After the end the Cold War and in the early 1990s, Western misunderstanding of Russia’s political culture placed high hopes of a democratic Russia more open to Western ideas. When Russia’s Federation President Boris Yeltsin resigned from office in December 1999, those hopes were shattered by Yeltsin’s appointment of Vladimir Putin, at the time Russia’s Prime Minister, as acting President. Elected for his first term in March 2000, and re-elected on March 14 for a second term, Putin’s rule and actions soon resembled that of a Tsar of modern times.
His successor, Dmitry Medvedev, looked very much the best solution for Putin to remain in control of Russian politics, since the former was very close to the latter. Expressions such as “Dmitry Putin” or “Vladimir Medvedev” were used to describe what would certainly be the continuation of Putin’s politics under a new face. Moreover, Putin stood down from the Presidency, but not from high politics. Indeed, changing from President to Prime Minister in a political system where the executive power is split between President and Prime Minister did not seem a big concession from Putin. On the contrary, it was the confirmation of a political system centered on a single person.
Medvedev was educated as a lawyer in St Petersburg, where he lectured in Leningrad State University and earned a PhD in private law. It was in the ancient capital of the Russian Empire that he initiated his professional connection to Putin. When the latter was appointed as head of the Committee for External Relations of St Petersburg Mayor’s Office, he hired the former to serve in his external affairs team. In 1999, Medvedev served as the Kremlin’s deputy chief of staff, before heading Putin’s election campaign in 2000. Appointed chairman of Russia’s state gas giant, Gazprom, in 2002, he was Putin’s chief of staff in 2003 and First Deputy Prime Minister in 2005. In all these positions that Medvedev occupied, he never gained the fame of a reformist, neither did he confirm his credentials as having a more liberal leaning than Putin. Instead, it is widely acknowledged that Medvedev was simply a fan of stability and of continuing the status quo.
When Putin was barred from a third consecutive term as President of the Russia Federation by the Russian Constitution, Medvedev was one of the natural and one of Putin’s favourite candidates to occupy his place. Medvedev was first flagged as Putin’s likely successor in November 2005, when he was entrusted with billions of dollars to pursue his activities as Deputy Prime Minister. In fact, Putin played a very important role in Medvedev’s presidential campaign, including featuring together with Medvedev in a poster alongside the slogan “Together we will win”.
After a landslide victory, it was time for the new president to appoint his staff. Medvedev made very few independent appointments, and most of his staff served under Putin, including the chief of staff, Sergei Naryshkin. This continuity with the Putin era, together with the support from the former President, and considering the 17 years of close professional and political collaboration between Putin and Medvedev, all contributed to the idea that Medvedev would be a sort of instrument for Putin in his continuous enterprise of dominating Russia’s political system.
In his first state-of-the-nation address, Medvedev seemed to confirm these credentials. In fact, he even sounded more cold and uttering a more aggressive rhetoric towards the West than his predecessor. In this speech, Medvedev said that the two main events of the year have been the war in Georgia and the world economic crisis. And “America is responsible for both”, he said. Particularly regarding the economic crisis, this was a result of America’s “arrogance and selfishness”, factors which undermined the global financial markets, according to Medvedev’s words.
In spite of all this, there is some ground to suspect that Medvedev might have worked on his relationship with Putin to get where he has, but once there, he will make his own way and escape from Putin’s political and ideological shadow. First of all, Dmitry Medvedev is the first leader since the Soviet Union faded away to have no official links to the former Soviet Communist party or the KGB. Not only more liberal than Putin, he is described as much more cosmopolitan and apparently more open minded to the outside world.
Very soon after being elected, a handful of declarations by Medvedev raised many questions on whether Putin’s disciple had played his part until being elected only to follow his own path and distance himself from his master. Among those there were talks of the importance of civil and economic freedoms, pledges to strengthen the independence of the judiciary and roll back state interference in the economy – after years in which government-controlled companies have expanded their influence. The President also argued for the importance of a free press, saying very simplistically in this context that “freedom is better than no freedom”. This constituted a significant break from what Russia had been used to with Putin in charge.
The issue of the independence of the judiciary in particular is a critical matter in Russia, and it could be seen as a threatening development for the old political establishment. Consider for example Putin’s fortune, estimated as 40 billion dollars, and what a fairly independent negotiation could disclose regarding the dubious sources of such fortune.
From early on in his mandate, Medvedev also seemed decided to tackle the excessive bureaucracy in the Russian state machinery. This bureaucracy was deemed responsible for huge levels of corruption, and exacerbated the state’s meddling in private business issues in Russia. About the problem of excessive bureaucracy and all its consequences he said the following: “it frightens business so that it doesn’t do the wrong thing, controls the media so that they don’t say the wrong thing and interferes in elections so that voters don’t back the wrong person.” These kinds of thoughts and declarations raise many questions about who is the real man heading Russia.
Being elected as President, however, did not guaranteed Medvedev a safe haven free of Putin’s political clout. In fact, Medvedev cannot break politically from Putin in an abrupt or radical way. First of all, many of the voters that chose Medvedev did so because they saw in him the continuation of Putin’s politics that brought stability and saved Russia from economic meltdown after Yeltsin’s presidency. A radical break instead of a gradual one from Putin’s political orientations would undermine his base of support with the Russian people. Furthermore, Putin also works as Medvedev’s protection card against the old Kremlin hard-liners who did not and do not appreciate Medvedev’s more liberal stance.
In terms of foreign policy, it is hard to tell what the recent improvement of relations between Russia and the US is due to. Is it directly related to a different approach brought about with the election of Medvedev and his more cooperative inclinations when compared with Putin, or to the fact that Bush’s provocative and insensitive foreign policy towards Russia is gone, or to Obama’s election and his fresh approach centered on dialogue, or a mix of all these and some other reasons?
After a first meeting between Hillary Clinton and Sergei Lavrov, where both parties demonstrated strong will to “erase” the recent past where the relations between the two powers is concerned, Medvedev met Obama on July 6, in order to discuss issues such as management of nuclear arsenals, non-proliferation concerns and the matters of North Korea and Iran’s nuclear programs, military co-operation, the US problem with Afghanistan, and the threat of terrorism. In spite of some inevitable differences of opinion, much progress was achieved, including an important transit agreement for US efforts in Afghanistan. Such improvements would seem quite unrealistic with Putin as President.
The apparent ambiguity of Medvedev’s position in Russia’s political system and regarding his loyalty to Putin and Putin’s ideas was reinforced with his proposal regarding the Russia presidential term. This idea, which originated with Putin, was to extend the presidential term from four to six years. This change was implemented in late 2008, to be effective after the 2012 presidential election takes place. Many argue that the main beneficiary of this constitutional change is Putin himself. In fact, if Putin runs again for president once Medvedev’s mandate is over, an election he is likely to win, he then would stay in power for 12 years.
After the financial crisis, with the Russian economy threatening to keep contracting, with growing inflation, together with the sliding of the price of oil and with Europe’s search for new alternatives for energy sources, and the continuous devaluation of the ruble, plus Russia’s increasing dependency on imports and foreign investments, Medvedev’s more liberal leanings and character might have their window of opportunity. However, one thing seems certain, if change comes in Russia with Medvedev, it will come only very slowly.
