Of the many wild cards that emerged from the US’s invasion of Iraq, perhaps none was more underestimated than that of Muqtada al-Sadr. The anti-American cleric and head of the Mahdi army has risen as one of the most important Shiite leaders in the country’s modern history. Since appearing under the limelight, al-Sadr has developed a reputation for being young, impetuous, violent and even simple-minded. Yet, al-Sadr has also been recognized as powerful in his ability to muster support for his brand of Shia opposition.
In a country where Shiite religious leaders are usually more respected the older they are, al-Sadr’s influence as a young cleric was largely inexplicable (at least to those who are unaware of the importance family ties plays in Iraqi politics). However, his cunning abilities and understanding of the drivers of politics in Iraq have allowed him to gather substantial support from a specific sector of the Iraqi population: poor, urban, and for the most part young Shias are the main supporters of his movement. Al-Sadr’s mixture of Iraqi nationalism and Shia radicalism, more specifically, have contributed in making him an important leader for Iraq’s Shia Muslims, despite his age.
In fact, Muqtada al-Sadr has made a name for himself by branding his politics as the main opposition to US and coalition forces, thus playing on the anti-American nationalist sentiment that arose not only in Iraq but throughout much of the Middle East as a result of the US-led invasion. Moreover, al-Sadr has opposed, with significant gusto, rival Shia forces within the country.
Yet the wunderkind of Iraqi politics also surpassed another important obstacle in the way of his influence; his comparatively low religious rank. Recognizing the importance of cultivating his religious gravitas, in late 2007 Muqtada announced his plans to attend seminary in the Iranian city of Qom. This led to his disappearance from public life for over one year and has raised important questions about Iran’s influence over his political intentions.
All in all, Muqtada’s personality is mysterious, and his political stance is not much different. At times he has called for a national rebellion against foreign troops and at others he has sent his army to confront the Iraqi police. He has been known to compromise and to fight, leading observers to believe that his political priority is to advance his position on the Iraqi stage by any means necessary—rendering Machiavellian in his unpredictability.
However, in his sermons and public interviews al-Sadr has been easier to pigeonhole. He consistently maintains the anti-American and Shia nationalist rhetoric that bolsters his movement. Since his ascendance in Iraqi politics, his demands have ranged from the withdrawal of American-led coalition forces and UN troops, to the establishment of a new Iraqi government with no links to the Baath party. He also called for a Shia government much like that of Iran—while always maintaining its independence from Iran.
Although Muqtada al-Sadr’s ability to garner support from poor Shia’s in Iraq is due to his ability to create a discourse that includes both nationalist and Shia ideology as its fundamental pillars, it is unlikely that he would have risen to power had his background been different. His family lineage is widely accredited with having played an important role in initiating support for his movement.
Al-Sadr is the son of the late Grand Ayatollah Mohammad Mohammad Sadeq al-Sadr, and the son-in-law of Grand Ayatollah Mohammad Baqir As-Sadr. Muqtada’s father was among the most powerful Shiite clerics in Iraq in the late 1990s. In addition, one of his father’s distant cousins, Ayatollah Mohammed Baqur al Sadr, was also leading Shiite activist. The Council on Foreign Relations explained that ‘Both men are credited with shaping contemporary Shiite thought and opposition to Baghdad based regimes’ and Muqtada undoubtedly built upon this family legacy.
Both Muqtada’s father and father-in-law were killed under orders of Saddam Hussein, and Muqtada has integrated their deaths in a narrative of martyrdom that fits particularly well with Shia history. Irish journalist Patrick Cockburn reiterated this point in his biography of al-Sadr when he stated that ‘Muqtada and his followers are intensely religious and see themselves as following in the tradition of martyrdom in opposition to tyranny established when Hussein and Abbas were killed by the Umayyads on the plains of Kerbala 1,400 years ago.’ While this narrative of martyrdom has had an important effect in making Muqtada al-Sadr appealing to a large number of Shiites in the country, his inheritance of a network of schools and charities built by his family have also won him a number of supporters.
Muqtada has been able to build on the social network of his family so as to engage with street politics in a what has been described as a Hezbollah-like approach—a tactic which proved successful in the December 2005 elections which won his movement 32 of the 275 seats in parliament. Vali Nasr argued that this event turned Sadr into a ‘Kingmaker’ and ‘played an important role in elevating al-Maliki to the post of Prime Minister.’
Despite the fact that Muqtada’s movement has expanded from a street force and now represents one of the two most important Shia blocs in the country, his hold on power is questionable. For one, the movement’s revenue system is weak and inconsistent, ‘with cash believed to be coming in from criminal enterprises including petroleum smuggling, theft and cash-for-services including armed protection of merchants and business’ reported Greg Bruno. Mahdi fighters have allegedly opposed his support of the political system. Further, his base of support appears to be weakening because of the rogue actions of the Mahdi army, and the detrimental impact they have had on the civilian population.
Perhaps more telling of al-Sadr’s awkward position in Iraqi politics has been his sudden disappearance from public life - although Time reported his short-lived reappearance in Ankara a few months ago where he discussed the state of Iraq with Turkish leaders. His followers have been as quiet as he has with regards to the certainty of his plans in the upcoming months. While his studies in Qom could give him the increased religious authority that his movement needs for a second wind, his questionable intellectual rigor, and his preoccupation with Iraqi politics might lead him to cut his religious education short. In either case it is unlikely that the world, US officials in particular, will again underestimate his potential to destabilize Iraq. For he still maintains two important sectors of support: his army and a sizeable bloc of loyalists in parliament.
