Although 27 months in the lifespan of most states or governments do not mean much, this is not the case for the Islamic resistance movement’s (Hamas) rule of Gaza Strip, since its famous coup against Fatah forces and its subsequent full control of Gaza in June 14, 2007. Since then, the movement has witnessed three stages and swings, which started with resistance alone and then slid into an intermarriage between power and resistance, and it is about to conclude by combining "power, settlement and resistance."
The keenness of Hamas to combine power and resistance is now threatened by the political game limitations that end ultimately with political negotiations to reach a settlement. Hamas was armed with a landslide victory in the January 2006 elections which gave it approximately 60% of the seats of the Palestinian parliament. The movement also denied that its action was a "coup", but rather an "abortion" of a coup set by the United States in favour of Fatah, a fact that was confirmed by the American "Vanity Fair" Magazine in its April 2008 issue, with documents.
It is true that while Hamas was keen to combine power and resistance in the past two years, it also sought not to relinquish firm beliefs and concepts that pertain to fundamentals of the conflict, and assert the right of resistance. But the fall of Gaza under a tough Israeli siege and successive attacks, imposed a kind of compulsory "truce" on Hamas.
But this truce in turn created internal and external challenges to Hamas, including a clash with the rest of the resistance branches in Gaza, to prevent them from violating the political truce agreement with the enemy. This resulted in clashes, especially with the Salafi resistance movements, such as the "Jund al-Ansar Allah" group and "Army of Islam" group. The clashes killed hundreds of people and defamed the movement's image and made it appear like a repressive authority which defends truce with the occupation at the expense of the lives of Gazans, regardless of the flaws of these Salafi movements.
Moreover, the stifling siege and the Arab and international pressure forced Hamas to cling to whatever political support they had available, including contacts with Europeans and Americans. Although the West's offer to engage with Hamas is an old American strategy that was followed by Fatah and Arafat to "soften up" the resistance, Hamas considers this approach- implemented after the failure of the January 2009 aggression to destroy the movement's infrastructure- to be different in their case.
The movement was kept strong and resilient after more than two years of a tight Israeli blockade, military operations and international pressure. It was not forced to surrender or sought to enter into dishonest negotiations. This prompted the West - not the movement - to engage in a series of meetings with the political leaders of Hamas.
It is true that the western-American intentions would seem evil, and seek to manipulate the movement politically. The same approach was applied by Fatah by involving Hamas in political work, and pushing it gradually to abandon armed activity. But the behaviour of Hamas leaders asserts their awareness of these Western goals, and their keenness to combine power and settlement along with resistance, as the movement enters its third year in Gaza.
The Western approaches towards Hamas have gradually developed since it won the January 2006 elections. They first tried to drag it to a political settlement with Israel - under the guise of Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas – and then forcing an economic blockade on it and stifling its funding, hoping that the Gazans would revolt against it or the movement would renounce power. The plans even included trying to oust the movement through the famous American scheme of Dahlan.
When all these western plans failed, they tried the policy of blockade and pressure. And finally they resorted to using the Israeli military force, during the last January aggression - to end the rule of Hamas. However, all these plans have not succeeded, but on the contrary they increased the movement's strength, which stood firm despite the Zionist war crimes in Gaza.
There is no doubt that this perseverance - although the people of Gaza paid a heavy price for it with their blood and the deterioration of their living - was behind the West's change of its strategy from the "stick" to "carrot". This strategy is based on the engagement with Hamas, and European and American officials met directly and indirectly with the movement to lure it into the trap of political settlement. The aim was to push the movement to change its policy and engage in the political process along with the Palestinian Authority.
But so far, all these developments - including the intrusion of Western political relationship with Hamas - have increased Hamas' political strength and made it a tough party that can not be bypassed in any equation or subject related to the Palestinian cause.
The problem is that these Hamas-Western meetings have conflicting objectives relating to the European endeavour - through the stick and the carrot - to involve the movement in the political process alongside the Palestinian Authority in Ramallah, while Hamas has different goals. Therefore, the main dispute between the two parties is the duality of resistance and settlement, which is rejected by the West and insisted upon by Hamas.
However, the practical reality indicates a de facto freezing by Hamas of the resistance option in the future during these negotiations which seek a settlement. This settlement targets the exchange of prisoners, opening of crossings, or re-drafting a truce agreement that Hamas needs in the coming phase. This truce would enable the movement to provide materials for the reconstruction of Gaza, and improve the conditions of the people to revitalise the movement's popularity at a time when the Palestinian presidential and parliamentary elections are approaching next year.
The equation of Hamas in its first year of rule in Gaza was thus limited to the resistance only, an element for which the movement fought to keep it going. With the movement entering its second year in power, Hamas was forced to combine power and resistance. But with the third year, and after all the attempts to exclude it through blockade, coup, or military invasion failed- the movement is forced to combine resistance, power and settlement together amid fears of its supporters that the Western luring succeeds with the movement like it did with Fatah. However, the movement leaders stress that they are aware of this scheme.
Muhammed Gamal Arafa
– Egyptian Political Analyst
