anarchy has been slowed by installing an opposition-led National Unity Government and holding presidential elections, scheduled for 21 February. But political infighting and exclusion of key constituencies raises grave doubts about the coalition’s capacity to lead and the durability of the transition process.



After nearly a year of protests, violent clashes, and military skirmishes between loyalist troops and army defectors, in late November Yemen’s main parliamentary parties agreed to a two-stage political transition. Following the swearing-in of a new Government of National Unity, phase one culminates in late February with presidential elections. Phase two will comprise a ‘national dialogue’ leading to constitutional and electoral reforms.

The transition plan holds out a promise that the past year’s slide towards anarchy will be halted. The swearing-in of an opposition-led national unity government bodes well. Yet political infighting threatens to undermine this show of unity and raises questions about the coalition’s durability. At the same time, government critics—particularly northern Houthis, southern separatists, and the nascent youth movement—wonder whether the transition plan goes far enough. They suggest the plan amounts to a pact among the elite.

Much will depend on the ‘national dialogue’ during the transition’s second phase, although quite what this will entail is still unclear. For now, it seems maximum effort is being spent on completing phase one, culminating in the presidential election. In terms of the transition plan, president Saleh transferred his most important responsibilities to vice president Abd Rabbu Mansour Al-Hadi. Saleh technically remains president, a post he has held for 33 years, and is thus spared the humiliation of being forced from office before his term ends. This and the fact that vice-president Hadi is the unity government’s consensus candidate and the only candidate contesting the poll, gives credence to criticism that the election is a somewhat stage-managed process designed to prevent a power vacuum while the difficult work of fostering a political context amenable to constitutional negotiations is deferred.



Arguably stage one has bought some time during which the political process might be oriented towards mutual interest and therewith a more consensual frame of reference. Whether this time has been used wisely will become clearer with the elections. Portrayed in Yemen as a referendum on the transition plan, voter turnout will be the measure to watch.

Yet buying time has not necessarily slowed the pace of developments on other fronts. Arguably these will be more decisive in shaping the political context in which phase two will be implemented. The ceasefire is tenuous between loyalist army units, defectors, tribal militias, and forces loyal to the main opposition party Al-Islah. The humanitarian challenges facing Yemen are growing. Unicef recently issued dire warnings about childhood malnutrition, while the supply of safe drinking water is increasingly strained. Yemen’s economic situation is getting worse. It was reported in January that Saudi Arabia would relieve Yemen’s oil shortages, the second time in six months this lifeline has been cast, although this time it is only enough to cover demand for two months. Combined with political and military rivalries, economic hardship makes the task of limiting the influence of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula considerably more difficult, as both Saudi Arabia and the US are acutely aware.


Syria


Assad Runs Down the Clock


Assad underestimated Syria’s vulnerability to the uprisings in the region. The opposition has dug in and armed up, and it looks like both sides are in for a long haul. Will Assad find a way out through the Arab League, or will outside actors like Turkey and Iran speed up the end of his tenure?



Unlike Egypt or Tunisia, which had both experienced full-scale change by February 2011, Syria initially appeared to be immune to the Arab Spring. In February, the conditions in Syria did not seem comparable to those in Egypt or Tunisia. There was a relatively youthful president compared to Hosni Mubarak or Ben Ali; he even had a reformist image. Syria also lacked civil society of the sort used to initiate the other protests—but by March, the first unrest had erupted.

This assessment clearly shaped President Bashar Al-Assad’s thinking. In an interview with The Wall Street Journal on 31 January 2011, Assad confidently pronounced, “We have more difficult circumstances than most of the Arab countries but in spite of that Syria is stable. Why? Because you have to be very closely linked to the beliefs of the people. This is the core issue.”

Assad stubbornly underestimated Syria’s vulnerability to the region. Despite often stressing the centrality of Syria in the Arab world, the idea that the scenes in Cairo and Tunis could inspire a similar Arab awakening in Syria did not worry the young President.



When the unrest erupted in Dara’a in March and subsequently spread, Assad confidently assumed it could be managed through cosmetic reforms. In his conversations with the press, Assad often stressed that he was open to reform, as long as he could manage it on his terms.

Assad also had no qualms about using his state’s security apparatus to stifle dissent. While some analysts have tried to explain this incongruity between reform and terror as a sign of his own lack of authority, Assad has clearly drawn a line very early on how far he is willing to reform even if such reforms have failed to gain traction, and he has no interest in crossing that line.

Assad has consistently ignored calls by his Arab neighbors, the European Union, and the United States for more substantive reforms and rejected a proposal by the Arab League - whose observer mission inside the country proved to be a failure. A recent veto by Russia and China of a UN draft Security Council resolution that urged Assad to step down was described as a “travesty” by US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. She now proposes an international coalition to support Syria's opposition.

President Assad reflected in his interview with Barbara Walters in mid-December 2011, stating that if he could survive isolation once in the early years of the Iraq War and the withdrawal from Lebanon in 2005, he could do it again despite the cost. In this regard, Assad has importantly showed not just his own proclivity to put his family and sect’s interests above Syria’s own national interest, but also his own personal assessment of the situation. Even with 5,000 people killed, an increasing number of army defections, and sectarian fighting, Assad has largely stuck to his original position.

This stubborn consistency may seem illogical or irrational to the observer looking at the events in Syria. But, Assad is betting on time. With Damascus largely quiet—despite security forces wrestling with the Free Syria Army for control of Damascus’ suburbs—the President hopes that 2012 will be a year of his perseverance. Relying on the belief that a combination of fear and limited reforms will keep a majority of the population off the street, Assad hopes the uprising against his rule will eventually lose its momentum. Will this be the case?


Morocco


Calls for Jobs, not Change


Upon taking the throne in 1999, Morocco’s King Mohammed IV promised to implement reforms. After proving his credentials as a reformer he has exceeded expectations in the past year, dealing with the destabilizing influence of a protest movement and promoting measured constitutional reform.



Morocco is home to some of the greatest inequalities in income in the Arab world. So, after a year of protests demanding, among other things, an end to pitiable standards of living, the country unveiled a new mega-mall in Casablanca in December 2011 to more than a few raised eyebrows. Developers argued that the mall’s designer shops would align Morocco more closely with the developed world. Others saw the project—which is unlikely to be frequented by the average Moroccan—as a vain endeavor of a country that often appears mindless of its economic troubles.

Upon taking to the throne in 1999, Morocco’s King Mohammed IV promised to implement reforms. He has since delivered on these promises, most notably in the case of changes to the family code in 2004, which improved the status of women. In 2011, the monarch was given the opportunity to exceed his reformist tendencies. Morocco was not immune to the popular protests that swept the Middle East and North Africa following the Tunisian uprising, but King Mohammed IV reacted quickly to events.



On 20 February 2011, an estimated 37,000 Moroccans took to the streets in Rabat, Casablanca, Tangier, and Marrakech. They were demanding a new constitution that would promote democracy, end corruption, enhance economic opportunity, reform education, improve health services, and establish a state benefit system to assist with the rising cost of living. With shrewd promptness, on 9 March King Mohammed VI announced his decision to undertake a comprehensive constitutional reform aimed at improving democracy and the rule of law, with a referendum on a new constitution to be organized for 1 June.

The swift suggestion of constitutional reform initially quelled the weekly protests, and robbed the opposition movement of momentum.

However, in mid-March dozens were injured in Casablanca as Morocco witnessed a crackdown against mass demonstrations. An estimated 35,000 citizens participated across the country on 20 March, and the protests continued despite the measured response of the government. On 5 June, nearly 60,000 demonstrators took to the streets in Rabat and Casablanca, carrying a picture of a protester reportedly killed by police brutality.

On 14 April, King Mohammed VI offered a quick appeasement, pardoning or reducing the sentences of 190 political prisoners.

The King unveiled the constitutional reforms on 17 June. These were rejected by leaders of the February 20 movement, who called for a mass boycott of the referendum. The majority of Moroccans supported the proposals, which were subsequently passed—giving the prime minister and parliament more executive authority and the Berber language official status.

The King brought elections forward from the scheduled date of September 2012, and on 25 November 2011, the long-established opposition Islamist Justice and Development Party (PJD) won at the polls, with their leader Abdullah Benkirane taking the position of Prime Minister. Activists have criticized the elections as undemocratic, saying the majority of power is still in the hands of the King, who remains the military commander-in-chief and retains his position as the chair of the Council of Ministers and the Supreme Security Council. However, the results of the national referendum demonstrate that most Moroccans still hold the monarchy in high esteem and regard it as a symbol of unity for the state.

The fading influence of the protest movement was shown on 19 December 2011, when the Islamist Justice and Development Group announced their withdrawal from the continued weekly protests because of a split in the movement. Though waning, the February 20 movement continues to organize pro-reform demonstrations. There were reports of 3,500-strong gatherings in Casablanca and Rabat on 25 December.  Despite having lost some ground in recent months, Omar Radi, a prominent member of the February 20 movement, has warned that, “The movement will continue because all the reasons for the anger still exist in Morocco.”

On the whole, Moroccans are satisfied by the changes they have witnessed so far—they are also glad to have avoided the bloodshed seen elsewhere in Arab World over the last year. Morocco’s transitions have passed with relative smoothness due to the King’s quick call to action.


Bahrain


Regime Support from the People


Events of last February and March led to severe sectarian tensions in Bahrain as well as economic downturn. Since, the country has witnessed tangible progress in all fields especially politically and legally. The political leadership has embarked on action to restore social cohesion between all society’s elements through building confidence between the government and a group represented by mainly Shiite political powers and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).



Bahrain’s uprising in which some Shiites were involved, due to legitimate social and political reasons have been quickly misrepresented by those with external loyalties (i.e. Iran), who have transformed the people’s demands to sectarian calls which threaten the unity of the state and its social fabric as well.

Al-Wefaq National Islamic Society, which has been the most prominent Shiite party in such events, has contributed to the protest movement. It has managed, despite of being criticized for using sectarianism in its march, to become the biggest political winner, even if this means losing the Sunni component and moderate Shiites, due to mixing between popular and sectarian demands.

The Bahraini King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa has formed an independent international committee to investigate into the events, their consequences and solutions, and accepted all its findings.

The king has also established another neutral and independent committee including respected figures from the government, political parties and NGOs to implement the recommendations of the independent committee. He announced that there would be constitutional amendments to expand the powers of the Bahraini Council of Representatives on the account of the executive body, and to free the judiciary from governmental restrictions in order to oversee the application of law, investigate into human rights violations, and form a committee to compensate the victims of the events.

On the other side, Bahrain’s economy is based on providing services. Thus, many world-famous banking and financial corporations have dwelt there, as a result of economic liberation and high profitability. Due to the recent events, the country has lost many investments of the private sector because of fears of financial instability in the future. However, after restoring stability, the confidence has returned as well as the investments.

Bahrain’s economy will be affected if it does not become more open to the world, and attract foreign investments which could activate the state’s economy, productivity, labor, employment and all parts of the economic integral cycle during such significant regional changes.

Notably, the government has adopted a policy of forgiving the participants and detainees of the events, decided to return the dismissed people to their work, and agreed on a roadmap between the government and the opposition addressing the country’s social, economic and political issues. This policy targets relieving the political and sectarian congestion, regaining confidence between government and opposition in order to go ahead towards the future, completing the national reform charter, and restoring social cohesion to put an end to sectarian calls.
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