The reactions and issues that were raised, within the United States and beyond, regarding Obama’s decision of sending 30,000 additional troops to Afghanistan revealed the complexity of the assessment the US Administration faced. Several variables played into the decision, first and foremost the financial issues for such a costly war and whether or not NATO allies would also contribute with more troops. Several concerns in the ground also had to be evaluated, such as the prospects of Karzai’s government “new face” being really new, and whether or not it can be expected that Pakistan is more serious than ever in doing its part of the job. Among all these variables, and implicit in the strategy that comes along with adding more troops to the surge, is the central issue of diplomatic engagement with the Taliban. This possibility has been the main topic for debate in the US about Afghanistan, and rightly so. The main question is whether it is achievable, and how.
The increase in troop numbers is not recognition by the Obama Administration that there should be no negotiations with the Taliban. It is however an implicit acknowledgment that, in order to talk with the Taliban, there is a need to break them first. Or at least, to use the phrase that is now being coined, to “break their momentum.” Indeed, as Mullah Omar has repeatedly affirmed, the Taliban will never negotiate. At least they won’t while they think they can win. Thus, there is the need to put real pressure on the Taliban and make them suffer several strategic setbacks for the Taliban to even consider the possibility of sitting at the table.
Several concerns were expressed regarding the 2011 deadline set out by Obama. Critics argued that it will embolden the Taliban and convince them that they just need patience because the US will soon be gone. These critiques are misplaced. The deadline sends the message that the United States will not stay in Afghanistan forever in the present conditions as the main military and security force fighting the Taliban. The Afghan military and policy forces are being trained to gradually take over from the US and NATO allies, but the deadline makes the point that this transition cannot take a decade. It also sends a very explicit warning to the Afghan government and places pressure on Karzai who, after a rigged election, has been trying to pass the image that from now on things will be different, in particular regarding the levels of corruption and the issue accountability (or lack thereof).
It soon became clear after Obama’s announcement that the deadline was more symbolic than anything else. If there are any doubts that this date is a political move rather than a defined military strategy, these were dissipated by the declarations by Gates and Clinton following Obama’s announcement. In CBS’s Face the Nation, both the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense were clear that 2011 is the date set to begin the transfer of responsibilities to the Afghans. This is dependent on the “conditions on the ground”, and the decision of whether or not to start sending troops home will ultimately depend on the assessment by the US military commanders in the field. Gates added that 2011 is a tentative date “to change the nature of the relationship” with the Afghan forces, but he was also clear that the US “will not abandon Afghanistan as we did in 1989”, once the soviets withdrew.
Thus, with the 30,000 US reinforcements plus at least 5,000 from NATO allies, the whole allied force will comprise more than 140,000 troops. In addition, there are roughly 95,000 Afghan army troops, an equal number of Afghan police members, and there are plans to expand both the Afghan army and police forces. These numbers, at least according to the calculations of the commanders in the field, should be enough to decisively change the course of the war. Moreover, an Iraqi-style strategy prepared according to the specific circumstances of Afghanistan, as the Petraeus counter insurgency field manual advises, is being designed. It consists in placing armed groups trained by NATO under government supervision. Their main goal would be the protection of their communities from the Taliban.
It is already consensual that an ultimate defeat of the Taliban is unrealistic. It’s too big a country with too adverse a geography to make such an achievement likely. Though a good case can be made that there is a difference between the Afghan and the Pakistani Taliban, especially when considering leadership and goals, in these circumstances it might not be a useful distinction. The Afghan Taliban easily move into Pakistan through the countries’ porous borders. The fact that Mullah Omar operates from Quetta in Pakistan explains it all. And all this justifies the need to negotiate. This number of forces, plus an increase in the quality and reliability of Afghan police and military, should be enough to pressure the Taliban and convince them that they have no other option but to sit at the negotiating table.
