The impending sale of billions of dollars of additional US weapons to Saudi Arabia, if realized, could achieve a major improvement in Saudi military capabilities. Although such weapons transfers have multiple motives, they would increase Saudi Arabia’s chances in a hypothetical conflict with Iran. More plausibly, the sale would allow Saudi Arabia to balance Iran’s military might.
The US Defense Department has not yet officially announced the details of this proposed arms sales package. According to the available public information, half of the $60 billion package will likely comprise new military hardware, while the other $30 billion will probably consist of upgrades to Saudi Arabia’s existing weapons, as well as comprise various support costs such as for training and logistics. The main items of the hardware package would likely include: 84 new Boeing F-15 combat aircraft; upgrades to 70 existing Saudi F-15S strike aircraft; 60 new AH-64D Longbow Apache attack helicopters and upgrades to Saudi Arabia’s 12 existing AH-64As; 72 additional UH-60 Black Hawk utility helicopters; upgrades to the existing 96 Patriot Advanced Capacity-2 air and missile defense systems; and helicopter-carrying patrol boats and other naval weapons.
The $60 billion figure is misleading in that the number is simply an authorized aggregate ceiling of the value of all the possible systems and related defense items Saudi Arabia can potentially buy from the United States. The actual volume of purchases is likely to be lower, perhaps by a considerable amount. In addition, the specific transactions (which typically detail the financial terms, the appropriate support packages, and other details) will probably take years to negotiate and implement given prudential Saudi financing due to the volatility of world oil prices and the country’s limited absorption capacity. This means the annual sales totals could plausibly amount to a few billion dollars each year.
Saudi Arabia already owns many of these weapons, so the sales would simply expand their number rather than provide the country with revolutionary new capabilities. That said, the sheer size of the deal would achieve a significant improvement in Saudi capabilities. The systems under consideration would complement Saudi Arabia’s existing panoply of American- and European-made weapons.
These advanced systems would help Saudi forces respond to air, sea and ground threats from Iran as well as possible contingencies in Yemen or other nearby countries where Iran and its local allies might engage in military or terrorist operations. For example, the Saudi Arabian air force would be better able to defend the country’s airspace from intrusions from the Iranian Air Force, whose top-of-the-line MiG-29s are equivalent, on paper, to F-15s. The new planes and helicopters would also help protect offshore oil facilities and oil tankers from potential naval threats. In addition, the air and missile defense systems would also provide some protection against Iranian cruise and ballistic missile strikes. Furthermore, the naval weapons would also help negate Iran’s emerging submarine warfare capabilities.
Although the most plausible threats are in the domains of land and sea, last year, Saudi forces fought against Houthi rebels in Yemen along their joint border. The Black Hawk helicopters would be especially useful here because they provide strategic mobility for Saudi Arabia’s limited number of ground forces, who must cover a large land area and a lengthy defense perimeter. Saudi Arabia’s territory covers 2,150,000 square kilometers. It has short land boundaries with Qatar and Kuwait, a lengthy one with Yemen, as well as medium-length ones with Iraq, Jordan, Oman and the United Arab Emirates. The Saudi military must also defend some 2,600 kilometers of coastline adjoining the Persian Gulf and Red Sea.
The Apache helicopters and F-15S strike planes would also provide close air support of ground border conflicts. In some cases, the strike planes could contribute to interwar deterrence and preemption, threatening or actually attacking Iranian missiles and planes stationed in Iran before they could be used. More direct US military support would probably be required to neutralize all Iran’s air and missile systems. It would also prove important for deterring any Iranian escalation to the use of nuclear or chemical weapons.
The United States could take other steps to strengthen Saudi Arabia’s military capabilities. The two countries can continue their robust joint training and exercise program, which has included such recent exercises as Green Flag 2010, Friendship One 2009 and Bright Star 2009. These exercises could rehearse a broader range of skills, last for longer periods, or expand to include additional countries. Improving the level of “jointness” among the different branches of the Saudi military as well as between Saudi forces and allied countries is essential for maximizing the benefits of the new weapons.
Additional supporting measures would include establishing a strong strategic partnership with Iraq, reducing tensions between Israel and its Arab neighbors, and continuing to make an effort to avert an Iranian nuclear weapons program through diplomacy as well as military preparations.
No matter how strong the Saudi military becomes, any war in the Gulf—with its potentially large loss of life and damage to a vital region of the world economy—is best avoided.
Richard Weitz – Senior Fellow and Director, Center for Political-Military Analysis at the Hudson Institute, Washington DC.
